AN

ENGLISH TRANSLATION,

WITH THE

SANSKRIT TEXT,

OF THE

TATTVA-KAUMUDÎ

(SÂNKHYA)

OF

VÂCHASPATI MIŚRA,

BY

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PREFACE.

T R the little we know of Vâchaspati Miśra the reader rred to the Sanskrit Introduction ; wherein it is shown ıe was a Maithila Brâhmana and flourished somewhere the 9th Century. A. D. For Udayanâchârya the author "Parisuddi" on Vâchaspati Miśra's "Tâtparya-Tikâ," shed in the reign of king Lakshmana Sen of Bengal,—of era we have just commenced the 8th century ; and at a century must have elapsed before a work could re the honor of a commentary at the hands of anâchârya.

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ke this opportunity to thank my friend Balu Govinda-a of Benares, to whom I owe more than I can express,—has been chiefly instrumental in my undertaking and ng—not only of the present translation, but also of the apprakâsa and the Nyâya—Muktâvali, and some works on nsâ. My thanks are also due to Tookaram Tatya Esq. mbay for his publication of the work, and also to the ietors of the "Theosophist" of Madras for allowing a ıt of the translation which first appeared in the columns ıt excellent journal.

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} GANGÂNÂTHA JHÂ.

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ERRATA.

P. 26	Line	3 *for*	"unction"	(in rhetoric)	*read*	"taste"
"	"	" 12 "	"	"	"	"

P. 56 to the left of line 18—*read* "(126)."

INTRODUCTION.

The lucid writing of Vâchaspati Miśra does not stand in need of much in the shape of an Introduction. But under the cover of this title, I propose to give a brief synopsis of the cardinal doctrines of the Sânkhya Philosophy, in the hope that a reading of this *resume* would prepare the mind of the student for the reception of the abstruse truths, in which the Tattvakaumudi abounds. Any corrections or suggestions for alteration &c., will be most gratefully received.

To begin with, the Sânkhya lays down a fourfold division of categories based on their respective causal and productive efficiency. This division is into—(1) Productive—(2) Productive and—Produced—(3) Produced—(4) Neither Productive—nor—Produced. This classification includes all the twenty-five Principles—called Tattwas,—Prakriti or Nature being the productive, since the Sânkhyas allow of no other purely productive agency. The Productive—and—Produced are the other Principles—Buddhi &c. These partake of the nature of both—thus Buddhi is *productive* in as much as out of it evolves Ahankâra and it is *produced* in as much as it itself evolves out of Prakriti. The purely non-productive Principles are the eleven sense-organs and the five elements. These are purely *non-productive* because none of these can give birth to a substance essentially different from them. The Purusha (Spirit) is *neither productive nor produced.* In fact it is without attributes. All accessories are the effects of the three Gunas, and the Spirit isby its very nature free from these and as such without any accessories.

Having thus classified the various principles, we now turn to the consideration of the various principles separately.

First of all then we must examine the nature of the all-powerful creative agent of the Sânkhyas or, more properly, the creative force of the Universe. Then first of all—how is this force constituted? It is naturally made up of the three

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Gunas—Sattwa, Rajas, and Tamas; and when the Pradhâna is in its natural state, lying dormant, these three attributes are in an equilibrium. When occasion presents itself *i. e.* when the Adrishta of the soul acts upon the Prâdhana, the equilibrium is disturbed, and it is this disturbance that gives rise to the various kinds of creations. The diversity of created objects is thus rendered quite explicable. As already mentioned, all accessories are due to the predominance of one or other of the three Gunas—the predominance of Sattwa giving rise to the kind of creation in which that attribute predominates, and so forth. Without proceeding any further, we must stop to consider the nature and properties and the *Modus operandi* of these Gunas.

The three attributes—Sattwa, Rajas and Tamas have respectively the character of Happiness, Unhappiness and Delusion; and have their operations characterised respectively by enlightenment, activity and restraint; and are so constituted that the one always operates in suppression of the other, and at the same time depending upon this latter. To explain this contrariety of properties—The universe would be in an unceasing round of activity, if the only operating force were the Rajas; in order to provide against this, Nature provides herself with a restraining agency in the shape of the Tamoguṇa which by its nature is dull and passive. The natures of the different objects of the universe are thus ascertained in accordance with the excess of one or the other of these attributes. Again, if there were no enlightening agency in the shape of Sattwa, Nature would be nothing better than a mass of blind force acting in a haphazard manner. Thus we have established the necessity of the three Attributes.

Here an objector comes forward and says—How can the attributes, endowed as they are with mutually counteracting properties, cöoperate and bring about such a grand and stupendous structure as our Universe? The reply is that it is a very common fact that two or more substances though mutually contradictory, do cöoperate towards a single end—*e. g.* the wick

and the oil—both taken separately are as much against the action of one another as towards fire, but when they are together they help to brighten the fire. In the same manner, though the Gunas are mutually counteractive, yet when combined, they act towards a single end, supplying each other's deficiencies.

The necessity of postulating three different forces is further supported by another reason. We see that in nature there are three distinct properties—of pleasure, pain and dulness. All other properties are reducible to these three heads. Again we find that these are properties so much opposed to one another that all could never be the effect of a single agency. Thus then we must postulate three different forces or constituent elements of Nature, to which severally we could trace the three distinct properties. To these three constituents of Nature we give the names—Sattwa, Rajas and Tamas. We find in the universe the above three properties, and as all the properties of the effect must be a direct resultant of a like property in its cause, so we at once arrive at the conclusion that the cause of the Universe—the Pradhâna—must be endowed with the three Attributes.

So much for the action of the Gunas. We must now turn our attention towards the all-important Prakriti—the Key-stone of the Sankhya Philosophy.

What, then, is this Prakriti? Does it stand for the Theistic God? Or for the Bauddha "Sensations"? Or does it correspond to the Vedantic "Mâyâ"? To all this we reply—It is all these, and It is neither of these. It resembles the Vedantic Mâyâ in asmuch as it is the one root of the Universe, which is asserted of *Mâyâ* also though, as of an illussory world. But the fact of its being the root of the Universe is akin to that of the Sankhya-Prakriti. It is not the God. Since it is said to be without intelligence, a mere dead Matter equipped with certain potentialities due to the Gunas. In short, Prakriti is the one rootless Root of the Universe (objective as well as subjective)—endowed with the three Gunas and evolv-

ing through these, every kind of existence—save of course, the Purusha—Spirit.

The next point that we have to consider is—How do the Sankhyas prove the existence, the rootlessness, and eternality of this Prakriti? Is it necessary to postulate such a rootless root itself unmanifested and yet manifesting all objective and subjective existence? Proofs of this are given at length in all works on the Sankhya Philosophy, and it will not be altogether out of place here to briefly sum them up. But before we take up this, it is necessary to explain the Sankhya doctrine of *causality*, the point on which rests the whole fabric of Prakriti. What then is the cause and how is it related to the effect? Cause is defined as a substance in which the effect subsists in a latent form. Thus then the effect must be said to be eternally existent—primarily in a latent condition, in the cause, and latterly manifesting itself and then commonly recognized as the effect. How to prove that the effect has been lying latent in the cause and has not been newly produced by the cause?

Firstly.—What is nonentity can never be made an entity—That is to say—that which has never existed can never be brought into existence. What remains to be done by the operation of the cause is the manifestation of the effect—that is to say, its manifestation as the effect of the particular cause. And this kind of manifestation we find in the production of oil from the different oil-seeds wherein it has been hitherto lying latent.

Secondly.—We always find that the effect is always in one way or the other related to the cause. Now, this relation would not be possible if the effect were a nonentity; for certainly a nonentity can have no relations. If the relation of the effect with the cause were not necessary then every effect would be possible from every cause. Since in that case there would be no restrictive qualification which would confine the operation of particular causes to particular effects. Thus then this would lead to an absurdity.

Thirdly.—we cannot deny causal efficiency. Now what does this efficiency consist in? It cannot be anything other than the existence in the cause of the effect in a latent condition. For the difference of seeds, as cause of oil, from sand, lies merely in the fact that it is only in the seeds and not in the sand, that the oil subsists.

Fourthly.—the effect is non-different from the cause; and the latter being a entity, the latter must be so also. To take an example, the cloth is non-different from the threads composing it. Because it is neither heavier than the latter, nor is any other relation than that of inherence possible between the two; and it is only between two different things that any other relation as that of conjunction &c., is possible. Nor can the cloth ever exist apart from the threads. The difference of properties and actions cannot establish any difference. For though a single thread cannot do the action of cloth, yet this latter is nothing more than a collection of threads; and we see that what a single man cannot do, can be done very well by a number of them together; *e. g.* a single man cannot carry a palanquin, which work can be very well performed by a number of men together. Thus then we see that the effect is nothing more than the developed cause; and the latter again is merely an undeveloped effect. This identity of cause and effect is declared by Sir William Hamilton also, who says—"when we are aware of something which begins to be, we are by the necessity of our intelligence, constrained to believe that it has a cause. But what does the expression, *that it has a cause*, signify? If we analyse our thought, we shall find that it simply means, that as we cannot conceive any new existence to commence, therefore, all that now is seen to arise under a new appearance had previously an existence under a prior form. We are utterly unable to realise in thought the possibility of the complement of existence either increased or diminished. We are unable on the one hand, to conceive nothing becoming something—or on the other something becoming nothing . . . . . .

There is thus conceived an absolute tautology between the effect and its causes. We think the causes to contain all that is contained in the effect; the effect to contain nothing which was not contained in the causes."
—*Lectures on Metaphysics*—XXXIX.

Having thus proved the existence of the effect in the cause, the Sânkhyas employ the fact in proving the existence of their Pradhâna. The effect being only a developed cause, in which it has been lying latent, all existence must have its unmanifested condition in its cause. That is to say, the elements lie in Self-Consciousness, which lies in Buddhi. Now if we go on increasing the series we would be landed in a *regressus ad infinitum.* In order to avoid this we must postulate the existence of a principle which must be uncaused and which must be the final substrate of the undeveloped state of all other substances. Thus then we have a causeless cause which must be by its very nature unmanifested, the final cause of all;—and to this the Sankhyas give the names "Pradhâna," "Prakriti" or "Avyakta."

Secondly we find that all the substances—from Buddhi downwards—are limited and are the development of some further ultimate Principle—and this is Pradhâna.

Having thus proved the Existence of Pradhana we must define its properties as well as those of its Effects; and see wherein lies the difference.

In order to do this we must first consider the properties of the Manifested Principles—the effects of Pradhâna. These are *caused* and as a necessary consequence of this—*transitory*, *limited*, *mobile*, *many*, *dependent* (on the activity of the Pradhâna), *made up of parts*; these are the characteristics where the Pradhâna differs from the Manifested Principles, Buddhi and the rest. For, as already explained, the Pradhâna is the *uncaused* root of the Universe, and as such, must be *eternal*. And as all Universe is the result of Its

evolution, It must be *all-pervading*; as a necessary consequence of this it is immoveable *i. e.* Cannot *more*, in the sense of going from one place to another. And further, since it is, all-pervading it must be *one*. It is *independent*—depending only on the activity of its own constituent Gunas.

These are the points difference. Those of agreement are, that the Pradhâna as well as the manifested principles are the resultants of the various actions of the three Gunas. Secondly, since without intelligence, both must be without discrimination, since discrimination is the result of intelligence. Thirdly both these present objects for the enjoyment of the Spirit. Fourthly since they are without intelligence, they can never be the observers, they must always remain the observed, and as such *common*. This is technical and requires some explanation. Every object that is observed is so, not differently by different individuals, but are common objects of observation for all, and are *common* in that sense. Fifthly they are without intelligence —the only Principle endowed with intelligence being the Spirit. Sixthly they are prolific *i. e.* endowed with evolving energy. The Spirits are without this.

—These in brief, are the points of agreement and difference between the Pradhâna on one hand and its effects on the other.

Now we must consider the nature of the *Spirits* and see what the Sankhyas have to say as to their existence, number and properties. But before we proceed with this, we must first see if it is necessary to have a distinct principle in the shape of innumerable Spirits. And on this score, the first reason that presents itself is the fact that we have not yet got any principle that will supply the intelligence. For certainly Intelligence cannot belong to the Buddhi for it is material, being the effect of Prakriti which is essentially non-intelligent, and what is absent in the cause cannot manifest itself in the effect. So we must have a distinct *Principle of Intelligence.*

Secondly.—we see in our every day life that all that is corporeal is for the use of another, as a bed, a chair &c. And we have seen before that all the principles from Prakriti

downwards are *bodied.* Though this sounds a little absurd as regards Prakriti, Buddhi and Ahanâkra, yet we must not forget that the body of the apparently immaterial principles is made up of the three Gunas-which are as material as anything. And such being the case, we must postulate the existence of an unbodied or incorporeal principle. And this is Purusha, the Spirit,—and as we have not yet had an Intelligent principle, we attribute intelligence to this incorporeal Spirit. And the Spirit must be unbodied because it is devoid of the three Attributes, for whatever is affected by the Gunas is found to be bodied.

Thirdly.—We have come across in daily life with the general proposition that whatever is naturally connected with either pleasure, pain or delusion, is supervised over by something, and we have also seen that all the principles from the Prakriti downwards are made up of the three Gunas, and as such necessarily, affected by pleasure, pain or delusion ; and so these must have a supervisor. And in order to escape *a regressus ad infinitum* this supervisor must be himself untouched by pleasure &c.; and as such must be something over and above Prakriti. And this is Purusha, the Spirit.

Fourthly.—Prakriti and the rest are objects of enjoyment ; and as such they necessitate the existence of an enjoyer, who again must not be an object himself. And the enjoyer must be the intelligent principle. For a non-intelligent principle being devoid of consciousness can never be the enjoyer. And this again must be something not made up of pleasure &c. Which can never be the case with Buddhi and the rest. These latter being made up as they are of pleasure, pain and delusion, cannot be the enjoyer of these ; for that will involve the absurdity of self-contradictory actions—one made up of pleasure, pain and delusion, cannot be only pleased or pained ; for each of these is contradictory to the one or other phase of the constitution of Buddhi. And so we must have an enjoyer over and above Prakriti and the rest. And this is Spirit.

Fifthly and lastly.—All systems of philosophy, and all the great men of the past we find striving after final Release. Now this is not possible of Prakriti or Buddhi. For these latter are constituently made up of pain and as such can never be released from this. So the object of final Release must be one who has neither pleasure nor pain nor delusion for its constituent element; and such a principle is the Spirit alone.

We have thus shown the necessity of postulating a distinct principle in the shape of Purusha, over and above the Prakriti.

The next thing, we have to consider is—What is this Purusha ?—How is it constituted ?—What are its properties? —What its aim ?—and finally, how and when does it attain final Release ? We must take each of these questions one by one.

(1) What is Purusha ? It is not the thinking principle, since thinking belongs to the *mind*. Nor is it the determinning principle since that is alloted to Buddhi. The character of the Spirit is a very unique one. It is none of these, still it is the necessary factor in all of these. It then is the principal agent of all functions, mental as well as organic. It is the agent who feels, thinks and wills. Without it no functions would be possible, specially consciousness. In short Spirit is the source of intelligence, and as such, the necessary factor in every function of the mind—feeling, intellecting and willing.

(2) How is this Spirit constituted ? As a matter of fact the Spirit is constituted of intelligence pure and simple, and is free from every other qualification and encumbrance.

(3) What are its properties ? These are thus ennunciated : it is *free from the three attributes, possessed of discriminative faculties, non-objective, singular, intelligent and non-productive.* If the Spirit were not naturally free from the action of the Attributes, no liberation from metempsychosis would be possible. Since pain constitutes the very nature of the Attributes and as such can not possibly be separated from it.

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And thus no liberation being possible, there would be no necessity for enquiries to which the various systems of philosophy are devoted. And again if the Spirit were not equipped with discriminative faculties, it could never attain to the discriminative wisdom arrived at by the philosophical systems, which would thus become useless.

Next as to the aims of the Spirit. It has been laid down that the Spirit mistakes the fluctuations of the Attributes constituting Nature, to be His own; and thus comes to be affected by pleasure, pain &c.,—which in reality do not affect him,—under the influence of the different kinds of delusions—the modifications of Buddhi. Now the one all-absorbing aim of every Spirit is the attainment of wisdom that would help him to discriminate between Himself and the fluctuations of the Attributes, and thus see the pleasure and pain caused by these in their true light and be no longer affected by them.

The next question that presents itself to us is—how does Purusha attain to this wisdom and thence to final emancipation? This wisdom arises from a constant study of the Sânkhya philosophy, when the Attribute of Goodness is paramount in one's constitution and the others have almost ceased to exist. The Purusha then sees Nature and its constituents in their true light and finds out His mistake, and so shakes off all mistaken preconceptions about self, and thus becomes free from the self,—imposed bonds of Buddhi, and finally retries from metempsycosis and attains final Beatitude.

Having thus said all that we had to say about Prakriti and Purusha, we must look a little into the details of the process of creation.

We have already said that Prakriti is the rootless Root of the Universe. From this Prakriti emanates Buddhi, to which the technical name of *Mahat* or the Great Principle is given. From this Buddhi proceeds *Ahankâra* or the principle of egoism. From this again emanate the eleven senses and the five subtle elements of sound, smell, taste, colour

and touch. And from these latter five, proceed the five gross elements—Earth, Water, Fire, Air and Akâśa.

Let us now examine the nature of these principles. First in the scale comes *Buddhi*. This is defined as the principle of *adhyavasâya*. This term literally means "ascertainment" and in explaining this term, the writers exemplify it as the determination that "this is to be done by me." It would thus appear that the functions of this principle are the same as those attributed by Western psychologists to *will*. But the Sankhya *Buddhi* is not mere *will*. It is Will and Intellect combined. For in the opinion of the majority of Western psychologists—specially of those belonging to the Kantian School—"Intellect contemplates the circumstances calling for action and provides the rule of conduct: Will controls the disposition in harmony with the dictator of intelligence." The Sankhyas attribute both these functions to their *Buddhi*. That Buddhi resembles *will*, is further made clearer by the properties assigned to it, by the Sankhyas. These properties are Virtue, Wisdom, Dispassion and Power. As we have said already *will* decides the course of action and as such the virtuousness or otherwise of actions must belong to this principle alone. Again we find that *wisdom* is described as both restrictive and directive and so to attribute the property of wisdom to Buddhi is to give it the dual character of Intellect and Will. Dispassion and Power again must belong to the principle that decides on a certain course of action and in this too we find Buddhi cognate with *Intellect* and *Will* combined.

The principle that we have to consider next is that of Egoism. It is the principle to which all notions of the "I" are due. It corresponds with Kant's "*apperception*" and Hamilton's "self-consciousness;" that is to say the notion of self in every form of consciousness: The idea that "*I* have the consciousness," "*I* feel &c." As immediate effects of this principle of Egoism, we have the eleven sense-organs and the five subtle elements. The eleven sense-organs consist of the

five intellectual (subjective) senses—the eyes, the ear, the nose, the tongue, the skin,—and the five of action (objective) —*viz.*:—the hands, the feet, speech, the excretory organ and that of generation. The eleventh sense is Manas, (mind). The five subtle elements are those of smell, touch taste, colour and sound. From these latter again proceed the five gross elements—Earth, Air, Water, Fire and Âkâśa; and these have the subtle elements for their properties. Before proceeding any further we must consider the nature of the eleventh sense-organ, the *mind* or the reflective principle. Here first of all we must consider why we should call *mind* a sense at all? The answer is not far to seek. The Sankhyas define *sense* as the immediate effect of the principle of Egoism under the influence of the attribute of Goodness; and this differentia we find in *Manas* as well as in the ten organs generally accepted as senses. Next let us consider what are the functions of this eleventh sense? Manas then is the only faculty that partakes of the nature of both kinds of senses—the objective and the subjective. If it were not so, none of the senses would act, for it is only when these are influenced by the operation of the mind that they act towards their various objects. It would not be quite accurate to say that the senses do not act. Act they do, but these operations are not taken cognizance of by the agent, and as such having their actions purposeless, they may for all intents and purposes, be said to be without action. The function of this principle is technically called in *Sankhya* "reflection" or "thinking." This is further explained—when we first look upon an object the first impressions in connection therewith are all indefinite and without qualifications (निर्विकल्प). This indefinite and vague impression is very soon rendered definite; and this definiteness and the different qualifications are imparted to it by the reflection (or thinking) of the Mind. This process follows so instantaneously that one can scarcely mark the process and thinks that the first impression he has had was all along definite, just as he latterly comes to perceive it.

It need not be repeated that the multifariousness of creations is due to the diverse actions of the Attributes.

The next question that is started is—whence proceeds the action of the senses? If their action were eternal then the creation would never cease. If not eternal, what is it that causes the operations to begin? The reply given is that all these organs have a certain sort of anxiety for the fulfilment of each other's actions; and this anxiety leads to the action of each of them. There is no external impetus save that of the purpose—discriminative wisdom and hence emancipation—of the Purusha. If there were no action of the different emanations from Prakriti, the Spirit would be at a loss to discriminate between itself and the inanimate Prakriti. So we see that the only impetus from without is supplied to the senses by the purpose of the Spirit, and thenceforward they are led on in their active path by their own anxiety.

Altogether then we see that there are thirteen organs—three internal, Buddhi, Ahankâra and Manas, and the ten external—the ten sense-organs. Of these the latter operate only in the present time, whereas the former act with regard to the past, present and future. Of the external organs, the five subjective senses operate towards subtle as well as gross substances, whereas the objective ones only towards gross ones.

Of the thirteen organs, the palm of supremacy is given to the internal ones, since these are applicable to all kinds of substances; and another cause of supremacy we have already noted—*viz.*, the one with regard to time. Of these internal organs again, the Buddhi is supreme, since the principles of Egoism and Reflection operate towards their objects and then present these experiences to the Buddhi, which finally presents them with its own additions and alterations to the discriminating eye of the Spirit. Thus we find that Buddhi is the chief agent of the Spirit and brings about all his worldly enjoyment, finally leading to His discrimination of self from the emanations of Prakriti, and thence to final liberation. Thus of all the organs, Buddhi is supreme.

Having thus described the organs, we turn our attention towards the gross substances. These are of three kinds—Subtle, Parent-born and the Great Elements. Of these the first is eternal, and the second and third fading and transient.

This "subtle body" of the Sankhyas resembles to a great extent, I believe, the "Astral Body" of Theosophical literature. It is born before the visible body and lasts till the Pralaya; and till then it presents the astral body of the Ego in all its reincarnations during that Kalpa. If this were not so, the actions of one incarnation could not act upon the Spirit in the next, for the Spirit itself cannot be affected by either good or evil, and as such could not be affected by the actions of one incarnation in another. For the actions were done by the body and the organs of the former incarnation; and these dying with the Body, wherein would the traces of the former actions be left? So we must postulate the existence of a substrate in the form of the "Linga-Sarîra," equipped with subtile counterparts of all the sensory and motor organs. And thus then we shall have the Linga-Sarîra imprinted with all the effects of the actions of one birth. And since this body follows the Spirit in all its subsequent incarnations, it is but natural that the fruits of past actions should affect the Spirit;—though the Spirit cannot be affected, yet so long as he has not attained to discriminative wisdom, he thinks all the affections of Buddhi to be his own. The Linga-Sarîra thus must have traces of virtue and vice on itself so as to bring out their effects in a future incarnation. This Linga-Sarîra again is the substrate of the different organs which are subtile in their nature, and as such could not subsist without a substratum.

Let us now see how the Sankhyas treat of the idea of means and consequences of actions. By means of virtue the Spirit ascends to higher regions. By "higher regions" here is of course meant a more highly spiritual life. Vice leads the other way. Emancipation results from discriminative wisdom. This wisdom consists of deep insight into the

character of the Spirit and Nature, and consequent intelligent perception of the difference between the two—from which results the Spirit's perception of His own true nature, which is above the operation of the three Attributes, though so long He has been labouring under the self-imposed imaginary thraldom of the Attributes. No sooner has this perception been gained than the Spirit casts off His self-imposed chains and becomes free of the Attributes, and thereby attains to His proper state, which is one of pure uninterupted and unmixed intelligence. By mere dispassion is gained a state of absorption into the subtler elements of Nature. A Spirit thus transformed enjoys for a time a state of unintelligent rest, and is born again under the same restrictions and with the same bondage as before the absorption. If on the other hand, the Spirit is under the influence of attachments proceeding from the attribute of Passion, then it is that it falls into the stingy darkness of metempsychosis from which it can be freed only by the divine ray of wisdom. We are all labouring under this category.

The Sankhyas have further entered into a very elaborate enunciation of the various manifestations of Buddhi dividing them into no less than fifty forms. These are made up of five kinds of *obstruction*, twenty-eight of *incapacity* (resulting from the disability of the organs), nine of *contentment* and eight of *perfection.* Of these, again there are 62 forms of *obstruction* alone.)

So much for intellectual creation. The elemental or material creation comprises the eight kinds of divine celestial beings, the five of the lower animals, and one, the human kind. The various grades of creation are attributed to the excess or otherwise of one of the attributes. Thus the attribute of Goodness predominates among the gods, that of Passion among men, and that of Darkness in all lower creation.

All this elaborate process of creation is begun by Nature solely for the sake of the Spirit's emancipation from the miseries of metempsychosis—miseries inevitable to Him when born in a

human body. Nature is described as a great benefactress, not caring for any return of services from the Spirit, and working for His emancipation out of her own sweet will, till He comes to perceive her true character; when She retires from the scene like an actress who has played her part, and never again returns to the same Spirit, the spectator. Thus then in reality all bonds and pains are only supposed by the Spirit to be His own. By His very nature He is free from all internal fluctuations, in as much as He is above the Attributes, whose effect these fluctuations are. After the attainment of discriminative wisdom, the Spirit steers clear of all notions of egoism, and attains to His own natural spiritual condition. But the body continues for a time on account of the impulse previously imparted to it. And the attainment of wisdom having put a stop to the operation of all such agents as virtue &c.—the operation of which is a necessary cause of rebirth—the body falls, and the Spirit regains His true character, and attains to absolute and eternal beatitude, never to return to the cycles of metempsychosis.

THE TATTWA-KAUMUDÎ.

[SÂNKHYA].

AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION.

(1). REVERENCE to the One Unborn, Red, White and Black, producing many children; and also to the Unborn Ones Who have recourse to Her, and renounce Her on having enjoyed the pleasures afforded by Her.

To the Great Rishi Kapila, and his disciple Âsuri, as also to Panchasikha and Iswara-Krishna,—to these we bow in reverence.

Introduction to Kârikâ I.

(2). In this world, that expounder is listened to by the audience, who offers expositions of facts whose knowledge is desired by them. Those, on the other hand, who expound undesired doctrines, are given up by them, as mad men, or as men unacquainted with science and custom. And that science is desirable which being known, leads to the attainment of the final end of man. Consequently, as the science to be (hereafter) explained supplies the means to the final goal, therefore, the author introduces the desirability of the subject-matter :—

KÂRIKÂ I.

There being (in this world) an impediment caused by the three kinds of pain, (there arises) a desire for enquiry into the means of alleviating them. And if (it be urged that) the enquiry is superfluous on account

of (the existence of) obvious means,—(we reply that it is) not so: because these (latter) are neither absolute nor final.

Necessity of scientific enquiry.

(3). The subject-matter of science would not be enquired into—(1) if there existed no pain in this world; or (2) if though extant, its removal were not desired; or (3) even if desired, its removal were impossible,—such impossibility arising either from the eternal character of the pain, or from ignorance of the means of alleviating it; or (4) notwithstanding the possibility of removing it, if the subject-matter of science did not afford the adequate means; or (5) lastly, if there were other and easier means elsewhere available.

The three-fold division of pain.

(4). Now, that there is no pain and that its removal is not universally desired, are opposed to facts. With this view, it is declared: "*There being an impediment caused by the three kinds of pain.*" The three kinds of pain constitute (what is ordinarily called) the "triad of pain." And these are: (1) The naturo-intrinsic (*Âdhyâtmika*), (2) The naturo-extrinsic (*Âdhibhautika*), and (3) The super-natural (*Adhidaivika*). Of these the *naturo-intrinsic* is two-fold, *bodily* and *mental*. *Bodily* pain is caused by the disorder of the various humours, wind, bile, and phlegm; and *mental* pain is due to desire, wrath, avarice, affection, fear, envy, grief, and the non-preception of particular objects. All these are called *intrinsic* on account of their admitting of internal remedies. Pains submitting to external remedies are two-fold: *extrinsic*, and *superhuman*. The *extrinsic* are caused by men, beasts, birds, reptiles and inanimate things; and the *superhuman* ones owe their existence to the evil influence of planets and the various class of elementals. Thus the fact that pain,—a specific modification of the attribute of Foulness (Rajas)—is experienced by each soul, cannot be gainsaid. "Impediment" (*Abhighâta*) is the connection of the sentient faculty with the

consciousness of disagreeableness caused by the three kinds of pain residing in the internal organs. Thus then this idea of disagreeableness constitutes the cause of the desire for the alleviation of pain. Though pain cannot be absolutely prevented, yet it is possible to alleviate it—as will be explained subsequently. Thus it is concluded that (enquirey is going to be made) "into the means of alleviating it" (the three kinds of pain). In "*Tadapaghatake*" the particle *tat* refers to the three kinds of pain; and though this forms the subordinate factor in the preceding compound, yet it is mentally the more proximate (and hence the following pronoun refers to it in preference to the other and primary factor of the compound). The means of alleviation, too, are only those derivable from science,—and none other.

Objection: Inquiry superfluous in presence of obvious means.

(5). *Objection*: "*On account of obvious remedies, such enquiry is superfluous.*" That is to say: we grant the existence of the triad of pain, and also the desirability of its removal, as also the possibility thereof; we go farther, and grant that the means derivable from the *Sâstras* are adequate to the removal. With all this, however, the present enquiry becomes superfluous; because we have easier obvious means for the removal of pain, and further because of the difficult character of the means prescribed in the *Sâstra*—a full knowledge of abstruse philosophical principles, attainable only by a long course of traditional study extending over mâny lives. Says a popular maxim: 'When a man can find honey in the house, wherefore should he go to the mountains? So, when the object of desire has been attained, which wise man will make any further attempts?'* Hundreds of easy remedies for *bodily* pain are laid down by eminent physicians; for the mental pains also we have easy remedies in the shape of the attainment of the objects of enjoyment—such as women, desirable food and drink, dress and the like. Similarly of the extrinsic pains we have easy remedies—such as acquaintance with moral and political

* *Vide* the *Nyâya-latikâ, in loco.*

science, residence in safe places, &c. In the same manner, of superhuman troubles we have remedies in the shape of gems and charms, &c.

Reply: Obvious means are not absolute or final.

(6). *Reply:* Not so: "*Because these are neither absolute nor final.*" *Absoluteness* (of the means) consists in the certainty of its effect; and its *finality* consists in the non-recurrence of the pain once removed. The absence of these two properties is denoted by the expression "*Ekântâtyantobhâvah.*" The universal affix *tasi* has a genitive force here. The upshot of the whole is this: On account of not observing the unfailing cure of the different kinds of pain, even on the employment in the prescribed manner of medicines, &c., mentioned before,—we predicate the want of certainty of the cure effected thereby; and similarly from the recurrence of the pain once cured, we infer non-permanence of the cure. Thus, though easily available, the obvious means do not effect absolute and final removal of pain. Consequently, the present enquiry is not superfluous.

Auspiciousness of the beginning word.

(7). Though the mention of the word *pain* in the very beginning is inauspicious, yet that of the extirpatory means as leading to its removal is auspicious; and as such quite appropriate at the commencement of a treatise.

Objection: Vedic means adequate to removal of pain.

(8). *Objection:* We grant the inadequacy of obvious means; but we have others prescribed in the Vedas—such as *Jyotishtoma*, &c.—which last for a thousand years—a whole host of these forming the Ritualistic portion of the Vedas. And these means verily will remove the triad of pain absolutely and finally. Declares the *S'ruti*: "Desiring Heaven one must perform sacrifices:" and Heaven is thus described in the *Bhattavârtika*: "Pleasure, unmixed and uninterspersed with pain, and attainable by pure longing for it, is what is

expressed by the word *Heaven.*" Heaven thus consists in pleasure, diametrically opposed to pain, which by its very existence extirpates all kinds of pain; nor is this pleasure short-lived,—for, declares the *S'ruti* : "We drank the *Soma* and became immortal" [*Atharvasiras* III]. And if the celestial pleasure were short-lived, how could there be 'immortality'? Hence the Vedic means for the removal of pain, which can be gone through in a moment, a few hours, a day, a month, or a year,—are easier than discriminative knowledge, which can be attained only by a long course of traditional study extending over many lives. Thus then the proposed enquiry again becomes superfluous.

Reply :

KÂRIKÂ II.

The revealed is like the obvious; since it is connected with impurity, decay and excess. A method contrary to both is preferable,—consisting in descriminative knowledge of the Manifested, the Unmanifested, and the Knowing (Spirit).*

Reply : The Vedic is like the obvious.

(9). "*Anusrava*" is that which is *heard* during the tutorial lectures of a qualified teacher,—and not *done* (written). *Ânuśravika* = relating to *Anusrava* or *Veda*, that which is known therefrom. The list of religious rites laid down in the Vedas is equal to the obvious (means, mentioned before) ;—both being equally inefficient in the *absolute* and *final* removal of the triad of pain. Though the text uses the generic term "*Vedic*" ("*Anusravika*"), yet it ought to be taken as implying only the ritualistic portion of it; because descriminative knowledge also forms part of the Veda (which of course is not what the author means). Says the *S'ruti* : "The Spirit ought to be

* This Kârikâ embodies, as Davies rightly remarks, the leading principle of Kapila's philosophy, according to which final emancipation is attainable not by religious rites, but by descriminative knowledge as explained by Kapila.

known and descriminated from Primordial Matter" (*Brihadâranyaka* 2-4-5); (by so doing) "the agent does not return, yea he does not return (into this world)" (*Chhândogaya* 8-15).

Because impure, decaying and excessive.

(10). Reason for the above assertion is given; "*since it is connected with impurity, decay and excess.*" The *impurity* lies in the fact of the *Soma*-sacrifice, &c., being accompanied by animal-slaughter, and the like. Says the revered Panchasikhâchârya: "It (the sin attendant upon slaughter) is slightly mixed, destructible and bearable." The 'slight mixture' is that of the principal effect (*Apurva, i.e.* merit) of the *Jyotishtoma, &c.*, with the minor *apurva*, the cause of evil, due to animal-slaughter. The epithet '*destructible*' implies that the sin is removeable by certain expiatory rites; but if some how, these are neglected, then at the time of the fructification of the principal Karma (merit), the evil element (demerit, caused by the slaughter) also bears its fruits; and as long as these latter are being experienced, they are borne with patience; hence the epithet '*bearable.*' Experts (in rituals) dangling in the nectar-tanks of Heaven attained to by a host of virtuous deeds, have to bear the spark of the fire of pain brought about by the element of evil (in the rituals).

The impurity of animal-slaughter in a sacrifice, established.

(11). It cannot be urged that the generic law—"Kill not any animal," is set aside by the specific one, "Kill the animal for the *Agnishtoma*" —because they do not contradict each other; and it is only when two laws are mutually contradictory, that the stronger sets aside the weaker. In the present instance, however, there is no contradiction, the two laws treating of two entirely different subjects. For the negative law "Kill not, &c.," only declares the capability of the slaughter to produce evil, and hence pain; but it does not do away with the fact of its being necessary for the completion of the sacrifice; and in the same manner, the following injunction "Kill the animal, &c.," declares the necessity of animal-

slaughter in the sacrifice, but does not negative the fact of its being productive of sin. Nor is there any contradiction between the productivity of sin and the capability of helping the completion of a sacrifice. Animal-slaughter can produce sin in the man, and at the same time, quite consistently help a sacrifice.

Non-permanence and excess shown to apply to the results of Vedic action.

(12). The properties—*decay* (*non-permanence*) and *excess*—belong really to the effect; but are here attributed to the means. This *Non-permanence* is inferred from the fact of Heaven being a *caused* entity. Further, *Jyotishtoma*, &c., are the means to the attainment of Heaven only, whereas the *Vâjapêya*, &c., lead to the attainment of the kingdom of Heaven. This is what constitutes the "*excess*" spoken of. The greatness of one's magnificence is a source of pain to another of lesser magnificence.

Immortality as a result of Vedic action is only long-durability.

(13). In the passage "Drinking *Soma*, we became immortal"—*immortality* implies long-durability,—as is declared elswhere: "Immortality is durability till the final dissolution of all elemental (or finite) existence." Hence the *S'ruti*: "Neither by deeds, nor by children, nor by wealth, but by renunciation alone they got immortality" [*Mahânârâyana Upanishad* X.—5]; and again "Swarga shines in a secluded valley at a distance, which the ascetics alone enter. By actions did the ascetics with children, desiring wealth, get death. Therefore those other learned Rishis, who were above all action, got immortality."

The only means is descriminative wisdom.

(14). With all this in view, it is declared: "*A method contrary to both is preferable—consisting in descriminative knowledge of the Manifested, the Unmanifested, and the Knowing.*" *Tasmât* refers to the Vedic means of removing pain. A method,—contrary to the impure Soma-

sacrifice, &c., bringing about excessive and short-lived results, —is pure, *i. e.*, unmixed with evils due to animal-slaughter, and leads to results non-excessive and everlasting, as is clear from the *S'ruti* precluding all return to metempychosis for people possessing descriminative knowledge. The argument based on the said result being a caused entity cannot be urged as a ground for its non-permanence; because this holds only in the case of the effect being an entity; in the present case, however, the consequence—the removal of pain—is a negation, a non-entity. And such negation putting an end to causal efficiency, there can be no further effect, in the shape of more pain. For it is a fact admitted on all hands that the causal activity lasts only till the attainment of descriminative knowledge. This will be explained later on. (Kârikâ LXVI.)

Literal meaning of the Kârikâ.

(15). The literal meaning of the *Kârikâ*, however, is this: The means of removing pain, consisting in the descriminative knowledge of the Spirit, as apart from Matter, is different from the scriptural means, and hence is preferable. The Scriptural is good inasmuch as it is authorised by the Veda and as such capable of removing pain to a certain extent. The descriminative knowledge of the Spirit as distinct from Matter is also good. Of these two, the latter is superior.

Source of descriminative knowledge.

(16). *Question*: "Whence does such descriminative knowledge arise"? *Answer*: "*From descriminative knowledge of the Manifested, the Unmanifested, and the Knowing.*" Knowledge of the Manifested precedes that of its cause, the Unmanifested; and from the fact of both of these (Manifested and Unmanifested) being for another's purpose, we infer the existence of the Spirit. Thus then we find that these three are mentioned in the order of precedence of the knowledge thereof. The upshot of the whole then is this: The knowledge of the distinction of Spirit from Matter arises from descriminative knowledge—consisting in meditation

and contemplation uninterruptedly and patiently practised for a long time, of the Manifested, &c., previously heard of in the *S'ruti* and *Purânas*, and then established by scientific reasoning. This will be explained in detail in Kârikâ LXIV.

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(17). Having thus decided Philosophy to be needful for the enquirer, the author, with a view to commence the work, sets down, in brief, the import of the system, in order to concentrate the attention of the enquirer.

Four-fold division of categories.

Kârikâ III.

"Nature or Primordial Matter, the root of all, is not produced; the Great Principle (Mahat, *i. e.*, Buddhi) and the rest are seven, being both producer and produced; sixteen are the produced; and the Spirit is neither the producer nor the produced."

Briefly, the objects treated of in the system are four-fold. Some of them are merely *productive*, some merely *products*, others *both productive and products*, and others, *neither the one nor the other*.

(18). It being asked —What is the *productive?* The answer is—Nature or Primordial Matter is the root of the Universe, an aggregate of effects; of Matter itself there is no root, or else we would be landed in an unwarranted *regressus ad infinitum*.

The Productive.

(19). How many are the objects that are *both productive and products*, and which are these? The answer is—The Great Principle and the rest are both. As the Great Principle (Buddhi) being the cause of Self-consciousness (Ahankara) is the effect of Nature (Prakriti), so is Self-consciousness

The Productive—Products.

the cause of the five subtle Primary Elements (Tanmâtras) together with the eleven sense-organs, and at the same time, the effect of the Great Principle; and so are the five subtle Primary Elements the cause of the grosser elements, Vril* (Akâsa) and the rest, and at the same time, the effect of Self-consciousness.

The Products.

(20). How many are the *productions*, pure and simple, and what are they? It is said—"*The productions are sixteen*"—*i. e.*, the five gross elements (earth, &c.) and the eleven sense-organs,—these are mere products or modifications not productive. Though cow, pot, trees, &c., are modifications of earth, and so are curd and sprout, of milk and seed respectively, yet these facts do not touch our position; since trees, &c., do not differ from earth, in their *essence*, and it is the productiveness of something different in essence, for which the term '*Prakriti*' stands; and further, cows, trees, &c., do not differ from each other in their essence, since they have, in common, the properties, grossness and perceptibility.

The non-product-productive.

(21). The form of that which is *neither productive nor product*, is now stated. "*The spirit is neither a product nor productive.*" All this will be explained later on.

Three kinds of proofs.

(22). In order to prove the above statements, the different kinds of proof ought to be noticed. Nor can there be a specific definition without a general one. Hence the definition of *proof* in general follows.

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* Though this translation of the word *Akâsa* is sure to jar upon European ears, as borrowed from a work on fiction (Lytton's "The Coming Race"), yet I have put it in, since I could not find any other word in the English language expressive enough to denote all that is connoted by the Sanskrit word Akâsa. "Inane," "Astral Light," "Ether," "Space," &c., do not sufficiently represent the active character of the Sanskrit *Akâsa.*

KÂRIKÂ IV.

"Perception, Inference, and Valid Testimony are admitted to be the three kinds of proof necessary; because they include all kinds of proof. It is by proof that a fact is ascertained."

Proof defined.

(23). Here, first of all, we have to explain the word *Pramâna*, which explanation would form its definition. Proof, then, is defined as that by which right notion is determined; it thus becomes the cause or means of all correct cognition. This definite right notion is a mental condition free from the contact of all that is either doubtful, self-contradictory or unknown; this comprehension too belongs to the human agent, and the result thereof is right notion; and that which leads to such right notion is *Proof*. Thus the term *Proof* is differentiated from all that leads to wrong notion, *viz.*, doubt, misconception, memory, and the like.

The three-foldness of proof.

(24). The author now rejects the different views with regard to the number of proofs: "*Of three kinds*," —that is—of proof there are three kinds, neither more nor less. This we shall explain in detail after the specific definitions of the particular kinds of proofs.

Only three kinds of proof.

(25). Now, it is asked, which are the three kinds of proof? The answer is—"*Perception, Inference, and Valid Testimony*. The above is an exposition of what is popularly known as proof; and a philosophical system is expounded for the people, since thereto is its province confined. The cognitions of the great sages, though realities, do not, in any way, help those of the ordinary people, and as such are not treated of here.

(26). *Objection.*—We grant that the number of proofs is not less than three; but wherefore should it not be more than three? The different schools do lay down others, as Analogy (Upamâna), &c. *Reply*—"*Since these three include all kinds of proof.*" This will be further explained later on.

The inclusion of all other proofs in the above-mentioned.

(27). Now an altogether different question is raised—Why should the philosophic system enquire into the nature and kinds of proof, when it is launched forth with the express purpose of explaining the *Praméya, i. e.*, the subject-matter of proof (*i. e.*, correct cognition)? To this it is replied —"*Since a fact is ascertained only by proofs.*"

Necessity of enquiry into the different kinds of proof.

[*Siddhi*=determination or ascertainment.]

The order of Explanation.

(28). The explanation of the Kârikâ follows the sense, not the order of the words.

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(29). Now on the occasion of the definition of the special kinds of proofs, the author of the Kârikâ, first of all, defines Perception, since it precedes all other Proofs, Inference, &c., which, therefore, are dependent upon it; and further since there are no two opinions with regard to it.

The specific definitions of the proofs.

Kârikâ V.

"'Perception' is definite sense-cognition (*i. e.*, cognition of particular objects through the senses); 'Inference' is declared to be three-fold, and it is preceded by (based upon) the knowledge of the major premiss [asserting the invariable concomitance of the Linga (the Hetu, *i. e.*, the characteristic mark, the middle term,) with the Lingi (the Vyâpaka or the Sâdhya, *i. e.*, the major term, in which the characteristic inheres] and

the minor premiss [asserting the existence of the characteristic in the Paksha, or the minor term]; and 'Valid Testimony' is true revelation (S'ruti)."

The mention of "*Perception*" is only the statement of the term to be defined: the remainder being the *definition*, by which word is meant the differentiation (of the term defined) from things of the same class or species, as well as from those of other classes.

"Perception" defined as the definite cognition of particular objects obtained through the senses.

(30). The literal meaning (of the definition of Perception) may be thus broken up: *objects* (*Vishaya*) are those that bind or connect the subject (*Vishayi*) with their own forms, *i. e.*, they mark out the subject; such are earth, pleasure, &c., belonging to us. The subtle Primary Elements are no objects (of sense) to us, though they are so to *Yogis* and the Gods. '*Prativishaya*' is that which is applied to different objects, *i. e.*, the organs of sense. *Application* here is close proximity, or direct communication,—*Prativishaya*, thus meaning, the sense-organ applied to, or in communication with, the object (perceived); and the definite cognition based on this (proximity) is "*Prativishayâdhyavasâyah.*" This cognition or knowledge, which is the result of an exercise of the Intellectual Faculty (*Buddhi*), is defined as consisting in the preponderance therein, of the attribute of Goodness—following on the subjugation of that of Darkness— resulting from the proximity of the sense-organs to the objects of perception. This proximate existence (Vritti) is also called cognition. This is a Proof; and right notion results from the apprehensions of the sentient faculty by means thereof.

The insentience of the Intellect; and the reflection of the Spirit therein.

(31). Intellect (Buddhi), being a modification of, oremanation from, Nature (Prakriti, Primordial Matter), is insentient; and so, therefore, are its cognitions, jar, &c. And similarly the different modifications or productions of the Intellect—pleasures, &c., are insentient. The Spirit

(Purusha), however, having no real relation with these pleasures, &c., is sentient. This Spirit, being reflected in the Intellect, appears to be actually affected by the cognitions and pleasures, &c., really belonging to the Intellect—which latter, therefore, are said to favour an intelligent entity, the Spirit. Through this reflection in the intelligence of the Spirit, the non-intelligent Buddhi and its cognitions appear endued with intelligence. This will be further explained in Kârikâ XX.

The above definition differentiates Perception from all other forms of cognition.

(32). In the definition, the mention of '*definite cognition*,' sets aside all doubtful knowledge, because the latter is not definitely comprehended or well-defined, and hence is uncertain. By saying "*objects*," their contraries, all non-entities, are excluded; as by saying '*prati*'—and thereby implying proximity of the sense-organs to the objects—are excluded "Inference," and "Trustworthy Assertion." Thus '*the definite cognition of particular objects*' is a complete definition of Perception, since it serves to distinguish it from all other things of the same, as well as of different classes The definition of "Perception" given by other philosophical systems are neither impugned nor defended, for fear of being too prolix.

Inference is established as a distinct proof.

(33). How can one, denying Inference as a proof,—*viz.*, the Materialist—be certain of the ignorance, doubt or erroneousness of another man? Since, these—ignorance, &c.—are not perceptible to our mortal eyes; nor can any other method of proof be applied to this case, since no other (than Perception) is accepted as such (by the Materialist). And not knowing the ignorance, &c., of others, and thus going about addressing people at random, one would be despised by the enquirers as a mad man. Consequently, (we assert) that the ignorance, &c., of others are *inferred* from such marks or characteristics, as difference of meaning or speech, &c. Thus, however unwill-

ing, the Materialist is constrained to accept Inference as a distinct method of proof.

The definition of *Inference.*

(34). And Inference following directly from Perception, its definition must follow close upon that of Perception; there again, on account of the particular definition being based on the general one, the author gives the latter first—"*It is preceded by (a notion of) the middle* and major terms:*"—the middle term being the *Vyâpya* or pervaded, and the major term, the *Vyâpaka* or pervader. the pervaded (*Vyâpya*) is that which is brought to its own natural sphere, after the removal of all dubious and assumed conditions; and that by which the *Vyâpya* is thus brought in, is the pervader (*Vyâpaka*). The mention of "the mark and the marked," both of which must be objects, indicates objective or substantive cognition. Inference proceeds from the knowledge of smoke as the pervaded (the mark) and the fire as the pervader (the marked). *Lingi* (the marked) must be twice construed in the definition, in order to imply the minor premiss [in which is stated the relation of the minor term (the *Paksha*), with the middle term (*Hetu*)]. Thus the general definition of Inference comes to be thus:—"*Inference* is (a method of cognition) preceded by (*i. e.*, based on) the knowledge of the relations of the major (*Sádhya*), the minor (*Paksha*) and the middle (*Hetu*) terms with one another." [That is to say, Inference is the knowledge derived from the major and the minor premises.]

The three kinds of Inference—(1) The *a priori* (*Purvavat*), (2) The *a posteriori* (Seshavat), and (3) *The inference from the perception of species (Sâmânyatodrishta.)*

(35). The author now sketches the divisions which have been laid down by other systems also—"*Inference is of three kinds,*" *i. e.*, the special divisions of Inference are three-fold—(i) The *a priori* [Purvavat—the inference of the effect from the cause, as of rain from the gathering of the clouds], (ii) The *a posteriori* [Seshavat—the inference of the cause, from the effect, as of rain from rise in the river], and

* *Literally*—"the mark and the marked."

(iii) *Inference from the perception of species or class* [Inference based on relations other than the causal, as of substantiality from earthiness].

(36). First of all, Inference is of two kinds:—(1) The *Affirmative* (*Vita*) and (2) the *Negative* (*Avita*).* That which is based on affirmative concomitance, is *Vita*; and that based on negative concomitance, the *Avita*.

The first division of Inference.

(37). Of these, *Avita* is *Seshavat (a posteriori* or analytic). *Sesha* is that which remains; and the Inferential knowledge having this remainder for its object is called *Seshavat*. As is declared†:—" The cause in question being excluded, and (the qualification) not found elsewhere, the idea of the remaining (object) is *Parisesha*." [Vâtsâyana Bhâshya on the Nyâya Sutras.] Examples of this Avita Inference, founded on negation, will be given later on Kârikâ IX].

The Negative—The *a posteriori* Inference.

(38). The *Vita* is two-fold (1) *Purvavat* (*a priori or synthetic* and (2) *from the perception of species*. Of these *Purva* is that whose object is such as has the characteristics of its species known; and the Inferential knowledge of which this forms the object is *Purvavat*; as from the existence of *smoke* is inferred the existance of an individual *fire* in the *mountain*,—the characteristics of the species 'fire' having been previously perceived in the culinary hearth. The second kind of *Vita*—the Inference based on the perception of the species—is that which has its object, such as has

The Affirmative—The *a priori* and that from the perception of the species.

* The *Vita* has an A proposition for its major premiss; and the *Avita*, an A proposition, converted, *per accidens*.

† As for instance, in a proposed inference of the form—'sound has earth for its substrate, since it is a quality'—the possibility of sound being in earth being excluded on the ground of its never being concomitant with smell, the quality specific of earth; and there being no possibility perceived, of sound residing elsewhere, we have the notion of sound, being a quality specific of Vril (*Akâsa*) as *Parisesha*.

the characteristics of its species (previously) unknown; of this kind are all inferences with regard to the sense-organs; because in all inferences of this kind, the existence of the cause of the perception of colour (*i. e.* vision) is inferred from the fact of its being an effect (and as such necessarily caused). Though the characteristics of instrumental cause in general have been perceived in objects like axes, &c., yet those of the species of the particular kind of such causes—the sense-organs which are inferred to exist as causing the perception of colour, &c.—are nowhere perceived. Nor are the individuals—the particular sense-organs—forming the class 'Sense,' perceptible to our mortal eyes; as are those of the class 'Fire.' In this lies the difference between the *Purvavat* (*a priori*) Inference and the *Sâmânyatodrishta* (Inference based on the perception of the species); though they resemble each other, inasmuch as both are *Vita* (affirmative). Here (in *Sâmânyatodrishta*) *drishta* = *darsâna*, *i. e.*, perception; and *Sâmânyatah* = of Sâmânya, *i. e.*, species or class; *to Sâmânya* is added the universal affix *Tasi*.* Thus then the term means—'The Inference, consisting in the comprehension by the individual of a species whose general characteristics are not known.' All this has been fully explained by us in the "*Nyâyavârtika-tâtparyatika*;" and is not repeated here for fear of being too prolix.

Valid Testimony based on Inference.

(39). Since the comprehension of the connection of words (in a sentence) is preceded by a process of inference with regard to the cause of action of the experienced youth directed, on hearing the words of the experienced director, and further, since the comprehension of the meaning of a word is due to the knowledge of its denotation,—therefore Valid Testimony, is preceded by, and based upon, Inference. Hence, after having defined Inference, the author next defines Valid Testimony.

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* Here, of course, having the force of the Genitive.

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"Valid Testimony *is true revelation*." Here the mention of Valid Testimony is merely a statement of the term to be defined; the rest forming the definition. 'True' means 'proper;' hence 'true revelation' means 'proper revelation.' '*S'ruti*' is the comprehension of the meaning of a sentence by means of the sentence.

The definition of *Trustworthy Assertion*, given in the Kârikâ, explained.

(40). This is self-evident. It is true; since all apparent discrepancies and doubts with regard to it are set aside by the fact of its proceeding from the Veda, which is superhuman. Thus also the knowledge obtained from Smritis, Purânas, &c., which are founded on the Veda, becomes true.

The Self-Evidence of *Sruti*.

(41). To the primeval Kapila, in the beginning of the Kalpa, we may attribute the reminiscence of the S'ruti studied in his previous birth, as we recollect, after the night's sleep, the occurrences of the previous day. And so did the revered Jaigishavya, in his conversation with Avatta, speak of his reminiscence of his births extending over such a long time as ten Mahâkalpas: "By me, evolving through ten Mahâkalpas, &c."

Smritis and Puranas included in "Apta-Vachana."

(42). By saying '*true* revelation,' all pretended revelations such as those of Sâkya, Bhikshu, &c.,—have been set aside. The invalidity of these systems is due to their making unreasonable assertions, to want of sufficient basis, to their making statements contradictory to proofs, and lastly to their being accepted only by *Mlechchhas* or other mean people.

Pretended revelations set aside.

(43). 'तु' distinguishes "Valid Testimony" from Inference. The meaning of a sentence is the *Prameya* (the fact to be proved): 'sentence' or 'word' is not its property; and as such could not be its mark or predicate. Nor does a sentence, ex-

Differentiation of Valid Testimony from Inference.

pressing a meaning, stand in need of the comprehension of the connection of the mark and the marked which are the necessary conditions of Inference; since the sentence of a new poet, previously unknown, expresses the meaning of sentences touching unknown regions.*

The other proofs postulated by other systems shown to be included in the three already defined.

(44). Having thus defined proofs, generically as well as specifically, the other kinds of proofs, Analogy and the rest, postulated by others, can be shown to be included in the above.

Analogy or Upamânâ shown to be included in Apta Vakya.

(45). *Analogy* (*Upamânâ*) is exemplified as 'The *gavaya* (a species of ruminants analogous to the deer) is like the cow.' But the knowledge produced by this statement is nothing more than that produced by our "Valid Testimony." The knowledge that the term '*gavaya*' denotes some object resembling the cow, is also nothing more than Inference. The object with reference to which experienced persons use a particular term, comes to be denoted by that term, in the absence of any other object (that could be so denoted), *e.g.*, गोत्व (the class 'cow') is denoted by गो. In the same manner experienced people having asserted that "the object denoted by the term, 'gavaya' resembles the cow," the term '*gavaya*' comes to denote something resembling the cow;—and this knowledge is purely Inferential. The cognition of similarity of the perceived '*gavaya*' with the cow is the result of mere Perception; hence, the cow being recalled to memory, the cognition of the '*gavaya's*' similarity thereto becomes perception, pure and simple. And it cannot be further urged that the similitude†

* Whereas Inference can belong only to objects previously known.

† This is levelled against the assertion of Mandana Misra in his *Mimansanukramani*, that the object of analogy is not either the *gavaya* or the cow, but the similarity of the one in the other, which cannot be said to be amenable to perception.

existing in the cow is different from that in the 'gavaya' since the similarity of one species with another consists in both of them having a common mode of the conjunction of their various parts; and this common method of conjunction can be one only; and this being perceived in the '*gavaya*,' must be the same in the cow also. Thus (we find) that nothing is left to be proved where Analogy could be applied to advantage. Hence Analogy is not a distinct Proof.

Apparent Inconsistency (Arthâpatti) shown to be included in Inference.

(46). Similarly Apparent Inconsistency (Arthâpatti) is not a distinct Proof. For the case of the assumption of the living Chaitra being outside, when he is not found at home, is cited as an instance of Apparent Inconsistency. To us, Sânkhyas, this is nothing more than Inference. A particular object being non-pervading or finite, when not found in one place, must be in another. The major premiss—in the form, that a finite object being in one place cannot be in another—is easily got at, with reference to our own bodies. Similarly the cognition of the external existence of an existing object, is inferred, from the mark of its not being *in* the house; and this process is purely Inferential. Chaitra's existence somewhere else cannot set aside the fact of his non-existence in the house; and as such, non-existence in the house could, very reasonably, be urged as a reason for his being outside. Nor does the fact of his non-existence in the house cut off his existence altogether; and consequently his entity could be said to retain itself outside. For Chaitra's non-existence in the house contradicts either his existence *in toto*, or merely his existence in the house. The former alternative cannot stand, the subjects of the two propositions being different.* If you say that by the general assertion—"he must be *somewhere*" (without any definite place being mentioned), any particular place—even

* It is only when two statements are made, with regard to one and the same subject, that they contradict each other; which is not the case in the present instance.

the house—may be implied; and as such the non-existence *in the house* becomes uncertain; and thus there being co-objectivity between the two propositions noticed above, they would contradict each other,—we reply: No: because the non-existence in the house having been ascertained by evidence—of Perception in the present instance—cannot be set aside, on the ground of uncertainty, by the *doubtful* fact of his existence therein. It is not proper to assert that his proved non-existence in the house, while overthrowing his uncertain existence therein, would set aside his existence *in toto* and set aside all doubt (of his existence in space). Because Chaitra's existence *in the house*, being contradictory to his proved non-existence therein, is overthrown by this latter: not so his existence *in toto*; since this latter fact is altogether disconnected with the non-existence *in the house*. Thus it is very proper to say that the external existence of an entity is inferred from its characteristic of internal non-existence. Hence the assertion—that the subject of *Arthâpatti* is the removal of contradiction after due consideration of the strength of two contradicting proofs—is set aside; for there is no real contradiction between the particular (the proof of non-existence in the house) and the general (that of mere existence). The other examples of *Arthâpatti* may similarly be shown to be included in Inference. Hence it is established that Apparent Inconsistency (*Arthâpatti*) is not a proof distinct from (Disjunctive) Inference.

Negation (Abhâva) shown to be included in Perception.

(47). *Negation* (*Abhâva*) again is nothing more than mere Perception. The Negation of a 'jar' is nothing more than a particular modification of the Earth characterised by (its) absence. Since all existences, with the single exception of Consciousness or Intelligence (*Chit—Sakti*), are momentarily undergoing modifications, all of which are perceptible to the senses; therefore there is no ground left uncovered by Perception for which we should postulate a distinct proof in the shape of Negation (*Abhâva*).

Probability (Sambhava) shown to be included in Inference.

(48). "Probability" (*Sambhava*)—*e. g.*, the knowledge of the existence of lesser weights in greater ones—is also an instance of Inference. The heavier weight is known as not capable of existing without the lesser ones; and this fact leads to the belief in the existence of the latter in the former.

Rumour (Aitihya) discarded, as affording doubtful testimony.

(49). That is called "Rumour" (*Aitihya*), by the Sankhyas, whose first speaker is unknown, and which is handed down by mere tradition—*e. g.*, 'a *Yaksha* resides in the Vata tree.' This —Rumour—is not a proof; since it is doubtful owing to the fact of the first speaker being unknown. "Valid Testimony," however, is that of which the speaker is known to be veracious. Thus the three-foldness of proofs is established.

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(50). Thus have been defined severally the different kinds of proof, with a view to demonstrate the existence of the *Manifested*, the *Unmanifested* and the *Knowing*. Of these, the *Manifested*—earth, &c.,—are perceptible in their true form, even to the common ploughman. And similarly the *a priori* Inference with regard to the existence of fire in the mountain, could easily be arrived at through the mark of the smoke. Such being the case, a system of philosophy, propounded for the sake of these, loses much of its importance and necessary character. Hence what is difficult to be got at (by ordinary methods) should be explained by philosophy. Consequently the cases of application of the different proofs are laid down.

KÂRIKÂ VI.

The cases of application of the different proofs.

Knowledge of supersensuous objects is obtained through Inference—the *Sâmanyatodrishta*. What is not proved by this is proved by revelation.

(51). The particle तु distinguishes the *Sâmânyatodrishta* from Perception and Inference *a priori*. Through the *Sâmânyatodrishta* Inference there arises knowledge of *Pradhâna** (Primordial Matter or Nature), and the Spirit both of which transcend the senses,—and this knowledge is due to the operation of Buddhi reflected in Consciousness (*Chaitanya* (belonging to Spirit). The above implies the application of the *Seshavat* (Negative) Inference also.

(52). Then, does the *Sâmânyatodrishta* Inference alone apply to all objects transcending the senses? If so, we shall have to deny the existence of the Great Principle (Mahat), &c., as also of Heaven, Destiny and the Gods in heaven, in the case of which the inference does not apply. Hence it is said —"*By this, &c.*," and as a simple "by this" would suffice to give the required meaning, the 'च' must be taken as referring to *Seshavat* (Negative) Inference.†

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(53). *Objection*—Granted all this. But the non-perception of such objects as 'sky-flowers,' &c., leads to their being accepted as non-entities; in the same way we might infer the non-existence of Nature, and the rest (which are like sky-flowers not amenable to perception). This being the case, why

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* Henceforth Pradhâna, Prakriti or Avyakta will, for the sake of simplicity, be translated as 'Nature.'

† There is a difference of opinion among Commentators as to the explanation of this Kârikâ, especially the first half of it. Vâchaspati Misra, as we have seen, explains it as—'we have a knowledge of supersensuous objects, through the *Sâmânyatodrishta* Inference.' Gaudapada takes it the same way. But Nârâyana Tirtha explains thus—"In '*Sâmânyatah*,' the affix '*tasi*' is substituted for the genitive case-termination. Thus the meaning is that of all (generic) objects amenable to the senses, we have a knowledge from *Perception*, &c." This last is the sense accepted by Davies in his translation. But the former interpretation appears to be the more reasonable. Because it cannot be said that Inference does not apply to objects amenable to the senses. Davies, in a foot-note *in loco*, says that '*Sâmânya*,' "does not mean, &c." But he loses sight of the fact that "*Sâmânyatodrishta*" is the technical name of a particular kind of Inference.

have recourse to the various kinds of Inference for the sake of these latter?

The reply is—

KÂRIKÂ VII.

"(Non-perception arises) from excessive distance, extreme proximity, destruction of the sense-organs, absence of mind (inattention), subtlety (or minuteness), intervention (or the existence of some intermediate barrier), predominance (of other objects), and from intermixture with with other like objects."

(54). The "non-perception" of the following Kârikâ is to be construed along with this, in accordance with the maxim of the "looking (back) of the lion."*

The different causes of the non-perception of objects, explained.

A bird soaring high, though existing, is yet not perceived on account of *extreme remoteness.* 'Extreme' (*ati*) must also be taken with 'proximity' (*sâmipya)*—*e. g.*, the non-perception, through extreme nearness, of the collyrium (anjana) in the eye.

"*Destruction of organs*" —*e. g.*, blindness, deafness, &c.

"*From absence of mind*"—As a person, under the influence of (some very strong) desire, &c., does not perceive objects, even in bright daylight, though quite within the range of his senses.

"*From Minuteness*"—As for instance, however, much we may concentrate our mind (*i. e.*, however attentively we may look) we can never perceive atoms, though under our very eyes.

"*From Intervention*"—*e. g.*, one cannot see the Queen behind the walls.

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* "The maxim of the lion's (backward) glance, is generally used to mark the connection of a thing with what precedes and follows." [*Vide.* The *Nyaya-Latika in loco.*]

"*From subjugation or suppression*"—*e. g.*, the non-perception of the constellations, suppressed by the brighter rays of the sun.

"*From intermixture*"—as one does not preceive drops of rain-water, disappearing in a tank.

(55). The च in the Kârikâ has a collective force, implying even those not here mentioned; such as '*non-production*' is also among the causes of non-perception—as one cannot perceive, in the milk, the curd, not yet produced therefrom.

(56). The upshot of the whole then is, that the non-existence of a certain object cannot be inferred merely from the fact of its not being perceived; for there is danger of the principle being unwarrantably stretched too far. Thus, for instance, a certain individual, getting out of his house, can never be he said to be assured of the non-existence of the inmates, simply on the ground of his not seeing them. The fact is that it is only with reference to objects capable of being perceived on the occasion, that non-perception leads to the inference of their non-existence, And this capability of being perceived can never belong to Nature &c., (which are by their nature imperceptible); and as such it is not proper for intelligent men to infer their non-existence merely from their non-perception or imperceptibility.

Question—Which of the above—mentioned causes (of non-perception) applies in the case of Nature, &c.? The *reply* is—

Kârikâ VIII.

The non-apprehension of this (Nature) is due to its subtlety, not to its non-existence; since it is apprehended through its effects. These effects are the Great Principle, and the rest—effects (some of) which are similar, and (some) dissimilar to Nature.

The non-apprehension of Nature, due to subtlety and not to non-existence Its existence verified by its effects.

(57). Why should we not, continues the objector, attribute the non-apprehension of Nature to its non-existence, as we do of the seventh kind of unction (in rhetoric)?

The Author replies.—"*Not due to its non-existence.*" Why? "*Because it is apprehended through its effects.*" *It* refers to Nature. The proofs of the apprehension of the Spirit will be mentioned later on, in Kârikâ XVII. If we find direct perception inapplicable in the case of objects, whose existence is ascertained by means of evidence other than that afforded by perception itself, we at once infer the inapplicability to be due to incapacity* (and not to non-existence of the object itself).† The seventh unction on the other hand, has not its existence ascertained by any proof, and as such, the incapacity of perception cannot be urged in its case.

(58). Granted all this, but which are the effects from whose existence, you infer that of Nature? The reply is—"*The Great Principle, and the rest are the effects.*"

This will be proved later on (Kârikâ XXII.) Next are mentioned the similarity and dissimilarity in form, of these effects, with Nature—the comprehension of both of which is auxiliary to discriminative knowledge:—"*Similar and dissimilar to Nature.*"

This division will be further treated of in Kârikâ XXIII *et. seq.*

Different views with regard to the nature of the effect. (1). The Bauddha view of the effect being an entity arising from non-entity. (2). The Vedanta view of the whole series of effects being a mere

(59). From (the existence of) the effect is inferred (that of) the cause:—on this point there is diversity of opinion. Thus some philosophers (the Bauddhas) assert the production of entity from non-entity. Others (the Vedantists) represent the whole

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* On the part of perception.

† This statement is with reference to Nature, the existence of which is proved through its effects—the proof being based on the general proposition "Every effect must have a cause." The effects, Mahat, &c., are perceptible; these must have a cause, and this cause is Nature.

evolution from a single real entity. (3). The Nyaya and Vaiseshika view of the effect being a non-entity arising from entity. (4). The Sânkhya view of the effect being an entity arising from an entity.

series of effects as a mere evolution from a single entity, and not a real entity in itself. A third set of philosophers (the Nayâyikas) hold the production of non-entity from entity. The Sânkhyas lastly teach that from entity emanates entity.

The impossibility of the existence of nature being proved in accordance with the first three views.

(60). Now, we cannot establish the existence of Nature, in accordance with the first three theories. The Universe consists essentially of sound, &c., which are different forms and modifications of pleasure, pain and delusion,—and as such bears testimony to the character of Nature, which lies in its being constituted by goodness, passion and darkness. Such being the case, if we assert the production of entity from non-entity (the Bauddha view) [we would land ourselves in an absurdity] *viz.*, how could the cause, an undefinable (unreal) non-entity, consist of sound, and the rest which are different forms of pleasure, &c.? For, certainly we cannot hold the identity of entity and non-entity (two opposites). Nor could the doctrine of the emanation of entity from entity (the Sânkhya view) be upheld in accordance with the theory that the phenomena of sound, &c., are mere evolutions from a single entity (the Vedânta view). Nor again could we attribute phenomenality (or changeability) to the single ; in fact the notion of such phenomenality (changeableness) with regard to the unphenomenal (unchangeable) would be a mistake. Even in the theory of Kanâda and Gautama, who maintain the production of non-entity from entity, the existence of Nature cannot be proved ; since, according to them, the cause is not identical with the effect, inasmuch as entity and non-entity are diagonally opposed to each other.*

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* According to the Nayâyikas the cause is an entity, the effect a non-entity ; and since an entity and a non-entity cannot be identical, therefore the cause and the effect cannot be identical.

(61). Hence, in order to establish the existence of Nature, the author first declares the effect to be an entity, (even prior to causal operation).

Kârikâ IX.

The five proofs of the effect being an entity.

The effect is an entity; (1) because a non-entity can never be brought into existence; (2) because of a (determinate) relation of the cause (with the effect); (3) because everything cannot be possible (by any and every means); (4) because a competent (cause) can do (only) that for which it is competent; and (5) lastly, because the effect is non-different from the cause.

The Bauddha view refuted.

(62). The effect is an entity—that is to say, it is so even prior to the operation of the cause. Against this theory, the Nayâyikas cannot urge the fault of the absurdity of the production of an already existing object. Because though the production of the sprout and the jar is consequent upon the destruction of the seed and the lump of clay respectively, yet causal energy can only be attributed to an entity in the shape of the seed, and not to its destruction [a kind of negation, a non-entity]. Further if you assert the production of entity from non-entity, this latter, being at any time available, would give rise to the (absurd) possibility of any and every effect being produced at any and all times. All this has been explained by us in the *Nyâyavârtikatâtparyatîkâ*.

The Vedânta view met.

(63). The belief in the existence of the phenomenal world cannot be said to be illusory unless we have some proof invalidating its existence.*

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* This is urged against the Vedânta theory of the effect being an evolution from a single real entity.

(64). Now remains the theory of Gautama and Kanâda, with reference to which the author asserts—"*The effect is an entity.*" In support of this assertion, the following proofs are adduced :—(1) "*Since a non-entity can never be brought into existence.*" If the effect were a non-entity before the operation of the cause, it could never be brought into existence by anybody. By even a thousand artists blue can never be made yellow. If you assert entity and non-entity to be mere properties belonging to the jar, then in that case, the qualified object (the jar) being non-existent, no property could belong to it; and as such the entity the (property) remains in the same condition (*i. e.*, cannot be attributed to the jar). Nor can non-entity (as a quality) be attributed to it. For, how can non-entity belong to the jar (as a property) when it is neither in any way related to it nor cognate to it? Hence as after the causal operation, so too before it, the effect subsists.

The Nyâya and Vaiseshika view criticised; and the Sânkhya view established.

Such being the case, all that remains to be done by the cause is the manifestation or unfolding of the pre-existing effect [*i. e.*, its emanation from the cause wherein it has been lying latent]. The manifestation of something existing beforehand is a fact quite compatible with experience; as of the oil from sesamum by pressure, of rice from paddy by thumping, and of milk from cows, by milking. On the other hand, we have no instance of the manifestation of a non-entity; for a non-entity is never seen to be either manifested or produced.

(65). (2) For the following reason also does the effect subsist before the operation of the cause: "*Because of a* (*determinate*) *relation of the cause with the effect.*" That is to say, the effect subsists because of the relation holding between itself and its material cause. That is, the cause produces the effect when in relation with it; and (we all know) that no relation with a non-existing effect is possible; hence the effect must be an entity.

(66). Granted all this; but, continues the objector wherefore is the effect not producible by causes unconnected therewith? We reply, that under such circumstances, only non-entity would be produced. With this reply in view the author lays down :—

(3) "*Since everything cannot be possible.*"—If the effect unconnected with the cause could be produced (by that cause), then every effect would arise from every cause (without restriction), there being no other limitation save that of unconnectedness (which any cause can have with reference to any effect.) But such is not the case. Hence a connected effect only can be produced by a connected cause, and not an unconnected effect by an unrelated one:—as say the Sânkhyas—"There is no relation of the cause, imbued with entity, with non-entity; those holding the production of an unconnected effect will land themselves in a *regressus ad infinitum.*"

(67). *Objection:* Be it so: But an entity, though unrelated, will always produce the effect for which it is competent; and this competency too could be inferred from the presence of the effect, and as such we sail clear of the *regressus ad infinitum.*

Reply: (4) "*Since a competent cause does that for which it is competent.*"—Now then, asks our author, does this '*Capability* or *competency*' belonging to the cause imbued with the causal energy, apply to every effect or only to those to which the cause is competent? If the former, then the same confusion arises; if the latter, then the following question will arise—how does the energy apply to non-entity? On this point if it be asserted that the (causal) energy itself is so constituted as to produce only certain effects, not others; then we ask—Is this peculiarly constituted energy of yours connected with the particular effect or not? In the former case, no relation being possible with a non-entity, the effect must be an entity; in the latter, you have the same endless series of causes and effects. Hence it is reasonably declared

that (the effect is an entity) "*because a competent cause can only produce an effect for which it is competent.*"

(68). (5) For the following reason too is the effect an entity: "*Since the effect is connate* (*non-different*) *with the cause.*"—The effect is not different from the cause; and the cause is an entity; then how can the effect, non-different from this latter, be a non-entity?

Proofs of the non-difference of cause and effect.

(69). The proofs establishing the non-difference of cause and effect are the following: (*a*) The cloth (an effect) is not different from the threads (its material cause), since it is a property characteristically inhering in the latter [*i. e.*, since the cloth inheres in the threads constituting it]. An object differing in its essence from another, can never inhere in it; as the cow in the horse; but the cloth is inherent in the threads; hence it is not different from it in its essence. (*b*) Owing to the causal relation subsisting between the cloth and the thread, they differ not in essence; because the causal relation can never subsist between objects essentially different from one another—*e. g.* between jar and cloth. But between cloth and threads we do find the causal relation subsisting; hence they can never differ from one another, in essence. (*c*) For the following reason also, there is no difference between cloth and threads: because of the absence of junction and non-contiguity between the two. We see junction taking place between objects differing from one another, as between a pool and a tree; the same with regard to non-contiguity, as between the Himavân and the Vindhya. In the instance before us, however, there is neither junction nor non-contiguity, and as such, no difference in essence. (*d*) For the following reason too, cloth and thread do not differ in essence: because of the non-inclusion (in the particular effect) of any (other) effect different in weight (from the cause). As a matter of fact, an object differing in essence from another always has a weight different from that of the latter—*e. g.* the lowering of

the balance caused by two *palas** is more than that caused by a single *pala*. But we find no such difference between the effects of the weight of the cloth and those of the weight of the threads constituting it. Hence cloth is non-different from the threads. These are the proofs afforded by a process of negative inference [*Avitânumâna*—see, *Kârikâ* V] establishing the non-difference (of cloth and threads in particular, and of cause and effect in general).

(70). The non-difference being thus established, (it is decided that) the cloth is only a particular development of the threads combining themselves in various ways; and that the two do not differ from each other in essence. No essential difference can be proved on the ground of self-contradictory actions in themselves (*i. e.*, the effects), (difference apprehended in) language, or the difference in action (of the cause and that of the effect).† Because these differences do not contradict each other, when we see that they are brought about by the appearance and disappearance of particular conditions—as for instance, the limbs of the tortoise disappear on entering its body and appear again on emerging from it; but for this, we cannot say that the limbs are either produced from, or destroyed by, the tortoise. In the same manner, jar, crown, &c., which are only particular developments of clay, gold, &c., on emanating from these latter, are said to be produced; and

* A particular weight.

† *Self-contradictory actions in themselves.* When the cloth is reduced to threads, we say 'the *cloth* is *destroyed*, and the *threads* are *produced*;' now *destruction* and *production* are diagonally opposed; and as such cannot be predicated of the same thing at one and the same time; but we do predicate *production* of the *threads* and *destruction* of the *cloth* at one and the same time. So they differ.

Difference apprehended in language—as when we use such sentences as—"Cloth is made of threads."

Difference in action—Thus we see that *cloth* can *cover* an object which certainly the threads cannot. And objects differing in their action must differ in essence.

These three are the objections brought forward against the theory of the non-difference of cause and effect. Each of these is considered and refuted separately in the following lines.

on entering them again (*i. e.*, being changed into clay, &c.,) they disappear and are said to be destroyed.

The Bhagavadgitâ supporting the Sânkhya view.

Nor again can a non-entity ever be produced or an entity destroyed; as says the revered Krishna-dvaipayana:—"There is neither an existence of non-entity, nor non-existence of entity" [*Bhagavadgitâ* II—16]. As the tortoise is not different from its own contracting and expanding limbs, so also are jar, crown, &c., not different from (their material cause), clay, gold, &c. The assertion "cloth is in (*i. e.*, made of) threads," is as consistent as the assertion—"Tilaka trees in this forest."*

(71.) Nor does difference of purpose and action establish difference in essence; since a single substance can have manifold functions, as the fire alone can burn, digest and give light. Nor is fixity of purpose and action a ground of difference among substances, ; for we see that this fixity varies in the substances themselves, taken singly or collectively; as a bearer, in company with other bearers, can carry the palanquin, which he can never do when alone. Similarly, the threads though unable to *cover*, when taken singly, yet do *cover* when conjoined and thus having their existence as cloth manifested (*i. e.*, having developed into cloth).

An objection,—based on the nature of the *manifestation* of the effect.

(72). *Objection*:—Granted all this. But, is the *manifestation* or *appearance* itself an entity or a non-entity, prior to the operation of the cause? If the latter, then you admit the production of non-entity. If, however, you hold to the former alternative, then have done with the causal agency altogether; for we do not see the necessity of

* As the Tilaka trees, constituting the forest, are nothing besides the forest itself; and yet we speak of the "Tilaka trees in the forest," so with the assertion with regard to the cloth and threads.

the causal operation when the effect already exists. If you assume the manifestation of the manifestation, you will be landed on a *regressus ad infinitum.* Hence the assertion, that 'the threads are made to have their existence as cloth manifested,' is invalid.

Reply—The objection set aside as common to both theories.

(73). To all this we make the following reply. Even on your own theory of the production of non-entity, we ask—what is this '*production*'—? An entity or a non-entity? If an entity, then have done with the agency of the cause; if, however, you assert it to be a non-entity, you will have to postulate the production of that production and so on *ad infinitum*[and such being the case, the fault of *regressus ad infinitum* you urged against us, loses its force, since it is common to both of us; and consequently it is not fair to urge it against one].*

(74). If, in order to avoid the *regressus ad infinitum,* you declare that the production is nothing more or less than the cloth itself;—then the notion of *cloth* would coincide with that of *production*; and as such, on saying *cloth,* one should not add *is produced* (because it would be a useless repetition); nor could he say the *cloth is destroyed*; because *destruction* and *production* (denoted by *cloth*) can never coexist.

(75). Consequently, we have only two alternatives: the *production* of the cloth must inhere either in its material cause (the threads), or in its mere *existence* (*Sattá*). In either case, the cloth cannot be produced without the operation of causes. Thus it is proved that the operation of the cause is necessary for the manifestation of already existing effects. (If you urge against us the common saying—'causes do (produce) the forms of cloth"—then we reply that) the causes have no relation with the forms of cloth; because these *forms* are not *actions*, and it is only with actions that causes are related; or else they lose their character.

* This point has been discussed by S'ankarâchârya, in his Bhâshya on the Vedânta Sutras, under the aphorism "*Swapakshadoshâchcha.*"

(76). Thus then it is proved that the effect is an entity.

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(77). Having thus proved the effect to be an entity, a fact favourable to the doctrine of the existence of Nature, the author next states the similarity and dissimilarity between the Manifested and the Unmanifested, a right comprehension of which appertains to discriminative knowledge; and this is done in order to show the character of Prakriti, whose existence is to be proved.

KÂRIKÂ X.

Points of dissimilarity between the Manifested and the Unmanifested.

The Manifested has a cause: it is neither eternal nor pervading (*i. e.*, universal); it is active (*i. e.*, mobile or modifiable), multiform, dependent, predicative (or characteristic), conjunct and subordinate. The Unmanifested is the reverse.

All the qualifications explained.

(78). "*Hetumat*"—*i. e.*, having cause. The question as to what is the cause of what, will be dealt with later on (Kârikâ XXII).

(79). "*Not Eternal*"—*i. e.*, destructible, revolving [returning to the condition of its material cause*].

(80). "*Not pervading*"—that is to say, the Manifested does not extend over all evolving or developing substances. The effect is pervaded by the cause but not *vice versâ*, *e. g.*, Consciousness (Buddhi) can never pervade Nature (Prakriti), and as such is non-pervading.

(81). "*Active*"—*i. e.*, mobile. Consciousness (Buddhi), &c., have mobility inasmuch as they renounce certain bodies they have hitherto occupied, and occupy others;

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* Since the Sânkhyas do not admit of an utter annihilation of a substance.

as for the mobility of earth, &c., it is too well known to need an explanation.

(82). "*Multiform*"—Since Consciousness &c., differ in different individuals; earth, &c., too are multiform in the shape of jars, &c.

(83). "*Dependent*"—On its cause; though the effect is non-different from its cause, yet the assertion of the relation of subserviency is based upon a difference conventionally accepted; as we say—"the Tilakas in the forest."

(84). "*Characteristic or predicative*"—*i. e.*, of Nature. Consciousness (Buddhi), &c., are characteristics of Nature, which cannot be its own characteristic, though it can be so of the Spirit (Purusha).

(85). "*Conjunct*"—Bearing in itself the relation of whole and parts. Conjunction consists in approach preceded by (*i. e.*, after) non-approach; and connection with such approach of the whole to the part is what is connoted by "*conjunct*;" as for instance, earth, &c., conjoin among themselves, and so do others. On the other hand, there is no conjunction of Nature (Prakriti) with Consciousness (Buddhi), since the two are connate (and as such there can be no non-approach); nor is there reciprocal conjunction among Goodness, Foulness and Darkness, since there is no non-approach among them [since they all conjointly inhere in Nature].

(86). "*Subordinate*"—Consciousness stands in need of the aid of Nature in the completion of the production of its effect, *Self-consciousness* (Ahankâra). Without this aid, being by itself too weak, it could not be efficient to produce its effect. Similarly do Self-consciousness and the rest stand in need of similar aids in the production of their several effects. Thus, each and all stand in need of the perfecting hand of Nature. Hence the *Manifested*, though efficient in the production of its effects, is yet subordinate, inasmuch as it stands in need of the aid of the Supreme Nature (the highest in the scale).

(87). "*The Unmanifested is the reverse*"—*i. e.*, of the Manifested. That is to say—the Unmanifested is uncaused, eternal, pervading, and inactive (immobile)—though to Prakriti does belong the action of evolution (or development,) yet it can have no mobility—single, independent (self-sufficient), non-predicative, unconjunct, compact (*i. e.*, not made up of parts), and non-subservient (supreme).

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(88). Having thus explained the dissimilarities of the Manifested and the Unmanifested, the author now mentions the similarities between these, and the dissimilarity of both of these again from the Spirit:

KÂRIKÂ XI.

The points of similarity between the Manifested and the Unmanifested and those of dissimilarity of these from the soul.

The Manifested has the three constituent Attributes (Gunas), it is indescriminating, objective, generic (or common), non-intelligent (or insentient) and productive. So also is Nature. The Spirit is the reverse, and yet also (in some respects) similar.

(89). "*Having the three constituent Attributes.*"—That is to say, the Manifested is possessed of the three attributes of pleasure, pain and dulness. By this assertion are set aside all the theories attributing pleasure and pain to the Spirit.

(90). "*Indescriminative*"—*i. e.*, as Nature is not descriminated from itself; so too the Great Principle (Mahat or Buddhi) being connate with Nature, cannot be descriminated from it. Or *indescriminativeness* may mean merely *co-operativeness*: nothing singly (among the Manifested) can be a cause efficient for its effect; it can be so only when in company with others; and as such no effect is possible from any cause taken singly by itself.

An objection based on the Idealism of the Banddhas.

(91). Some (the Vijnâna-Vâdi Banddhas) assert that it is *Idea* (Vijnâna) alone that is denoted by the words pleasure, pain and dulness; and that there exists nothing besides Vijnâna that could possess these (pleasures, &c.,) as its attributes.

The Idealistic objection set aside.

In opposition to this view it is laid down that the Manifested is "*objective*" (=perceptible). That is to say—it is so outside (and as such over and above) Vijnâna, and as such it is "*Common*"—*i. e.*, perceived (simultaneously) by many persons. If, however, these were nothing more or less than Vijnâna, then in that case, this latter being uncommon (or specifically belonging to particular individuals), all the Manifested elements would be so also; for the Vijnâna of one person can never be perceived by another, owing to the imperceptibility of any intellect other than the agent's own. On the contrary, in the case of a Manifested substance (such as) the glances of a dancing girl, the attentiveness of many persons to that single object is quite a consistent fact, which it could not be if we were to reduce all existence to mere *Idea* or Vijnâna.

(92). "*Non-intelligent or Insentient.*"—Nature (Prakriti), Consciousness (Buddhi), &c., are all non-intelligent. We do not, like the Vainâsikas (a scion of the Bauddhas) attribute intelligence to Buddhi.

(93). "*Productive or Prolific*"—*i. e.*, possessed of the faculty of producing or developing. The particular possessive affix (*Matu*) is used in order to denote the constant character of the property of productiveness with regard to the Manifested. That is to say, these are ever accompanied by their several emanations or developments, whether similar or dissimilar.

(94). "*So also is Nature*"—*i. e.*, as the Manifested is, so is the Unmanifested Nature. That is to say, the properties of the *Manifested*, just enumerated, belong to Nature also.

(95). The dissimilarity of these from the Spirit is stated—"*Reverse is the Spirit.*"

(96). *Objection:*—Granted all this: But how can you assert the Spirit to be the reverse of the Manifested and the Unmanifested; when we see that there are points of similarity between the Spirit and the Unmanifested—such as Uncausedness, Eternality, &c.,—and also between the Spirit and the Manifested—such as plurality?

Objection—There are points of similarity also between the soul and the Manifested as well as the Unmanifested.

We reply: "*Yet also*"—that is to say, though there are points of similarity, such as uncausedness, &c., yet there are points of dissimilarity also, in the form of non-possession of the triad of attributes (Gunas), and the rest.

The objection conceded to-there are points of similarity as well as of dissimilarity.

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(97). The Manifested and the Unmanifested have been described as having 'three Attributes'.* Now the author names and describes these three Constituent Attributes:

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* This word Attribute requires some explanation. It stands for the *Gunas* of the Sânkhyas—a term denoting the constituent elements of Nature or Primordial Matter;—as says Colebrooke—"These three qualities are not mere accidents of Nature, but are of its essence and enter into its composition." On this Davies very rightly remarks—"Nature or Primordial Matter is described. in the system of Kapila as formed by the *Gunas*, which were primarily in equilibrium, and so long as this state existed, there was no emanation into separate forms of matter." And, as we shall see later on, the intert condition of Nature is disturbed by the subsequent predominance of the Attribute of Foulness (Rajas). Davies has rendered this important word—*Guna*—by *Mode*. I am afraid this is apt to mislead. For *Mode*, as understood by Western philosophers, is an affection of a substance, "a quality which it *may have or not, without affecting its essence* or existence." Now as we have seen the *Guna* of the Sânkhyas is almost the reverse of this—it belongs to a substance as constituting its very essence. I have perferred to translate *Guna* as *Attribute*—using the latter term in the sense imparted to it specifically, by Spinoza, who thus distinguishes between *Attribute* and *Mode*: "By *Attribute*, I understand, that which the mind perceives of substance *as constituting its essence*. By *Mode*, I understand, the affections of substances, &c.," (the italics are mine).—G. J.

KÂRIKÂ XII.

The Attributes are of the nature of love, aversion, and stupefaction. They are adapted to illumination, activity, and restraint; and they mutually subdue, and support, and produce each other and consort together (for one purpose).

The character of the three Attributes (Gunas).

(98). These are called *Gunas* (literally, subsidiary or secondary) because they exist for the sake of others (the Spirits). The three Attributes will be named in order in the next Kârikâ. And according to the maxim of presight, common among writers, the "love, &c.," of this Kârikâ are to be taken in the same order (as "Goodness, &c.," in the next).

(99). Thus then, "*priti*" (love) being (a form of) pleasure, the attribute of Goodness is of the nature of pleasure; "*Apriti*" (aversion) being (a form of) pain, the attribute of Foulness (Rajas) is of the nature of pain; and, lastly, "*Vishâda*" being (a form of) stupefaction, the attribute of Darkness is of the nature of stupefaction. The word '*Âtmâ*' is inserted in order to guard against the theory that *pleasure* is nothing more than mere negation of pain, and *vice versâ*. Pleasure and pain are not negations of one another; on the contrary, they are entities independent of one another. Thus "*aprityâtma*" means one whose existence (not non-existence) consists in love or pleasure; "*vishâdâtma*" and "*aprityâtma*" may be similarly explained. The fact of pleasure and pain being entities by themselves, and not mere negations of one another, is one of common experience. If they were mere mutual negations, they would be mutually dependent; and thus the non-fulfilment of one would lead to that of the other.

(100). Having thus described the nature of the Attributes, the author next lays down their several functions—"*They are adapted to illumina-*

Their functions.

tion, activity, and restraint." Here, too, the three members of the compound are to be construed in the same order as before. Foulness (Rajas), in accordance with its active nature, would always and everywhere be urging the buoyant Goodness (Sattva) to action, if it were not restrained by the sluggish Darkness (Tamas)—by which restraint it operates only at times; thus Darkness (Tamas) becomes a restraining agency.

The method of their operation.

(101). Having thus laid down their functions, the author lays down the method of their operation—"*Mutually subdue and support, and produce one another, and consort together.*" "*Vritti*" (action) is to be construed with each member of the compound. Now, to explain, "*Mutually subduing*—" The Attributes are so constituted that when one is brought to play, by some external cause, it subdues the other; *e. g.*, Goodness attains to its peaceful state only after having subdued Foulness and Darkness. Similarly do Passion and Darkness, in their turn, attain to their respective terrible and stupid conditions after having subdued the other two.

"*Mutually supporting*"—[*Anyonyâsrâyavrittayah*].—Though this statement as not applicable here, in the sense of *the container and the contained*, yet by 'support' (*Âsraya*) here is meant something on which depends the action of another—as for instance, Goodness helps by its illuminative character, only when helped by Foulness and Darkness through their respective properties of activity and restraint. [Or else Goodness by itself, without the touch of Foulness, would remain inert, and never be moved to action.] In the same manner do Passion and Darkness help respectively by their activity and restraint only when supported by the functions of the other two. "*Producing each other.*" That is to say, one can produce (its effects) only when resting on the other two. By *production* here is meant *development* or *modification*, which is always of the same character as the parent Attribute which latter, therefore, are uncaused there being no possibility of

anything differing in essence therefrom being the cause ; nor are they transient since they are never resolved into an essentially different cause. " *Consorting together.*" That is to say they are mutual companions, not existing apart from one another. च has a collective force. In support of the above, we have the following : " all (attr ibutes) are mutual consorts ; all omnipresent ; Goodness is the consort of Passion, Passion of Goodness, both of these again of Darkness, which latter again of both, Goodness and Passion. The first conjunction or separation of these has never been perceived."

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(102). It has been said—" *Adapted, to illumination activity, and restraint.*" Now it is explained what those are that are adapted, and wherefore are they so ?

Kârikâ XIII.

The three Attributes named and their nature explained.

१३ Goodness is considered to be buoyant and illuminating ; Foulness is exciting and versatile (mobile) ; Darkness, sluggish and enveloping. Their action, like a lamp, is for a (single) purpose.

The properties of Goodness (Satwa).

(103). Goodness alone is considered, by the masters of Sânkhya philosophy, to be buoyant and illuminating. *Buoyancy*—as opposed to sluggishness—is the property to which the ascension of objects is due ; it is to this property that the rising flame of fire is due. In some cases, this property also brings about lateral motion, as in the case of air. Thus, generally, *buoyancy* may be said to be that property in the cause, which greatly helps its efficiency to its particular effects ; *sluggishness*, on the other hand, would only dull the efficiency of the cause. The illuminative character of Goodness has already been explained (Kârikâ XII).

Buoyancy.

Illuminativeness.

(104). Goodness and Darkness, being by themselves inactive, stand in need of a force, exciting their causal operation; this force is supplied by Foulness, which excites them and rouses them from their natural passivity, and urges them on to the accomplishment of their respective effects. Hence, Foulness is said to be *exciting*. This exciting character of Foulness is next accounted for—"(*it is also*) *versatile*." This also proves the existence of Foulness as a particular Attribute, being necessary for the sake of action.

Necessity of the properties of Foulness (Rajas)—activity and excitingness.

(105). Foulness, in accordance with its versatility, would keep the triad of Attributes in a continuous whirl of activity, but for its being restrained by the "sluggish and enveloping" Attribute of Darkness, which thus limits the scope of its actions. Thus, in order to be distinguished from the active Foulness, Darkness has been said to be the *restrainer*—"*Darkness is sluggish and enveloping*." The particle *Eva* is to be construed—not only with "Darkness"—but with "Goodness" and "Foulness" also.

Necessity of the properties of Darkness (Tamas)—sluggishness and envelopingness.

(106). The enquirer objects: Instead of co-operating for a single purpose, the Attributes, being endued as they are with contradictory properties, would counteract each other, like opposed wrestlers, (and thus there would be no effect emanating from them). The author replies—"*Like a lamp, their action is for a single purpose*." We have all observed how the wick and the oil,—each, by itself, opposed to the action of fire—co-operate, when in contact with fire, for the single purpose of giving light; and the various humours of the body—wind, bile, and phlegm—though possessed of contradictory properties, co-operate for the single purpose of sustaining the body. Precisely in the same manner, do the three Attributes, though,

Objection—The Attributes of contradictory natures cannot co-operate.

Reply—they can, like wick and oil, in giving light.

possessed of mutually contradictory properties, co-operate towards a single end— the purpose (emancipation) of the Spirit. This will be further explained in Kârikâ XXXI.

Necessity of postulating the three Attributes, as causes of pleasure, pain and delusion respectively.

(107). To return to our original subject—Pleasure, pain and delusion, opposed to one another, lead us to three different causes connate with themselves respectively, (and as these causes we have postulated the three Attributes). These causes too must be multiform, since, by their very nature, they are mutually suppressive. As an example of the multiform character of these various causes of pleasure, pain and delusion, we may have the following: A single girl, young, beautiful, gentle and virtuous, is a source of delight to her husband, because with regard to him she is born with her essence consisting in pleasure. She pains her co-wives, because with regard to them, she is born with her essence consisting in pain. And, lastly, the same girl stupefies another man who is unable to get at her, because with regard to him, she has her essence in delusion. All the different forms—pleasure, &c., have been explained by this single instance of a woman. In the above case,

Goodness the cause of pleasure: Foulness of pain, and Darkness of delusion.

that which is the cause of pleasure, is the *Attribute of Goodness* which is essentially made up of pleasure; the cause of pain is Foulness, consisting in pain; and, lastly, the cause of delusion is *Darkness*, consisting of delusion. The properties, pleasure, illuminativeness, and buoyancy (belong-

The properties of each of the Attributes are not contradictory, and so they do not necessitate the assumption of different causes for each of them.

ing to Goodness) cannot be similarly said to be mutually opposed, and thus incapable of co-existing in a single Attribute. As a matter of fact, we find them actually co-existing. Hence, pleasure, illuminativeness, and buoyancy, being mutually consistent, do not necessitate the assumption of different causes (for each of them severally) as do pleasure, pain, and delusion which are mutually opposed, (and as such unable to co-here in a single substratum). In the

same manner, pain, versatility, and activity (properties of Foulness), as also delusion, sluggishness, and envelopingness (properties of Darkness), do not lead to the assumption of various causes. *Thus the triad of Attributes* is established.

Question—Indiscreetness, &c., of the Attributes, how proved?

(108). *Objection* :—Granted all this. As regards earth, &c., we actually perceive the properties of indiscreetness, &c., as belonging to them. But the Attributes, Goodness, and the rest, can never come within the range of perceptible experience. And under such circumstances, how can we attribute to these latter, the properties of indiscreetness, objectivity, &c., (enumerated above)?

To this objection we reply—

Kârikâ XIV.

Two reasons for the above given. Existence of nature proved.

Indiscreetness and the rest are proved from the existence of the three Attributes, and from the absence of these (the three Attributes) in the reverse (of indiscreetness, &c. *i. e.*, *Purusha*). And the existence of the Unmanifested (Nature) too is established on the ground of the properties of the effect (the Manifested) being consequent on those of the cause.

(109). By "*a virêki*" in the Kârikâ is to be understood "*avirêkitva*", as '*dvi*' and '*êka*'—in "*drêkayordrivachanaikavachanê*" [*Siddhântakaumudi* I—iv—22]—denote '*dvitva*' and '*êkatva*' respectively; or else it would be (*) "*dvêkêshu*" (and not "*dvêkayoh*":). It being asked—How do you prove these, indiscreetness, &c.?—the reply is :—"*From the existence of the three Attributes.*" That is to say, we have found

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* For if the compound were analysed into "*dvi*" and "*êka*," the sum would be three, and would thus require a plural ending, and not the dual,—which is explained by making "*dvi*" and "*êka*" stand for "*dvitva*" and *êkatva* making only two nouns, and thus having a dual ending.

First proof: *From the existence of the three Attributes.*

in common experience, with regard to the perceptible material existence, that, whatever consists of pleasure, &c., is qualified by indiscreetness, &c. The affirmative reasoning, being explicit enough, is not stated in the Kârikâ, which only mentions the negative reasoning :—"*From the absence of these in the reverse*"—that is to say, from the non-existence of the Attributes in the Spirit which is the reverse of indiscreetness, &c. Or again, we may have the *Manifested and the Unmanifested* (both together) as the subject (minor term) of the syllogism, and then we shall have the reasoning—"*From the existence of the three Attributes*"—as a purely negative inference* (*Avîta*), there being no other case (besides the minor term) where we could have the agreement of the reason (Middle term—existence of the Attributes).

Second proof: *From the absence of these in the reverse (Spirit).*

(110). An objection is again raised—We grant all this; but the existence of the properties—indiscreetness, &c.,—cannot be proved before the object possessing these properties (the Unmanifested) has been proved to exist To this we reply—"*From the properties of the effect being due to the properties of the cause.*" The connection may be thus explained: All effects are seen to possess properties similar to those of their respective causes, as the cloth of the

Question—How is Nature proved to exist?

Reply: *From the properties of the effect being due to those of the cause.*

* The syllogism has previously been explained as—"Whatever has pleasure, &c., is indiscreet, as the perceptible material substances :"—and here we hand the agreement *(Anwaya)* of the reason in the "perceptible substances" whose connotation is different from that of the subject of the syllogism, "*All things* having pleasure, &c." Now what our author proposes is that we might explain the reasoning thus: "All things besides the spirit (the Manifested and the Unmanifested) are indiscreet, since they possess the three Attributes, and whatever is not indiscreet does not possess the three attributes." Thus in the latter syllogism we have for the minor term *The Manifested and the Unmanifested* which comprehend all cases where the reason (the presence of the three attributes) could be found; for nothing besides the Manifested and the Unmanifested can be said to have the three Attributes.

threads. Similarly we must admit that pleasure, &c., being properties of Consciousness (Mahat), &c., must be the outcome of similar properties subsisting in their cause. [And this cause is no other than Nature.] And thus we have proved the existence of Nature, as possessed of the properties of pleasure, pain, and delusion.*

Why not accept the atomic theory—which discards the necessity of an Unmanifested Entity?

(111). "I grant all this", says the enquirer; "but the followers of Kanâda (the Vaiseshikas) and Gautama (the Nayâyikas) assert the production of the Manifested, Earth, and the rest from the binary compound downward—from homogeneous atoms, which too are manifested. The various properties in the effects owe their existence to similar properties in the primary atoms.† And

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* And consequently *Nature* too is proved to have indiscreetness, &c., in accordance with the proposition laid down before—"whatever has pleasure, &c , has indiscreetness, &c., also." The reasoning may be rendered clearer by reducing it to the form of two Aristotelian syllogisms :—

Properties of the effect (Intellect) are properties of the cause (Nature).
Pleasure, &c., are properties of the effect (Intellect).
∴ Pleasure, &c., are properties of the cause (Nature.)

And again :—

Whatever has pleasure, &c., has indiscreetness, &c.
Nature has pleasure, &c., (as first proved).
∴ Nature has indiscreetness, &c.

† It will, I think, not be out of place here, to indicate, in brief, the atomic theory of Kanâda and Gautama,—which may be thus summed up.—In the beginning there existed only atoms of various substances (Earth, Water, Fire and Air) besides, of course, Akâsa, &c., which are in themselves eternal. These various atoms were respectively endued with four different sets of properties, latterly perceived in their compounds. By some agency or other—mainly that of "Adrishta," the Unseen (Fate)—all homogeneous atoms combine, one with one, into couples and thus form binary compounds, which latter again combining in the same manner, but three at a time, give rise to tertiary compounds, and so on to the various objects of perception. These atoms are declared to be without extension in space, or else they could not be permanent. But, as far as I know, no Nayâyika has even yet tried to show how two things devoid of extension, can combine—a point which affords the strongest handle to S'ankarachârya in his refutation of the atomic theory.—See *S'âriraka-Bhâshya* on the *Brahma-Sutras* II—ii—12/17.

thus finding the production of the Manifested from the Manifested, quite explicable, what is the use of postulating an Unmanifested, an imperceptible Entity (in the form of Nature)?"

We reply—

KÂRIKÂ XV.

Reply—we must postulate an Unmanifested Reality—Reasons given.

From the finite nature of specific objects, from homogeneity, from evolution being due to active (causal) energy, from the separation of cause and effect, and from the undividedness (resolution) of the whole universe.

First proof of the existence of Prakriti—"*Since there is separation of cause and effect, and re-union of the whole Universe.*"

(112). Of specific objects, the primary cause is the Unmanifested (Nature). Because (1) "*There is separation of cause and effect, and resolution of the whole Universe.*" It has already been proved (in Kârikâ IX) that the effect subsists (in its unmanifested form) in the cause; as the limbs of the tortoise, coming out of its body, are perceived as separate from the body, which again they enter and thus disappear (from view). In the same manner, the various objects, jar, &c., are perceived as different from their causes, clay, &c., when they come out of these (*i. e.*, are produced from them when they have their existence, as the jar manifested out of the lump of clay, wherein they have all along inhered.) The same is the case with earth, &c., as effects of the primary elements, with these latter again as effects of Self-consciousness (Ahankâra); with this latter again as that of Consciousness and lastly, with this last again as the effect of the Unmanifested, which is the final cause. This separation, from the final cause (the Unmanifested), of the various effects—either mediately (as with earth, &c.,) or immediately (as with Consciousness)—related to it, is

what is meant by the *separation of the cause and the effect.* In the same manner, at every dissolution, the various grades of effects—(1) Earth, &c., (2) The Primary Elements, (3) Self-consciousness and (4) Intellect—lose themselves in their respective immediate causes—(1) Primary Elements (2) Self-consciousness, (3) Intellect and (4) the Unmanifested Nature. Thus we see that it is only a certain form of the cause which becomes imperceptible (at dissolution) as far as a particular effect is concerned. Ascending in the same order as before, we find the various effects up to Will disappearing in their respective immediate causes—up to the Final Unmanifested—and thus rendering these latter imperceptible, —at least that form of the cause which concerns each of them severally. Of this unmanifested, however there is no further receptacle; and thus it becomes the receptacle—and hence an aggregate of the unmanifested states—of all the effects. This is what is meant by the *re-union* (in the final Unmanifested) *of the whole Universe.* In *Vaiswarupya,* the affix ष्यञ् has a reflexive sense.

Second proof: "*Because Evolution is due to Energy.*"

(113). "*Because Evolution is due to Energy.*"—It is a well-known fact that the Evolution of the effect is due to the active energy of the cause; for certainly, no effect can arise from an inefficient cause. This latent energy in the cause is no other than the existence therein of the effect in its unmanifested state; since, on the hypothesis of the effect being an entity, there can be no other form of causal energy. The difference of sand from sesamum—the material cause of oil—lies only in the fact that it is only in the latter that oil exists in its unmanifested condition.

Objection: These two reasons might rest with *Intellect*.

(114). *Objection*: Granted all this:—But the above two reasons that you have urged might very well rest with the Will—what is the use of assuming a further Unmanifested Reality? We reply: (3) "*From finiteness*"—*i. e.*, from the fact of the effects being, in their very nature

finite. (In support of his ground, the author puts forth a syllogism). The specific objects in question, Will and the rest have an Unmanifested Entity for their cause (*i. e.*, they have a cause in which they exist in their unmanifested state), since, they are finite, as jar, &c. The finite objects, jar, &c., as commonly seen, have, for their cause, clay, &c., (in which inhere) the unmanifested (state of the effects); since we have already shown that the cause is nothing more than the unmanifested condition of the effect. And under these circumstances, the cause of Will must be the Unmanifested which must be the *final* cause, for there is no ground for postulating a further Unmanifested Reality.*

Reply—Third proof —"*From finiteness*" (of all manifested existence.)

(115). "*Because of homogeneity.*"—Homogeneity consists in the similarity of different objects. Intellect, and the rest—manifesting themselves as ascertainment, &c.—are seen to be similarly related to pleasure, pain and delusion. And whatever is invariably connected with a certain form must have, for its cause (wherein it inheres), something which has that form for its constituent element. Thus it is decided that of the specific objects, the Unmanifested (Nature) is the cause.†

Fourth proof—"*Because of homogeneity.*"

Having proved the existence of the Unmanifested, the author next states the method of its operation—

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* Because the Unmanifested Nature (the cause of Will is not finite, as its effects, Consciousness and the rest are. And further, because, by so doing we would have to postulate causes *ad infinitum*.

† Thus we have in the present case: Will and the rest are invariably connected, with pleasure, pain and delusion; and, as such, must have, for their cause, Nature wherein they all lie unmanifested prior to their Evolution; and this Nature has, for its Constituent Elements, the three Attributes which respectively consist in pleasure, pain and delusion.

KÂRIKÂ XVI.

The method of Natur's operation.

The Unmanifested is the cause; it operates through the three Attributes by blending and by modification, as water, on account of the difference arising from the receptacle of the Attributes, as they are variously distributed.

Through the Attributes.

(116). "*Operates, &c.*"—At the time of cosmic dissolution, the three Attributes continue to be of similar modifications. Modified condition forms a part of the nature of the Attributes; and as such they can never, for a moment, remain inert. Thus at the time of dissolution, the Attributes operate through their respective forms of Goodness, Foulness and Darkness*.

By a blending of the Attributes.

(117). Another method of operation is next stated—"*By blending.*"—This "blending" of the Attributes, however, is not possible without the relation of subserviency among them, and this subserviency again is due to a diversity among the Attributes—which diversity again is not possible without destructibility (*i. e.*, unless the Attributes are so constituted that they suppress one another). Thus the second method of operation is through development into Will &c.†

Objection—How can an Attribute of uniform nature bring about diverse actions?

(118). The enquirer objects—How can diverse methods of operation belong to an Attributes which have been declared to be of uniform nature? We reply—"*By modification—as water*"—we all know how the water falling from the clouds, though

* This is the state of equilibrium of the Attributes, during which no evolution is possible.

† The various evolutions from Nature are due to the disturbance of equilibrium among the Attributes, which rouses the hitherto dormant, evolving energy of Nature, whence issue forth the various manifestations—Intellect and the rest.

naturally of itself, having one taste,* becomes sweet, bitter, sour, &c., according as it comes into contact with different modifications of earth—such as cocoanut, wood-apple, &c.

Reply: "*By modification as water.*"

In the same manner, owing to the blending and the mutual suppression of the Attributes, the Attributes occupying a subordinate position base themselves on the prominent one, and thus give rise to diverse forms of cosmic manifestations. Hence it is laid down—"*On account of the difference arising from the receptacle of the various Attributes.*"

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(119). Now the existence of the Spirit (Purusha) is laid down, in opposition to those self-contented (Materialists) who accept as spirit either Nature or Intellect, or Self-consciousness, or the sense-organs, or (lastly) the elements.

KÂRIKÂ XVII.

Reason for the existence of spirit.

Since all composite (or compound) objects are for another's use; since the reverse of (that which possesses) the three Attributes with other properties (must exist); since there must be super-intendence; since there must be one to enjoy (experience or feel); and since there is a tendency towards final beatitude (abstraction of the Spirit from material existence);—therefore Spirit exists.

The spirit exists: because all compound objects are for another.

Spirit exists, apart from Primordial Matter (Nature):—

(120). "*Because all compound objects* (objects made up of integral component parts) *are for another's use.*"—This reason, when reduced to the syllogistic form, would stand

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* 'Sweet'—according the Nayayikas.

thus—Nature, Intellect and the rest exist for another's use, because they are compounds, as chair, bed, &c., and these latter are all compound, inasmuch as they are made up of pleasure, pain and delusion.*

Objection: The above reasoning would only lead to another set of compounds not to an Elementary Spirit.

(121). But, says the objector, the compound objects chair, &c., are seen to exist for other objects which too are compound, such as men's bodies and not for the sake of Spirit as apart from Matter (the body). And as such Nature, &c., being compounds, should only lead to the inference of another set of compound substances (for whose use they exist) and not to that of an Elementary Non-compound Spirit (an "End-in-itself.") We reply—"*Since the reverse of that which possesses the three Attributes and other properties must exist.*"

Reply—*Since the reverse of that which possesses the three Attributes must exist.*

The view of the objector would lead to compounds *ad infinitum.*

—That is to say, if from the fact of Nature, &c., being for another's use, we were to infer only another compound substance, then in that case we would have to assume such compounds *ad infinitum*; for even this latter compound must lead to another for whose use it will exist and this again to another, and so on *ad infinitum.* And when we can escape this *regressus ad infinitum* by postulating a reasonable resting ground, it is certainly, not proper to multiply unnecessary assumptions (in the shape of compounds *ad infinitum*). Nor can it be urged that multiplication of assumptions becomes excusable when supported by proofs; for in the above inference the application of the instance ought to be extended only so far as "existing for another's use" is concerned; it can be extended no further. And we have explained in the *Nyâyavârtika-*

* This sounds rather absurd. But we must not forget that the whole set of material objects are mere emanations from Nature, whose constituent elements are the three Attributes, which latter consist in pleasure, pain and delusion, respectively.

*tâtparyatika** that if the complete identification of every phase of the cited instance were to be looked for in the subject in question, then there could be no reasoning by inference.† Thus then, in order to escape the *regressus ad infinitum*, if we accept the non-compound nature of Spirit, we find ourselves constrained to attribute to it the properties of "being without the three Attributes," "discreetness," "non-objectivity" (subjectivity), "uncommonality" (*i. e.*, specific character), "intelligence" and "unprolificness" (inability to produce). For, these properties are invariably accompanied by that of *compoundness*, which latter being absent in spirit, must lead to the inference of the absence of the three Attributes, &c., as when a certain individual is not a Brahmana, he can never be a Kaṭha (a special class of Brahmans). Hence the author—when he laid down that "the reverse of that which possesses the three Attributes, &c., must exist"—implied that this something which would be "the reverse, &c." must be an independent Elementary Entity—an "End-in-itself." And this is Spirit.

Because there must be superintendence.

(122). For the following reason also there must be a Spirit apart from Matter: *Because there must be superintendence.*" That is to say, because the objects constituted by the three

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* This is a commentary on the Nyâyavartika (a gloss on the Nyayasutras of Gautama) of Udyotakara by Vâchaspatî Misra. This work with the Parisuddhi of Udayanacharya is generally counted as closing the epoch of ancient Nyâya,—latterly supplanted by the modern system, introduced and most extensively expounded by Gangesa Upâdhyaya, in his Tattwa-Chintâmani.

† Because there can scarcely be found any two occurrences in nature, which could be quite identical. Even in the stock example of the Naiyayikas —"Fiery, because smoking, as the culinary hearth"—we have a dissimilarity between the subject-matter of the syllogism and the instance cited. Thus, in the culinary hearth the fire is for cooking food, and proceeding from a house made by men, &c., &c., whereas such is not the case with the fire in the mountain.

Attributes are such as necessitate the existence of a superintendent. For, everything consisting in pleasure, pain and delusion, is seen to be superintended over by something else —*e. g.* the chariot by the charioteer ; and Intellect and the rest have been proved to consist in pleasure, pain and delusion ; therefore, they must have a supervisor,—and this supervisor must be beyond* the three Attributes and independent, an "End-in-itself"—and this is Spirit.

Because there must be one to feel.

(123). Again the Spirit exists "*because there must be one to experience* (or feel)"—That is to say, every one of us has an idea of pleasure and pain as something to be felt—as agreeable or the reverse ; and as such there must be some substance, beyond the feelings themselves, to which they (feelings) can be agreeable or otherwise. Feelings cannot be pleasurable to the Intellect (Buddhi), &c., for that would imply self-contradictory actions, inasmuch as the Intellect and the rest are integrally composed of pleasure, pain and delusion.† Thus, then, something else, independent of pleasure, &c., must be the agent who feels—and this is Spirit.

A different interpretation of the above reason.

(124). Others, however, interpret the above reasoning of the Kârikâ thus : *Bhogya* (enjoyable) means *visible*; and the visibility of *Buddhi* and the rest not being possible without an observer, there must be one outside of, and beyond, Intellect, &c.,—and this is Spirit. The visibility of

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* Otherwise the supervisor also will stand in need of another, for the presence of the Attributes in the former will necessarily lead to that of pleasure, &c., which again will necessitate its superintendence by something beyond itself. And so we shall be landed in a *regressus ad infinitum.*

† That is to say—Intellect, as made up of pleasure, pain and dulness, cannot be properly said to *feel* pleasure, &c., for that would imply the feeling of *pleasure* by pleasure ;—or worse still—by pain ; and *vice versâ*, which is absurd.

Intellect and the rest can be inferred from the fact of their being made up of pleasure, &c., as earth, &c.

Because of the tendency of writers and sages towards beatitude.

(125). Lastly, Spirit exists—"*because there is a tendency towards action for final beatitude.*"—The final beatitude, treated of in all the systems of philosophy, and mentioned by the great sages of divine insight—as the absolute and final alleviation of the three kinds of pain—can never apply to Intellect, &c.; for, these have by their very nature, pain as one of their integral components, from which, therefore, they can never be absolved; since a substance cannot be absolved of something forming its constituting element. Thus then, there must be something independent of pleasure, &c., wherefrom pain could be expunged. Consequently, as the various systems of philosophy have all along aimed at beatitude, therefore, there exists something beyond (pleasure, &c., and hence) Intellect and the rest—and this is Spirit.

Having thus proved the existence of Spirit, the author next raises the question—Is this spirit one (*) (manifesting itself) in all bodies, or many, being different in different bodies? And in reply, he lays down the theory of the plurality of Spirits.

KÂRIKÂ XVIII.

Plurality of Spirits—Reasons.

From allotment of birth, death, and the organs; (2) from the non-simultaneity of actions (with different individuals); and (3) from the different modifications of the Attributes—the plurality of Spirits is established.

"*The plurality of Spirits is established*"—How?

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* As the Vedantin asserts.

(127). "*From allotment of birth, death and the organs.*"—

"From allotment of birth, death and the organs.

Birth of the Spirit consists in its relation with the body the sense-organs, Self-consciousness, Will and Feeling* (*vedana*)—all these latter forming into an aggregate of a particular character. This is what is meant by *birth*—which does *not* mean *modification*; since the Spirit is essentially unmodifiable (unchangeable). And *death* too consists in the departure from the body, of the Spirit, which cannot be destroyed, since it is eternal. The "*organs*" are thirteen, beginning with the Will. The (diversified) "*allotment*" of these—births, &c.—is not explicable on the hypothesis of the unity of Spirit. For, if the Spirit were one (in all bodies), the birth, death, blindness or madness of one individual would lead to exactly the same effects in others. The several allotment, however, becomes quite consistent with the theory of the plurality of Spirits. Nor can the Monist explain the above difference by attributing it to the Spirit, as conditioned by contact with different bodies, &c. For in that case he would land himself on another absurdity—that of attributing birth or death in accordance with the different parts of the body!—which can never be. For a woman is not said to be born or dead, by the mere development or derangement of certain portions of her body.

(128). For the following reason also, the Spirit is different with different individuals:—"*Since activity is not simultaneous.*"

"Since activity is not simultaneous."

Action, in the form of endeavour, is a function of the internal organs; still it is here attributed to the Spirit. If the Spirit were one, the activity of one man would lead to similar activity in all other men; and thus the motion of one would

* "*Vedana*" might be taken severally with "body," &c. In that case the passage would be translated thus—"bodily, sensuous, mental, egoistic and intellectual cognitions"; but the translation given above is preferable: for certainly, there can be no cognition through body, &c., taken singly. No cognition is possible in the body alone, without the aid of (the sense-organs) mind, &c., and so on with the rest.

lead to that of all others—a palpable absurdity, which is explained away quite reasonably, on the hypothesis of *plurality*.

Because the modifications of the Attributes are different.

(129). Again, the Spirits are many—"*because the modifications of the Attributes are different*"—Some persons abounding in the attribute of Goodness, represent aggregates of that attribute—*e. g.* the gods and saints. Others abound in Foulness—such are men. The rest abound in Darkness—and these are the beasts. This diversity in the distribution of Attributes could not be explained if the Spirit were one. The hypothesis of plurality, however, makes it quite explicable.

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(130). Having thus established the plurality of Spirits the author now states their properties—a knowledge of which is conducive to discriminative knowledge (wisdom) :—

Kârikâ XIX.

The properties of the soul.

And from that contrast (before set forth) it follows that the Spirit is witness, and has final emancipation, neutrality, and is perceiving and inactive.

"*And*" connects the following properties of the Spirit with its plurality.

Why *that* contrast?

(131). If it were said—"And from *this* contrast," then it would refer to *the various distribution of the three Attributes*, of the last Kârikâ. In order to avoid this, it is said—"and from *that*, &c." A subject, immediately preceding, is referred to by the pronoun *this*; whereas one not so immediate is denoted by *that;* hence the *that* here refers to Kârikâ XI.

(132). Thus, then, the *contrast* of "having the three Attributes, &c.," connotes the Spirit's property of being without the three Attributes, and being discriminative, non-

objective, singular, intelligent and non-productive. Now, the properties of being a *witness* and *perceptive* are necessary accompaniments of intelligence and non-objectivity. Since an intelligent being alone can be a spectator, and one can be a witness only when the objects have been shown to him; as in daily life we find the two parties of a dispute showing and explaining their various objects and reasons to the witness; similarly does the Prakriti exhibit its creations before the Spirit, which latter, therefore, becomes the *witness*. And again no object can be shown to one, himself an object and non-intelligent; and since the Spirit is both intelligent and non-objective, it becomes the *witness*. For the same reasons, the Spirit is *perceiving*.

The necessity of so many properties. Their inter-dependence.

(133). Further, the absence of the three Attributes leads to *final emancipation*—by which is meant the final and absolute removal of pain; and this property, as belonging to the spirit, is a necessary deduction from the fact of the soul being naturally without the three Attributes, and hence without pleasure, pain or dulness.

(134). From the absence of Attributes, again, follows *neutrality*; since this latter property is such as cannot belong either to the happy and satisfied, or to the sad and grumbling. It is only one who is devoid of both pleasure and pain, who can be called *neutral*—also called *Udâsina* (indifferent). Lastly, the property of *inactivity* is a necessary outcome of the properties of non-productiveness and discriminativeness (wisdom). The inactivity of the Spirit is inferred from its wisdom and non-productive character.

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(135). *Objection*:—We grant all this: but in our daily life we first decide our duty and then we think in the following strain—'I, who am an intelligent being, wish to act.' Thus, then, we find intelligence and activity co-

Objection—Intelligence and activity always found co-existent.

गुणकर्तृत्वे च तथा कर्तेव भवत्युदासीनः

existent. And this goes against the Sankhya tenets which make intelligence devoid of activity and *vice versâ*.

We reply :—

KÂRIKÂ XX.

Reply:—The apparent activity of the soul due to union with Buddhi, and the apparent intelligence of the latter due to union with Purusha.

Thus, from this union the unintelligent *Linga* (Buddhi, &c.,) appears as intelligent ; and from the activity of the Attributes, the indifferent Spirit appears as an (active) agent.

(136). Since intelligence and activity have been proved to be differently located, therefore, the feeling referred to by the objector must be a mistake. The word *Linga* includes everything from the *Mahat* down to the primary elements—to be described later on. The cause of the mistake is said to be the union or proximity of the Spirit with the *Linga*. (Buddhi and the rest).

The rest is clear enough.

Objection—What is the need of the union?

(137). *Objection* :—You say that the feeling is due to *union, &c.* But no union is possible without some need which, again, is not possible without the relation of the helper and the helped. How is this possible in accordance with your tenets, with regard to the union of the Spirit with the *Linga*?

In reply, the author lays down the grounds of need—

KÂRIKÂ XXI.

Reply—The need is that of final Emancipation.

For the Spirit's contemplation of Prakriti, and its final Emancipation, the union of both takes place, like that of the halt and the blind ; and from this union proceeds creation.

(138). In "*Pradhânasya*," the genitive affix has the objective force, the meaning being—"for the contemplation by Spirit of Nature,"—thus implying the fact of Nature being

પઙ્ગ્વન્ધવદુભયોરપિ સંયોગસ્તત્કૃતઃ સર્ગઃ ॥૨૧॥

an object—something to be enjoyed. But this enjoyability is not possible without an enjoyer, whose existence thus becomes necessary, for that of Nature.

The need explained.

(139). The author next lays down the ground of the Spirit's need—"*For the Emancipation of the Spirit*"—The Spirit, while in connection with the enjoyable Nature, believes the three kind of pains—the constituents of Nature—to be his own; and from this self-imposed bond he seeks liberation—which can result only from wisdom discriminating between the Spirit and the three Attributes—which wisdom thus becomes impossible without the knowledge; and hence the existence, of Nature. Thus then we find the Spirit standing in need of Nature, for his emancipation. Since the relation (of Spirit with Nature) is eternal, therefore, it is quite proper that the Spirit should be related to Nature for emancipation, though primarily, the relation was for enjoyment only.

(140). Granted all this relation—But whence the creation of Buddhi, &c.?

The necessity of the creation of Buddhi, &c.

We reply—"*From this union proceeds creation.*" The relation (of Spirit with Nature) cannot by itself suffice either for enjoyment or emancipation, if there were no Buddhi and the rest; under the circumstances the *union* itself brings about the creation, for the sake—primarily—of enjoyment, and finally, of emancipation.

The process of creation is now described—

KÂRIKÂ XXII.

The process of Evolution from Prakriti downwards.

From Prakriti issues Mahat (or Buddhi); from this Mahat again issues Self-consciousness (Ahankâra), from which proceeds the set of sixteen; from five of these sixteen, proceed the five gross elements.

(141). *From Prakriti, &c.*—*Prakriti* is a name of the Unmanifested Principle; *Mahat* and *Ahankâra* will be

described later on, as also the set of sixteen, made up of the eleven sense-organs and the five primary elements. Out of these sixteen, from the five primary elements, proceed respectively the five gross ones—Akâsa, Earth, &c.

The process of the production of the elements.

(142). Thus, from the primary element of sound proceeds Akâsa, having sound as its characteristic property; similarly from the mixture of the primary elements of touch and sound, proceeds Air, with sound and touch as its characteristic properties; again, from the mixture of the primary elements of sound, touch and colour, proceeds Light, with sound, touch and colour for its characteristic properties; and from the mixture of the primary elements, of sound, touch, colour and taste, proceeds Water, with sound, touch, colour, and taste as its characteristic properties; and lastly, from the mixture of the primary element of smell with that of the last four, proceeds Earth, with all the five for its characteristic properties.

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(143). The Unmanifested Principle has been defined in general terms in Kârikâ X, and specifically in Kârikâ XIII; the Manifested also has been generally defined in Kârikâ X; now the author defines a particular Manifested Principle—the *Buddhi*—

KÂRIKÂ XXIII.

Buddhi defined. Its properties stated.

Buddhi is the determining Principle (Will)*; Virtue, Wisdom, Dispassion and Power constitute its form (when affected by Goodness), and the reverse of these when affected by Darkness.

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* Though there is some difference of opinion on this point, yet I am inclined to think that *Adhyavasaya* means 'determining,' and of all the faculties *will* appears to be the only determining principle in Man. Henceforth *Buddhi* will be translated as *Will,* and the reader is requested to mark the same change in the foregoing pages.

(144). "*Buddhi is determination*"—Since there is no difference between the action and the active agent (effect and cause). Everyone, when he comes across something to be done, thinks that he is deputed to the work and, finally, determines that it is his duty, and thus acts towards its accomplishment. This determination of the duty is the charateristic property of *Buddhi*—which appears as if endued with intelligence by contact with the intelligence of the Spirit. Buddhi, again, is non-different from determination, which thus forms its definition, inasmuch as it serves to distinguish it from similar as well as dissimilar substances.

The definition of Buddhi explained.

(145). Having thus defined *Buddhi*, the author next states its properties, in order to help the attainment of true wisdom—"*Virtue*," &c., Virtue leads to (worldly) prosperity, as well as to Super-physical bliss,—that brought about by the performance of sacrifices &c. leading to the former, and that due to the eightfold practice of *Yoga* leading to the latter. Wisdom consists in the knowledge of the difference between the Attributes (as constituting Nature) and the Spirit. Dispassion is absence of passion.

The properties of Buddhi–Virtue, Wisdom, Dispassion and Power, and the reverse of these.

(146). *This Dispassion is of four kinds—*Yatamâna-Sanjnâ Vyatireka-Sanjnâ*, *Ekendriyâ-Sanjnâ and Vasikâra-Sanjnâ*. The passion—naturally impure—residing in the mind, lead the different senses-organs to action. The effort to put a stop to this action of the senses is named *Yatamâna-Sanjnâ* (literally, *effort*). When this process of resistance is once begun, some passions will have been suppressed before others; then the discrimination of these from those still operating is called *Vyatireka-Sanjnâ*. When the senses have been disabled, then the passions that have been suppressed reside in the mind in

The four kinds of dispassion.

* *Cf. Bhashya* on *Yogasutra* 1—15.

the form of mere anxiety—and this is known as *Ekendriyá-Sanjná.* The suppression of even this anxiety towards all perceptible objects,—the ordinary ones as well as those mentioned in the Veda,—is called *Vasikara-Sanjná*—and is superior to the first three; this has been thus described by the revered Patanjali: "The dispassion named *Vasikara-Sanjnyá* belongs to one who has no desire for either visible or Vedic objects." [Yoga-Sûtra I. 15].

The eight kinds of power.

(147). This is Dispassion, a property of Buddhi. Power also is a property of Buddhi; an it is to this that the perfections Attenuation and the rest (*Animâ,* &c.) are due.* Of these (1) *Animâ* (*Lit* Atomic character) the is the property by which one can enter the densest substances, such as stones. (2) *Laghimâ* (Buoyancy) is that to which is due the ability to traverse solar regions by means of the sun's rays. (3) *Garimâ* (Gravity) leads to heaviness; and (4) *Mahimâ* (Grandeur) causes supremacy. To (5) *Approach* is due the ability to touch the moon with the fingers. (6) *Fulfilment of desires* is such as can enable one to dip into the earth as in water. (7) *Vasitwa* leads to the subordination of all objects to the devotee. Supremacy brings about mastery over all objects. (8) *Infallibility of purpose* is such that all objects follow the course dictated by the will of the devotee. The decisions of ordinary mortals follow the course of events, whereas those of a trained devotee precede them and dictate their course.

(148). These four are the properties of Buddhi, partaking of the attribute of Goodness. Those partaking of the attribute of Darkness are the reverse of these—*viz.*: Sin Ignorance, Passion and Weakness or Fallibility.

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* There is some confusion as to the number of these perfections. As enumerated here, they appear *nine*; but they ought to be *eight* only; hence I have taken *Vasitwa* and *Isitwa* as one.

The author next defines Egoism or Self-consciousness (Ahankâra).

KÂRIKÂ XXIV.

The principle of Ahankâra defined. Its effects.

Egoism is self-consciousness; thence proceeds a two-fold creation,—the set of eleven and the five primary elements.

(149). "*Egoism is self-consciousness*"—and this Self-consciousness is perceptible in such ideas as—"The object I have observed and known," "none but myself has power over this and that," "I exist," &c. All this is the characteristic action of the principle of Egoism, on which the Buddhi depends for its determinative function in such decisions as "this is to be done by *me*."

(150). The different products of this effect are next stated —"*Thence proceeds a two-fold creation.*" The forms of these creations are stated—"*The set of eleven and the five primary elements*"—only these two creations proceed from the principle of Egoism. The '*eva*' excludes all other possible suppositions.

Objection:—How can two diverse kinds of creation proceed from a uniform Egoism?

Objection:—We grant all this: But the principle of Egoism being of one uniform nature, how can two different kinds of creation—inanimate (the elements) and enlightening (the senses)—proceed therefrom?

We reply—

KÂRIKÂ XXV.

Reply—The difference due to the diversity of the operating Attributes.

The set of eleven proceeds from the modified principle of Egoism, and partakes of the attribute of Goodness. The primary elements are due to the Attribute of Darkness; from Foulness proceed both.

(151). The eleven senses, being light and enlightening, are said to partake of Goodness, and as such proceed from modified Egoism. From Egoism as affected, on the other hand,

by Darkness, proceed the set of the primary elements. How so? Because these elements partake of the Attribute of Darkness. That is to say—Though the principle of Egoism is one and uniform, yet from the operation or suppression of various Attributes, it produces creations of diverse characters.

Objection:—The purposelessness of Passions.

(152). This is objected to—When all the necessary effects are brought about by the action of the attributes of Goodness and Darkness only, have done with the purposeless attribute of Foulness.

We reply—

Reply—Passion necesary for urging the other Attributes to action.

"*From Foulness proceed both*"—*i. e.*, the set of eleven as well as the primary elements. Though there is nothing to be done exclusively by Foulness, yet it is a necessary factor, since the attributes of Goodness and Darkness are both, by their very nature, inert; and as such could not do their own work unless urged to action by the active and mobile *Rajas*. Thus then, the efficacy of the attribute of Foulness lies in its character of supplying the motive force to the inert attributes of Goodness and Darkness. And thus we see that it is not altogether purposeless.

In order to describe the set of eleven—the effects of Goodness—the author first describes the ten external sense-organs.

KÂRIKÂ XXVI.

The ten External Organs.

The intellectual organs are, the Eye, the Ear, the Nose, the Tongue and the Skin; those of action are, speech, hand, feet, the excretory organs, and the organ of generation.

Sense defined.

(153). *Sense* is defined as the immediate effect of the principle of Egoism, as affected by the attribute of Goodness. These are two-fold —intellectual, and those of action. Both these are called

Indriyas (senses) because they are characteristics of the Spirit (*Indra*). The senses are named: "*The eye, &c.*"—Of these the eye is the sense for perceiving colour, the ear for perceiving sound, the nose for perceiving smell, the tongue for perceiving taste, and the skin for experiencing touch. These are the intellectual sense-organs. The action of the organs of speech and the rest will be spoken of later on (Kârikâ XXVII.)

Named. Functions.

The eleventh sense-organs is next described—

KÂRIKÂ XXVII.

Of these (sense-organs) Mind (*Manas*) partakes of the nature of both (intellectual as well as those of action): it is the reflecting (or thinking) principle, and is called a sense-organ since it has cognate properties. Its multifariousness, as well as its external forms, are due to the various specific modifications of the Attributes.

The eleventh sense —*Mind* defined.

(154). "*Partakes, &c.*"—Among the eleven organs, Mind partakes of the nature of both—*i. e.*, it is an intellectual organ of sensation, as well as one of action, since the eye and speech, &c., operate on their respective objects only when influenced by the principle of *Manas*.

The double nature of mind.

(155). The author next gives the specific definition of *Manas*—"*It is the reflecting principle*"—That is to say, *Mind* is defined by reflection (or thought). It is the principle which supplies forms and qualifications to the abstract cognition of a certain object, which invariably precedes the concrete and well-defined knowledge thereof. As is laid down by an ancient writer—"At first, one observes a certain object without qualifications, and latterly intelligent people think of the object as belonging to a certain

Mind defined.

The reflecting character of Mind explained.

class and having certain properties." It is a well-known fact that on first seeing an object, the first cognition that one has of it, resembles to a great degree the cognition of a child—indefinite and unqualified. Soon after this one learns to connect the object so observed, with its genus, property, &c. This latter cognition is said to be perception, which is a function characteristic of *Manas* (Mind), and as such serves to distinguish it from similar and dissimilar objects, and thus serves as its definition.

Objection :—Why make *Mind* a sense when it has distinct function of its own?

(156). *Objection:*—Granted all this: But we have seen that Egosim and Buddhi, having distinct functions of their own are not classed among sense-organs ; in the same manner, we shall not class *Manas* among them either.

Reply—It is a sense inasmuch as it is an immediate effect of the principle of Egoism, as affected by Goodness—which is the definition of a *sense.*

The author replies—"*It is a sense-organ*"—Why? "*Because of its having cognate properties.*" This property mainly is the fact of its being the immediate effect of Egoism as affected by Goodness, and not that of being a characteristic of the Spirit; for this latter property belongs to Egoism also ; and as such this latter would also have to be classed among sense-organs. Thus then "being the characteristic of the Spirit is only an explanation of the derivation of the term *Indriya* ; it cannot be said to form its denotation.

Whence the multifarious effects from Egoism.

(157). It is asked—Whence such multifarious effects from the single principle of Egoism as affected by Goodness? We reply—"*It is due to the specific modifications of the Attributes*"—The difference in the effects is due to the diversity of auxiliaries in the form of the operative principles of sound, &c.

(158). Destiny (*adrishta*) is also a modification of the Attributes. We have the qualifying term "External" as presenting a comprehensible example, the sense of the sen-

tence being—As the external forms are the effects of the modifications of the Attributes, so are also the internal and imperceptible ones.

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(159). Having thus described the forms of the eleven sense-organs, the particular functions of the first ten are next stated.—

KÂRIKÂ XXVIII.

The functions of the external organs.

The function of the five senses, in respect to colour, &c., is mere observation or feeling; speech, handling, walking, excretion and gratification are (the functions of) the other five.

Observation:—the function of the five intellectual senses.

Speech, handling, walking, excretions pertain to the senses of action.

By "*observation*" here is meant the primary abstract perception (*Nirvikalpa*) through the intellectual senses. "*Speech &c., are of the other five,*" *i. e.*, of the organs of action. The vocal organ is located in the throat, the palate, &c., whose function is speech. The functions of the cognitive (intellectual organs) are clear enough.*

The functions of the three internal organs are next stated.

KÂRIKÂ XXIX.

Function of the internal organs.

Of the three (the internal organs) the functions are constituted by their respective characteristics; these are peculiar to each.

* That is to say they are denoted by their very names or by their definitions *e. g.* the ear is defined as the sense for perceiving (or comprehending) sound—and thus the function of the ear is perception of sound, and so with the others.

The function common to the organs consists in the five vital airs—Prâna and the rest.

Reflection of Manas, *Self-consciousness* of Ahankâra and *determination* of Buddhi.

(160). "*The functions of the three are constituted by their respective characteristics.*" That is to say, the property which serves as the distinguishing feature of each of the internal organs, also denotes their respective functions; thus, determination of *Buddhi*, self-consciousness of *Ahankâra* and reflection of *Manas*.

The five vital airs, the common function of the three internal organs.

(161). The double character of the functions based on the fact of their being specific or common is next stated—"*These are peculiar*," *&c.* "*The five vital airs*, constitute *the common function*." The function of the three internal organs is the substance (of life, and hence) of the five vital airs; since the latter exist when the former do and cease to exist when these are absent. Of these the air called *Prâna* (Breath or Life) resides in the heart, the navel and the toes; that called *Apâna* resides at the back, &c., *Samâna* in the heart, the navel and the joints; *Udâna* in the throat, heart, &c.; and lastly, *Vyâna* resides in the skin. These are the five airs.

The author now states the order of the functions of these fourfold organs (the external organs and the three internal organs).

Kârikâ XXX.

The instantaneous and the gradual character of these functions.

With regard to visible objects, the functions of the four are said to be instantaneous, as well as gradual; with regard to invisible objects, the functions of the three

(internal organs) are preceded by that (*i. e.* the cognition of some visible object.)

Instantaneous with regard to visible objects.

(162). "*Instantaneous*"—"*with regard to visible objects,*" *e. g.*, when one sees in the dark by means of a flash of lightning, a tiger facing him, his *observation*, *reflection* and *determination* are instantaneous and accordingly he runs away from the place at once.

Gradual with regard to visible objects.

(163). "*Gradual,*" *e. g.*, in dim light, a person has at first only a faint *cognition* of a certain object; then he *looks at it* more steadily and *ascertains* that it is a thief with his bow and arrow levelled at him; then the consciousness follows "the thief is advancing against me"; and he finally decides to run away from the place.

With regard to invisible objects, the operation of the internal organs independent of the external organs.

The functions of internal organs preceded by those of the external ones.

(164). With regard to invisible objects, on the other hand, the internal organs operate without the aid of the external organs—"*The function of the three is preceded by that,*" *i. e.*, the instantaneous as well as the gradual functions of the three internal organs are preceded by some perception of a visible object; since Inference, Testimony and the other methods of proof operate only when they have for their back ground some sort of external perception.

Objection: Functions permanent or otherwise?

(165). *Objection*: Granted all this: But the functions either of the four or of the three (organs) cannot depend on themselves alone; for in that case (these organs) must be either permanent or transient; if permanent, then their funcions also would be permanent; if transient, then the various functions would combine most absurdly, there being no restrictive agency.

KÂRIKÂ XXXI.

Reply—Functions of the organs due to mutual impulse. Soul proposes the incentive.

We reply:—They* (the organs) operate towards the performation of their respective functions, due to mutual impulse. The purpose of the Spirit supplies the motive; by nothing (else) is an organ caused to act.

The subject of the first sentence is "organs."

(166). A number of persons wielding different weapons, unite for suppressing a common enemy, the one holding a lance uses that alone, and so on, each using his own particular weapon. In the same manner one organ operates towards the fulfilment of another's purpose, which tends to help its own. And since this movement towards action is the cause (and hence the regulating motive power) of the action of the organs, there cannot arise any absurd collision of the functions.

Objection—How can the non-intelligent organs understand each other's motives?

(167). Another objection—The lancers, &c., being sentient beings, can comprehend each other's motives and can act towards the fulfilment thereof. The organs on the contrary, are all in-sentient, and as such can never act in the same way as the lancers, &c., do (and hence your analogy does not apply to the case in question). Consequently the in-sentient organs must have an animate and intelligent supervisor over them, who is to understand their end and urge them to action accordingly.

Reply—Soul's purpose urging them to action.

We reply:—"*The Spirit's purpose is the motive, by nothing (else) can the organs be brought to act.*" Since the purpose of the Spirit is to urge the organs to action, what is the need of postulating a supervisor *ab extra*? This point will be further elucidated in Kârikâ LVII.

* Davies restricts this to the internal organs; but there is no reason why the Kârikâ should not apply to organs in general—as the Kaumudi takes it.

(168). It has been declared that "*by nothing is an organ brought to act.*" The author next states the division of these organs :—

KÂRIKÂ XXXII.

The organs devided—their functions—*seizing, retaining and manifesting.*

Organs are of thirteen kinds ; they have variously the functions of seizing, retaining and manifesting. The objects of these are tenfold, that which is to be seized, retained or manifested.

The thirteen organs—the ten external organs, *Manas*, *Ahankâra* and *Buddhi*.

Seizing—the function of the senses of action.

Retention — the function of *Buddhi*, *Ahankâra* and *Manas*.

Manifestation—of the intellectual organs.

(169). The thirteen organs consist of the eleven sense-organs, *Ahankâra* and *Buddhi*. An organ is a particular kind of agent, and no agency is possible without a function ; hence the author next states the various functions. "*They have the functions, &c.*" The senses of action have the function of *seizing* ; that is to say, they extend their action to their respective objects. *Buddhi*, *Ahankâra* and *Manas retain* impressions by their respective functions—the life-breath, &c. (mentioned before) ; and lastly, the intellectual (perceptive) organs *manifest* their respective objects.

The objects of these functions, tenfold.

(170). Since every action must have an object, the objects of the above-mentioned functions are next stated—"*That which is to be seized,*" *&c.* The objects to be acted upon by the thirteen organs are those that are to be seized, retained and manifested. By *seizure* here is meant pervasion (or extension). The five senses of action extend over speech and the rest ; and each of these being both human and superhuman these objects become tenfold. Similarly the object to be retained by the three internal organs is the body, which is fivefold being an aggregate of the five great elements, of sound, touch, colour, taste and odour. Each of these five being both human and superhuman, these objects also become

tenfold. Similarly the objects of the five intellectual senses are five—sound, touch, colour, taste and odour; and each of these being both human and superhuman, the objects also become tenfold.

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(171). The sub-divisions of the thirteen organs are next stated:—

KÂRIKÂ XXXIII.

The organs numbered and the difference between the external and internal in point of time noted.

Internal organs are three; and the external ten, making objects known to the former three. The external organs act at time present; and the internal at the three divisions of time.

(172). The internal organs are three: *Manas*, *Ahankâra* and *Buddhi*, called *internal* because located *inside* the body.

(173). The external organs are ten: the ten sense-organs. These latter exhibit objects to the three internal organs, *i. e.*, they supply the means for *reflection*, *consciousness* and *determination* of objects—the intellectual senses functioning by means of observation, and the senses of action by means of their respective functions.

The external senses acting at time present; the internal with reference to all three divisions of time.

(174). The author next states a further point of difference between organs internal and external—"*The external organs act at time present.*" By "present" is meant here the time closely preceding and following the immediate present; thus then, speech* also belongs to the present. "*The internal organs at the three divisions of time.*" *e. g.*, the idea that "there has been rain," since the river has risen—(for the past); "there is fire in the mountain, since there is smoke"—(for the

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* The special qualification is necessary for the case of speech, because no two letters can be pronounced at the same moment, and, as such, no word could be uttered at the time *present* if by this word were meant the present *moment* only. This absurdity, however, is avoided by counting a few moments before and after the present moment as included in it.

present); and lastly, "we shall have rain, since we see ants carrying their eggs"—(for the future).

Time not a distinct principle according to the Sânkhyas.

(175). Time, according to the Vaisêshikas, being one, cannot allow such divisions as past, present and future. Hence we must have for the various units, the various conditions or specifications to which we give the names, past, present and future. So the Sânkhyas do not admit of a distinct principle in the shape of Time.

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(176). The author next considers the objects of the external senses operating at time present—

KÂRIKÂ XXXIV.

The intellectual senses touching specific as well as unspecific objects: speech touching sound; the rest regarding the five objects of sense.

Of these, the five intellectual senses (those of sensation) concern objects specific as well as non-specific (collective); speech concerns sound; the rest regard the five objects (of sense.)

(177). Of the ten external senses, the five intellectual ones concern specific as well as non-specific objects:—by *specific* here is meant *gross*—and such objects are sound and the rest (the *Tanmâtras*), manifesting themselves as Earth, &c.,—(the elements) having the properties of calmness, turbulence and dulness. The *non-specific* objects are the primary elements. The particle *Mâtra*, in the word *Tanmâtra*, serves to distinguish these from the gross objects. The senses of Yogis concern sound, &c., in their subtle as well as gross states, whereas the senses of ordinary men relate to sound, &c., in their gross forms only.

(178). Similarly of the senses of action (the Motor Senses). Speech concerns sound, in its gross form, because speech is the cause of sound. Speech, however, can not be the cause of the primary element of sound, which is the direct effect of Self-consciousness (*Ahankâra*); and as such has the same cause as speech itself (which also being one of senses, proceeds directly from the principle of Self-consciousness.

"*The rest,*" *i. e.*, the four other senses of action—the excretory organs, &c., "*concern five objects,*" because the different objects, *e. g.* jar &c., which are the objects of these senses, are all made up of the five primary elements of sound, colour, &c.

Among the thirteen organs, some are said to be superior to others, reasons for which are given:

Kârikâ XXXV.

The superiority of internal over external organs.

Since Buddhi with the other internal organs adverts to (comprehends) all objects (of sense), these three are said to be the warders (principal ones), and the others the gates (secondary).

(179). *Warders*, *i. e.*, chief ones.

Gates i. e., such as are the external organs.

The superiority accounted for.

Since *Buddhi*, with *Ahankâra* and *Manas*, apprehends (*i. e.*, determines) all objects exhibited by the external organs, these latter are said to be gates (secondary organs), and *Buddhi*, with the other internal organs, the warders (chiefs).

Buddhi is the chief, not only in comparison with the external organs, but also with regard to the other external organs, *Manas* and *Ahankâra*. To this effect it is said:—

Kârikâ XXXVI.

The superiority of Buddhi over all others accounted for.

These (the external organs together with *Manas* and *Ahankâra*), characteristically differing from one another and being different modifications of Attributes resemble a lamp in action; (and as such) having first enlightened the Spirit's purpose, present it in its entirety to *Buddhi*.

(180). As the village officer collects the rent from the different heads of families and delivers the collection to the treasurer, who again, in his turn, carries it to the head-officer, who finally makes it over to the king: so, in the same manner, the external organs, having operated on (observed) an object, present the observation to *Manas*, which reflects on it (and thereby imparts thereto its qualifications) presenting these qualified observations in turn to *Ahankâra*, which takes specific cognizance of them, and finally delivers such personal cognition to the head-officer, *Buddhi*. Hence it is said: "*These having enlightened the Spirit's purpose present it to Buddhi.*"

In spite of diverse combination of the Attributes, yet the internal organs co-operate towards a single purpose like a lamp.

(181). The external organs together with *Manas* and *Ahankâra*, are various affections of Attributes, *i. e.*, modifications of Goodness, Foulness and Dulness, which though Essentially opposed to one another, are yet brought to co-operate for the supreme purpose of the Spirit: just as the wick, oil and fire, though variously opposed to the action of one another, yet join, under the form of a lamp, in removing darkness, and thus illumine (manifest) the different colours. The same is the case with the Attributes; such is the connection.

Objection — why not make Buddhi subordinate to the others?

An objection is raised. Why should it be said that the other organs present their impressions to *Buddhi?*—Why should not we make it quite the other way: *Buddhi* subordinate to *Ahankâra?*

We reply:—

KÂRIKÂ XXXVII.

Reply: The superiority of Buddhi accounted for, because it directly fulfils the soul's purpose, and bridges the gap between Spirit and Matter.

Since it is *Buddhi* that accomplishes the Spirit's enjoyment, and again it is Buddhi that exposes the subtle difference between Nature and Spirit.

(182). Since the purpose of the Spirit is the only incentive to the action of the organs, that organ is supreme over others which accomplishes that purpose directly; and since it is *Buddhi* alone that does this, it is supreme. Just as the chief minister, being the direct agent of the king, is supreme over other officials. *Buddhi* assumes the form of the Spirit through its proximity to it, and as such leads to the accomplishment of its purpose. Sensation consisting either of pleasure or pain, resides in *Buddhi*, which is (reflected) in the Spirit and thus leads to its enjoyment. As the observation, reflection and consciousness of objects are transferred to *Buddhi* through their various modifications; in the same manner, the functions of the senses also coalesce with the functional determination of *Buddhi*, as the forces of the subordinate officials do with that of the master.

Objection :—Buddhi supplying the soul with pleasure, no Mukti, is possible.

Reply :—It latterly shows to the soul its distinction from Matter.

(183). The objector asks: If *Buddhi* only serves to accomplish the Spirit's enjoyment, then no emancipation is possible.* We reply :—"*It afterwards exposes the difference between Spirit and Nature.*"—By *exposition* here is meant 'bringing about'; the construction of *Antaram Visinashti*, being similar to that of *Odanapâkam pachati*.†

The difference being caused, will end and thus would emancipation cease with it.

The objector retorts: the difference between Spirit and Nature being thus, according to your own saying, a *caused* one, must have an end in time; and thus (the Spirit could never attain to eternal Beatitude).

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* For *Buddhi* would continue help the Spirit to its enjoyment of pleasure, and hence this latter could never attain to final beatitude which consists in the total extinction of both pleasure and pain.

† *Visinashti* itself has been explained as—"expresses the difference." then the mention of *Antaram* would seem superfluous. But it is not so; it helps to intensify the meaning of the sentence.

We reply :—The difference has been everlasting ; and the function of *Buddhi* lies only in exhibiting the difference to the full view of the Spirit who then recognises the fact that he himself is something distinct from the constitutionally mobile and modifiable Nature. (The distinction is not *caused* by *Buddhi* ; it is as eternal as the Spirit and Nature themselves). By this it is also implied that emancipation is the sole purpose of the Spirit. The distinction of Spirit and Nature, however, is extremely subtle and hard to be perceived.

Reply :—the difference is permanent Buddhi only serving to expose it to the soul's view.

The organs having been described, the author next describes objects, specific and non-specific :

KÂRIKÂ XXXVIII.

The five primary elements are non-specific ; from these five proceed the five gross elements ; these latter are said to be specific (because) they are calm (soothing), turbulent (terrific) and deluding.

The division of objects into specific and non-specific.

(184). The *Tanmâtras—sound* and the rest—are subtle ; and the character of *calmness*, &c., do not belong to these. The word *Mâtra* denotes the capability of these elements of being enjoyed.

(185). Having thus stated the non-specific, the specific objects are described: "*From these &c.*" From the five *Tanmâtras*, of sound, touch, colour, taste and odour proceed respectively the five gross Elements—Âkâsa, Air, Fire, Water and Earth.

(186). *Objection:* we grant that these are thus produced ; but what about their specific character ? We reply : "*These are said to be specific*" —Why ? because "*they are calm, turbulent and deluding.*" The first च has a causal and the second a collective signification.

Specific because soothing, terrific and deluding.

Among the gross elements, A'kâsa, &c., some have the attribute of Goodness predominating in them ; and these accordingly are pleasing, enlightening and buoyant ; others predominate in Foulness, and are turbulent, painful and fickle ; the rest predominating in Darkness are dull, confounded and sluggish. These elements, thus visibly discriminated, are *specific i. e.*, gross. The primary elements on the contrary cannot be similarly discriminated by ordinary people ; and as such they are said to be non-specific, *i. e.*, subtle.

The sub-divisions of the specific objects are stated :—

KÂRIKÂ XXXIX.

Specific objects divided into : (1) subtle bodies, (2) bodies produced of parents. and (3) the great elements.

Subtle (astral) bodies and such as are produced of parents, together with the gross elements, form the three sorts of specific objects. Of these the subtle bodies are everlasting, and those produced of parents are perishable.

(187). "*The specific objects are of three sorts*" ; these three sorts are mentioned : (1) Subtile bodies (which are not visible, but are only postulated in order to explain certain phenomena) ; (2) Those produced of parents, comprising the sixfold Sheaths (Kośas). Among these latter, hair, blood and flesh are produced from the mother ; and the veins, bones and marrow from the father ; these six are the six Kôśas. Thus then we have seen that the subtile bodies form the first kind of specific objects ; bodies produced of parents, the second ; and the gross elements the third,—objects like the jar, &c., being included in the last.

The subtile bodies are permanent, those produced of parents perishable.

(188). The difference between a subtile body and a body produced of parents is stated—"*Subtile bodies are permanent and those produced of parents perishable*," that is to say ending in (dissolving into) either liquid, ash or dirt.

The Astral body is described.

KÂRIKÂ XL.

The mergent, subtle (astral) body,—formed primevally, unconfined, permanent, composed of *Buddhi* and the rest down to the primary elements,—migrates, is without enjoyment, and is invested with dispositions.

The Astral Body is unconfined permanent, and migrating, invested with dispositions.

(189). When the emanations from Nature began, the first object to evolve therefrom, for each Spirit individually, was the Astral Body. This body is *unconfined*, inasmuch as it can enter even a solid piece of stone. It is again "*permanent* ;"* since it exists all along, from the first creation to the final dissolution.

Unconfined and Permanent.

The Astral Body is "*composed of Buddhi and the rest, down to the primary elements.*" That is to say, it is an aggregate— of *Buddhi*, *Ahankâra*, the eleven senses and the five primary elements ; and as such it is specific, being endowed with the properties of calmness, restlessness and dulness.

(190). *Objection* : Let this astral body be the only body the seat of enjoyment for the Spirit :—What is the need of the gross physical body comprised of the six sheaths ?

Objection :—Unnecessariness of postulating two bodies, astral and gross.

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* The word *niyata* is differently interpreted by Nârâyana Tirtha (in his *Sânkhya-Chandrikâ*). He takes it in the sense of "restricted," *i. e.*, an astral body is restricted to one particular Spirit ; and so there are distinct astral bodies to each Spirit. The interpretation of Gaudapâda closely resembles that of the *Kaumudi*. There does not seem to be any special ground for preferring either of the two, though I am more inclined to the interpretation of the *Kaumudi*.

We *reply* :—" *It migrates*," *i. e.*, the astral body invariably deserts the body it has lately occupied, and again occupies another. (If it be asked) why does it do so? (we reply)—(because it is) "*without enjoyment*," that is to say, because the astral body by itself—without a corresponding gross physical body of six sheaths to afford the seat of enjoyments,—would be without any enjoyments, and therefore it migrates.

Necessity of the physical body, because the astral body migrates.

(191). *Objection* :—Transmigration is due to merit and demerit; and these have no connection with the Astral Body (referring as they do primarily to *Buddhi*, and then by reflection, to the Spirit) then how can this latter migrate?

Objection:—How can the Astral Body migrate, being without dispositions?

We *reply* :—(because) "*it is invested with dispositions*." The dispositions are merit and demerit, wisdom and ignorance, passion and dispassion, power and weakness; endowed with these primarily is the *Buddhi*, with which latter again the Astral Body is connected; and as such the Astral Body becomes mediately connected with the various dispositions, just as a piece of cloth is perfumed by contact with *champaka* flowers. Thus then, being invested with dispositions, it becomes quite natural that the Astral Body should migrate.

Reply:—It has dispositions?

(192). (If it is asked) why should not the Astral Body—like Nature—last even after the final dissolution? We reply (because it is) "*mergent*," that is to say, because it dissolves (into Nature its immediate cause). The mergent character of the Astral Body is to be inferred from the fact of its being caused, (*i. e.*, being caused, and, as such, having a beginning in time, it must have an end also).

The Astral Body dissolving at each pralaya.

Objection: We grant all this. But why not attribute migration to Buddhi, Ahankâra and the senses? Have done with the unwarranted postulation of an Astral Body.

Objections:—Why not attribute migration to Buddhi, &c.?

We *reply* :—

KÂRIKÂ XLI.

As a painting stands not without a ground, nor a shadow without a stake, so neither does the *Linga* (*Buddhi*, &c.,) subsist supportless, without a specific (body).

Reply—the Buddhi cannot rest without substrate.

(193). Buddhi, &c., are called *Lingâ*, because they are the means of cognition (*Linganât, Jnâpakât, lingam*).* In support of this the author puts forth a syllogism :—between the ordinary physical death and re-birth, Buddhi and the rest have some sort of evolved body for their receptacle, because they are aggregates of the five primary elements; like their prototypes in the ordinary physical body.

"*Without specific bodies*," *i. e.*, without subtle (astral) bodies. Testifying to this assertion, we have the following (from the Mahâbhârata): "Then Yama extracted from Satyavân's body, the thumb-sized body, which he had entrapped and thus subjugated." Here the mention of the extracted body as "thumb-sized" implies the fact of its having been the Astral Body, since it is impossible that the Spirit could have been extracted. By *Purusha* in the above extract, is meant the Astral Body,—explaining the word derivatively as—that *which sleeps* (*lies—sêtê*) in the body (*puri*).

The existence of the Astral Body corroborated by the Mahâbhârata.

Having thus proved the existence of the Astral Body, the author states the reason and method of its migration:—

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* Cf. The *Panchikarana-vivarana—Tattwachandrikâ*—where a similar explanation of the word is given.

KÂRIKÂ XLII.

Reasons and manner of the migration of the Astral Body.

Formed for the sake of the Spirit's purpose the Astral Body plays its parts like a dramatic actor, on account of the connection of means and consequences, and by union with the predominant power of Nature.

(194). Formed for the Spirit's purpose the Astral Body plays like a dramatic actor by connection with the means—merit, &c., and consequences, the occupation of different kinds of gross bodies, the effects of merit, &c. That is to say, as a dramatic actor, occpuying different stages, plays severally the parts of Parasurâma, Yudhishthira, Vatsarâja so does the astral body, occupying various gross bodies, play the part of man, brute or plant.

The capacity of the Astral Body is due to the power of Nature.

(195). (If it is asked) Whence this capability of the Astral Body? We reply, "*by union with the predominant power of Nature.*" As is declared by the Puranas: "The various strange developments are due to Nature's omnipotence."

It has just been said, "*by connection with means and consequences;*" the author therefore next describes these *means* and *consequences*:

KÂRIRÂ XLIII.

The means and consequences—Dharma, &c.

The essential dispositions are innate; the incidental ones, such as merit, &c., are seen (considered) to be appurtenant to the organs; the uterine germ, &c., belong to the effect.*

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* It may be pointed out that Davies has quite misunderstood this Kârikâ. In the first place, he renders *Sâm-siddhikâh* by "transcendental", the very reverse of what it does mean. Secondly he renders *Karanâsrayinah* by "including cause", though in reality the compound means "located in organs"—as explained by the *Kaumudi* as well as the *Chandrikâ.*

I. Incidental dispositions.

(196). *Incidental* = consequent ; *i. e.*, brought about after the man's birth, by propitiating the gods, &c.

II. Essential innate.

"*Essential dispositions are innate,*" *e. g.*, it is declared that at the beginning of the creation the revered primeval sage Kapila emerged into existence, fully equipped with merit, wisdom, dispassion and power. Incidental dispositions, on the other hand, are not innate, that is to say, they are brought about by personal effort; such merit, &c., are those belonging to Vâlmiki and other Great Rishis.

The opposites of Dharma, &c., similarly explained.

The same is to be understood with regard to demerit, ignorance, passion and weakness.

Flesh, blood, &c., related to the gross body.

(197). The agrregate formed of the uterine germ, flesh, blood, &c., of the child in the mother's womb, is related to the gross physical body : that is to say, they are particular states of the latter ; as are also the childhood, youth, &c., of the born man.

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(198). The *means* and the *consequences* have been explained ; now the respective consequences of the various means are described.

KÂRIKÂ XLIV.

Consequences of the various means.

By virtue (is obtained) ascent to higher planes ; by vice, descent to the lower ; from wisdom (results) beatitude ; and bondage from the reverse.

Virtue leads to higher planes.

(199). "*By virtue, &c.,*" *i. e.*, to the various starry spheres (the Brâhma, the Prâjâpatya and so forth.)

Vice to lower.

"*By vice, &c.,*" *i. e.*, to the lower planes known as *sutala*, &c.

Wisdom, brings about beatitude.

"*From wisdom, beatitude.*" Nature ministers to the experience of the Spirit only so long as discriminative wisdom is not attained; when, however, this is attained, Nature finds its work in connection with that particular Spirit fulfilled, and accordingly retires from him. As is declared, "The workings of Nature continue only till the attainment of discriminative knowledge." "*From the reverse, &c.,*" *i. e.*, from false knowledge, results bondage.

From the reverse of the above, respectively, contradictory results. The three kinds of bondage.

(200). This bondage is also of three kinds: Natural, Incidental and Personal. The natural bondage is that of those Materialists who contemplate on Nature as the Spirit; with reference to such men, it is laid down in the Puranas: "The contemplators of the unmanifested (Nature) continue (in the chain of metempsychosis) till a hundred thousand years" [at the end of which they attain to true wisdom]. The incidental bondage is of those who contemplate on the various products of Nature as Spirit,—the elements, the senses, *Ahankâra* and *Buddhi*. With regard to these it is laid down: "The contemplators of the senses continue till ten Manvantaras; those of the elements, till a hundred Manvantaras; those of Ahankâra, till a thousand; and lastly, those of the Buddhi having done away with all feverish excitement, continue till ten thousand Manvantaras. Those labouring under the incidental bondage are (conventionally called) *Videhas*."

The personal bondage is due to *Ishtâpûrta* (actions done with selfish motives, such as the digging of tanks, &c., done with the sole motive of personal gains hereafter). Those performing such actions, having their minds influenced by desire, are ignorant of the true nature of the Spirit, and as such undergo bondage.

KÂRIKÂ XLV.

Consequences of various means.

From dispassion results absorption* into *Prakriti*; from passionate attachment, transmigration; from power, non-impediment (of desires;) and from the reverse, the contrary.

I. Absorption into Prakriti from dispassion.

(201). "*From dispassion results absorption into Prakriti.*" Those who are free from passion, but are ignorant of the true nature of spirit, are absorbed into *Nature*. By *Prakriti* here are meant Prakriti, *Buddhi*, *Ahankâra*, the Elements, and the senses. Those who meditate upon these as Spirit are absorbed into these (*i. e.* those mistaking the senses for the Spirit become absorbed in the senses, and so on), that is to say, they rest there till, in the course of time, they are born again.

II. Transmigration from passionate attachment.

(202). "*From passionate attachment results migration.*" The epithet "passionate" implies the painful character of metempsychosis; because (as has been previously described) passion is the source of pain.

III. Non-impediment from power.

(203). "*From power, non-impediment,*" *i. e.*, the non-obstruction of desires. "A powerful man (Iśwara) is one who can do whatever he wishes."

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* Davies takes the Hindu commentators to task, here, and remarks: "It (the Sânkhya) does not recognise any absorption of the subtle body into Nature, until the soul is entirely free.........Hence the meaning is that by the destruction of passion, the influence of the material world is destroyed, and the soul is independent, though not yet finally liberated." All this is quite true; but I don't see how this affects the position of the Hindu commentators, who, at least Vâchaspati Misra among them, do not assert the final absorption of the bodies into Nature; all that they mean is that by dispassion, the soul—or more properly, its seat, the astral body—is absorbed into Nature and rests there till it is born again. It may be remarked that this resting is what, in theosophic parlance, is called "the peaceful rest enjoyed by the Individuality in Devachan."

IV. Obstruction of desires from weakness.

"*From the reverse,*" *i. e.* form weakness—"*the contrary*"—*i. e.*, the frequent obstruction of desires.

With a view to describe collectively as well as individually, the eight properties of *Buddhi*—virtue, vice, &c., in order to show which of these are to be practised, and which relinquished, by those desiring emancipation—the author first describes them collectively :—

KÂRIKÂ XLVI.

The intellectual creation described.

This is an intellectual creation, distinguished by Error, Disablity, Contentment and Perfection. By the hostile influence of the inequalities of attributes, the different forms of this creation become fifty.

I. Error.
II. Disability.
III. Contentment.
IV. Perfection.

(204). *Pratyaya*=That by which anything is known, *i. e.*, *Buddhi*. "*Error*," *i. e.*, ignorance, is a property of *Buddhi*; so is also "*disablity*" which results from the incapacity of the sense-organs. *Contentment* and *Perfection* also are properties of *Buddhi* as will be described later on.

Virtue &c., included in the above four.

Of these, the three former,—error, disability and contentment—include Virtue and the other six intellectual properties ; leaving aside Wisdom which is included in Perfection.

Subdivisions of the above are fifty.

(205). These properties are next considered individually. "*The forms of these are fifty.*" If it is asked : Whence these fifty forms? We reply "*from the hostile influence of the inequalities of the attributes.*" The inequality may consist either in the individual strength of the one in comparison with the other two, or of two conjointly with that of the third. This inquality is assumed to be more or less in accordance with the requirements of particular cases ; and it leads to the

suppression of Attributes by one another—thus giving rise to the fifty forms of intellectual creation.

The fifty forms are next enumerated:

KÂRIKÂ XLVII.

There are five forms of Error; twenty-eight of Disability, arising from the imperfection of the organs; Contentment has nine forms; and Perfection eight.

5 forms of Error.
28 of Disability.
9 of Contentment.
8 of Perfection.
50

(206). The forms* of Error are *ignorance*, *egotism*, *passion*, *hatred* and *attachment to the body*: respectively called, *obscurity* (*Tamas*), *delusion* (*Moha*). *extreme delusion* (*Mahamoha*), *gloom* (*Tamisra*), and *utter darkness* (*Andhatamisra*). Egotism, &c., partake of the nature of Error; though, as a matter of fact, they are its products. A certain object being erroneously determined by Ignorance, Egotism and the rest, partaking of the nature of Ignorance, become attached to it. It is for this reason that the revered Vârshaganya (Vyâsa?) declares Ignorance to be made up of the five component parts.

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(207). Now the author states the sub-divisions of the five forms of error:—

KÂRIKÂ XLVIII.

Of Error there are eight forms, as also of Delusion; extreme Delusion is ten-fold; Gloom is eighteen-fold, and so is also utter Darkness.

Sixty-two subdivisions of Error.

Of Ignorance—eight forms.

(208). "*Of Error*," *i. e.*, of Ignorance, "*there are eight forms*."

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* *Abhinivésa*—is a technicality of Yoga Philosophy. It is defined by Patanjali (*Yoga Sutra* 11-9) as the "tenacity of life—an attachment to the body which relates the residue of one's former life."

Ignorance of the form of Error consists in mistaking non-spiritual Nature, *Buddhi*, *Ahankâra* and the subtle elements, for Spirit ; and these non—spiritual things are eight in number, Error is said to be eight-fold.

Eight of Delusion.

(209). The च refers the eight forms to Delusion. The gods having attained the eight occult powers, consider themselves to be immortal, and their powers also to be everlasting ; this is the error of Egotism, and since this has the eight *Siddhis* for its object, it is said to be eight-fold.

Ten of Extreme Delusion.

(210). "*Extreme Delusion is ten-fold.*" By *Extreme Delusion* is meant the attachment to the objects of sense, sound, odour and the rest —which are ten-fold, each of the five being either divine or otherwise ; and hence having these for its object, Extreme Delusion is said to be ten-fold.

Eighteen of Gloom.

(211). "*Gloom*," *i. e.*, Hatred, "*is eighteen-fold.*" The objects of sense, sound, &c., are ten by themselves ; the eight occult powers however are not objects of sense by themselves, but only as means to the attainment of the various sensuous objects. And the objects of sense, being mutually suppressive, their means—the Powers—too are retarded. The Powers, together with the objects of sense, make up eighteen, and these being the objects of Gloom or Hatred, make it eighteen-fold.

Eighteen of Utter Darkness.

(212). "*So is Utter Darkness*"—[Utter Darkness = Attachment to life]. The word "*tathâ*" refers *eighteen-fold-ness* to Utter Darkness. The gods having attained the eight occult powers and enjoying their consequences—the ten sensuous objects—live in continual fear of these being wrested from them by the Rakshasas ; and this fear constitutes *Abhiniveśa* or attachment ; and this latter having for its object the aforesaid eighteen things—the eight powers and the ten objects—is said to be eighteen-fold.

(213). Thus the five forms of Error, with their sub-divisions become sixty-two.

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(214). Having thus described the five forms of Error, the author next states the twenty eight forms of Disability :

KÂRIKÂ XLIX.

Twenty-eight forms of Disability.

The injuries of the eleven organs, together with those of *Buddhi*, are pronounced to be Disability; the injuries of *Buddhi* (itself) are seventeen—brought about by the reversion of contentment and perfection.

The Eleven—caused by injuries to the sense-organs.

(215). The injuries of the organs are mentioned as causes of so many injuries of *Buddhi*, and not as, by themselves, independent forms of Disability. These injuries—"Deafness, leprosy, blindness, paralysis, paralysis of the hands, lameness, dumbness, *ajighratâ* (failure of the sensibility of the olfactory nerves), impotency, failure of the action of the bowels, and idiocy,"—consequent on the failure of the various sense-organs, are the eleven kinds of intellectual disability, and these are mentioned together with those of *Buddhi* (itself) in accordance with the theory of the non-difference of cause and effect.

Seventeen caused by the reversion of contentment of perfection.

(216). Having thus described the disabilities of *Buddhi*, arising from those of the sense-organs, the disabilities of *Buddhi* itself are next stated —"*With the injuries of Buddhi.*" If it be asked—how many are these?—we reply, "*seventeen are the injuries of Buddhi.*" Wherefore? "*by the reversion of contentment and perfection.*" Contentment being nine-fold, the disabilities caused by its reversion are nine-fold also ; and similarly *perfection* being eight-fold, the disability caused by its reversion is eight-fold,—thus making the seventeen intellectual disabilities proper.

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(217). The author next enumerates the nine forms of Contentment:

KÂRIKÂ L.

Nine forms of Acquiescence.

Nine forms of Contentment are set forth: four internal, relating severally to nature, means, time and luck; and five external, relating to abstinence from objects of sense.

The five internal forms.

(218). The five internal forms of Contentment belong to those who have ascertained that Spirit is different form Nature, but still being ill-advised, do not make further attempts in the direction of meditation, &c., which are the means of discriminative wisdom; and these forms are called *internal*, because they pre-suppose the difference of *Átman* and *Prakriti*. It being asked—which are these?—the reply is "*relating severally to nature, means, time and luck*," *i. e.*, whose names are *nature* &c.

I. Ambha.

(219). The contentment called "*prakriti*" consists in the satisfaction of the disciple on being told that discriminative wisdom is only a modification of *Prakriti* and, as such, would come to every one in the natural course of events, and there is no need of hankering after it by meditation, &c., and this contentment is also called *Ambha*.

II. Salila.

(220). The second form of contentment arises from the following instruction: wisdom could not be attained in the ordinary course of nature; because, if it were so, then everybody would attain to wisdom, because the course of nature for the forms of nature affects all individuals equally. Such wisdom could only be attained through asceticism; and so thou must follow an ascetic life and give up all meditation, &c. The satisfaction arising from the above instruction is called *Salila*.

(221). The third form, called "Time," or *Ogha*, is the satisfaction arising from the instruction that asceticism too cannot bring about Emancipation; for all means await the proper *Time* for bringing about their various consequences, and so when the *Time* has arrived, one's ends will be gained without undergoing the troubles of asceticism.

III. Ogha.

(222). The fourth form called "*Luck*," or *Vrishti*, is the satisfaction arising from the following: "Discriminative wisdom proceeds neither from nature, nor from any other means (such as asceticism, &c.), nor does it depend solely upon time, but it comes only by luck. Thus it was through mere luck that the children of Madâlasâ when quite infants, obtained wisdom by their mother's instructions and thereby attained beatitude.

IV. Vrishti.

(223). The external forms of Contentment are five, arising from abstinence from sound, odour, &c.—the five objects of sense. These belong to those who are free from all attachment, but take the non-spirits—Nature, &c., to be Spirit. These forms are called *external*, because they pre-suppose the existence of Spirit, without knowing what it is; and these come after freedom from attachment. The causes of this non-attachment being five, it is five-fold, and consequently so is the contentment resulting therefrom. The objects of sense being five, the abstinence from these must also be five-fold. Abstinence too is due to the preception of discrepancies in the process of sensuous enjoyment—consisting mainly of earning, saving, wasting, enjoying, killing lives and so on.

The five external forms.

(224). To explain:—The means of acquiring wealth, service, &c., are invarably the sources of pain to the servants—as is declared in the following:—"Who would ever be attracted towards service, considering the pain caused by the insults to be suffered at the hands of the wardens of a vain monarch?"—the content-

I. Pâra.

ment resulting from abstinence from objects of sense due to the consideration of such troubles, is called *Pâra.*

(225). And then, the wealth being obtained, brings with it the further trouble of protecting it from the king, thieves, floods and fire—the contentment due to abstience arising from such considerations is the second called *Supâra.*

II. Supâra.

(226). Thirdly, the wealth having been obtained and safely hoarded, there arises the fear of its being spent—this consideration gives rise to the third form of abstinence leading to contentment called *Pârâpâra.*

III. *Pârâpâra.*

(227). Fourthly, when one becomes accustomed to sensuous objects, his desires increase; the non-fulfilment of these brings about the fourth, called *Anuttamâmbha.*

IV. *Anuttamâmbha.*

(228). Lastly, there arises the notion that there can be no enjoyment (either in this world or the other), without the cruel process of killing animals, and contentment, due to the abstinence arising from the perception of the cruelty of the process, is the fifth called *Uttamâmbha.*

V. *Uttamâmbha.*

Thus the four external froms of contentment, together with the five internal ones, make up the nine froms mentioned above.

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(229). The author next describes the primary and secondary divisions of *Power* :—

KÂRIKÂ LI.

The eight Powers (*i. e.*, means of acquiring them) are reasoning, oral instruction, study, three-fold suppression of pain, acquisition of friends, and purity. The three before mentioned (Error, &c.) are checks to these (Powers).

The eight powers.

(230). The chief among those enumerated above is the *three-fold suppression of pain*—three-fold on account of the three-foldness of the pains to be suppressed.

The other means mentioned, being means to power only through the three-fold suppression of pain, are called *secondary*. And these five are both causes and effects. Of these *study* is only a cause. The three principal ones (suppression of pain) being only effects; the rest are both cause and effect.

(231). The first, *study*, named *Târa*, consists in comprehending the sense of the psychological sciences by listening to the teachings of a qualified teacher.

(1) Târa.

(232). The effect of this last, *oral instruction*, implies the comprehension of the meaning of instructions, it being a useful habit with writers, to imply the effect by the cause; this constitutes the second *Siddhi* called *Sutâra*.

(2) Sutâra.

(233). *Reasoning* consists in the investigatin of the meaning of scripture by a process of dialetics not contrary to the scriptures themselves. This investigation consists in strengthening the portion of the scripture by setting aside all doubts and objections with regard to it; this process is also called *meditation* by writers on the Vedas, and the Power due to this is called *Târâtâra*.

(3) Târatâra.

(234). The fourth is the *acquisition of friends*. Even though one has arrived at truth by the right process of reasoning yet he has no faith in his conclusions until he has talked them over with his teacher and follow-students. Hence the acquisition of a qualified teacher and follow-students is said to be the fourth *Siddhi* called *Ramyaka*.*

(4) Ramyaka.

(235). By *dâna* here is meant *purity* (of discriminative wisdom)—deriving the word from the root *Daip** = to purify. As is declared by the

(5) Sadamudita.

* Davies remarks that the root is "coined for the occasion." But I may refer the reader to the *Siddhânta-Kaumudî*, under the *Sutra Vânyasya Sânyôgadĉh* (VI/4/68).

revered Patanjali: "An unimpeded discriminatve knowledge is the means to the suppression of pain." (*Yoga-Sutra* II—26). By *unimpededness* in the Sutra is meant *purity*, by which again is meant the process of placing discriminative wisdom on a clear basis, after having destroyed all doubts and mistaken notions mixed with different kinds of cravings or desires]. This *purity* is not obtainable without the refinement arising from a long and uninterrupted course of practice (of the wisdom attained). Thus the word *dâna* includes (as a means to power) Practice also. This is the fifth, called *Sadâ-Mudita.*

(236). The three primary means to Power are called, *Pramoda Mudita* and *Modamâna.* And these three with the last five are the eight (means to) Power.

Another explanation of the Powers.

(237). Others explain the distich thus: The perception of truth without the instruction of others, brought about purely by means of instructions received in past births is what is meant by *ûha.* And that which is obtained by listening to the tenets of the Sânkhya Philosophy as learnt by others, is the second called *Sâbda*, because it follows merely from the study of the text. When the truth is learnt at a teacher's, in the company of follow-students, it is said to be the third, known as *study*, because it is brought about by study. The fourth consists in the attainment of wisdom by coming in contact with a friend who has already got it. Fifthly, *generosity* is said to be a means to wisdom, because true wisdom is imparted by the teacher, duly propitiated with gifts.

The propriety of either interpretation we leave to the learned to judge; and we desist from pointing out the faults of others, because our duty lies only in elucidating the cardinal doctrines of the Sânkhya Philosophy.

(238). The Disabilities of *Buddhi* arising from the reversion of Contentment and Power thus become seventeen in number. Of the different poritions of intellectual creation, it is well-known that Power is most desired by all. So the author next mentions Error, Disability and Contentment as impediments

to Power: "*The aforesaid three are checks to Power.*" *The aforesaid three* refers to Error, Disability and Contentment. And these are curbs to the different means of attaining Power, because they retard their progress; and thus being opposed to Power, the latter three are ever undesirable.

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(239). *Objection:*—Granted all this. But it has been laid down that the creation is for the Spirit's purpose. This purpose can be fulfilled either by the intellectual creation alone; or by the elemental alone. Why have both?

The reply is:—

KÂRIKÂ LII.

Necessity of two-fold creation.

Without dispositions there would be no Linga (Element), and without the Linga there would be no development of dispositions. Wherefore proceeds a two-fold creation, the personal (belonging to the body, astral and gross) and intellectual.

(240). *Linga* denotes the creation composed of the primary elements; and *disposition*, the intellectual.

The meaning of the Kârikâ is that the elemental creation cannot manifest itself for the fulfilment of the purpose of the Spirit, without the intellectual creation; nor conversely is the latter capable of having its complete manifestation without the elements. Hence the necessity of a two-fold creation.

Necessity of the elemental creation.

Necessity of the intellectual creation.

Again experience, the purpose of the Spirit, is not possible in the absence of the two bodies and the object of sense. Hence the necessity of the elemental creation. And conversely the means of experience—the sense-organs—could never be complete without the three internal organs—*Manas Ahankâra* and *Buddhi*. Nor would these latter be what they are, if there were no dispositions, virtue, &c. And lastly, discriminative

wisdom—the only means to emancipation, would not be possible without the above two kinds of creation. Whence the necessity of the double creation.

The fault of reciprocal causality explained as due to the eternality of creation.

(241). The possible objection of reciprocal causality is explained away as being similar to that of the seed and the sprout, due to the fact of the creation having had no beginning in time (being eternal), and the creation of bodies and dispositions at the beginning of the present cycle is said to be due to the impulse of residual tendencies left by the bodies and (dispositions related to particular Spirits), in the previous cycle.

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(242). The various forms of the intellectual creation having been mentioned, the author next mentions those of the elemental creation:

Kârikâ LIII.

The force of elemental creation.

The divine class has eight varieties, the lower animals, five; mankind is single in its class; thus briefly is the world of living beings.

The eight divine sorts.

(243). The eight divine varieties are the Brâhma, the Pâjâpatya, the Aindra, the Paitra, the Gândharva, Yâksha, the Râkshasa and the Paiśâcha.

five of the lower animals.

(244). The five varieties of lower animals are quadrupeds (other than deer), deer, birds, creeping things and the immovable (trees, &c.)

Mankind single.

(245). *Mankind is single*, not counting its sub-divisions—Brahmanas &c., as separate, as the bodily formation is the same in all classes of men.

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(246). The author next lays down the three-foldness of the elemental creation based on the excess or otherwise of intelligence in the form of the higher, the middle and the lower:

KÂRIKÂ LIV.

The different divisions of beings based on the predominance of the Attributes.

Among the beings of the higher plane Goodness predominates: among those of the lower predominates Dulness; in the middle reside those predominating in Foulness—these constituting the whole Universe, from Brahmâ to the tuft of grass.

The six Heavenly Regions.

(247). The Heavenly regions—Bhuvah, Swah, Mahah, Jana, Tapas and Satya—predominate in Goodness. Those consisting of the lower animals and trees, &c., are characterised by Dulness. The regions of the earth—consisting of the seven Dvipas (or continents) and Oceans—predominate in Foulness, inasmuch as they abound in pain and are given to actions, righteous or otherwise.

The whole of the Universe is summed up in the pharse "*from Brahmâ to the tuft of grass.*"

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(248). Having thus described the creation, the author next describes its productiveness of pain, that would lead to dispassion, one of the means to Emancipation:—

KÂRIKÂ LV.

The sources of pain.

There (in the world) does the Sentient Spirit experience pain, arising from decay and death, due to the non-discrimination of the Spirit from the body, until it is released from its person (until the dissolution of the astral body); wherefore pain is natural.

Among corporeal beings there are many varieties of experience interspersed with pleasure and pain; yet the pain of decay and death is the common lot of all. The fear of death,—"may I not cease to be; may I continue to be" &c.—being common to man as well as to the smallest insect, and the cause of fear constituting pain, death is a source of pain.*

Pain of decay and death, the common lot of all creatures.

(249). *Objection:*—Pleasure and pain are the properties of *Buddhi*; and as such how can these be said to belong to the Spirit?

Reply:—(the name) "*Purusha*," literally meaning "One who sleeps in the astral body"; and this latter being connected with *Buddhi* and its properties, leads to the idea of the Spirit being connected with them.

Explanation of the word *Purusha*.

(250). *Question:*—How can pain related to the body be said to belong to the Spirit?

"*Reply:*—"*Due to the non-discrimination of Spirit from the body.*" The Spirit, not alive to its distinction from the body, mistakes the fluctuations of the latter for its own. The आ in आविनिवृत्तेः may be taken as pointing to the limit of the Spirit's pain—the meaning being, "*Until the body has ceased to be*, the Spirit suffers pain."

Limit of the pain.

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(251). The author next decides the question of the Maker of the Universe:

KÂRIKÂ LVI.

This creation from *Buddhi* down to the specific elements, is brought about by the modifications of Prakriti. The work is done for the emancipation of each

The question as to the Maker of the Universe decided.

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* It may be worth noting here that Death in itself is not pain. it is only the fear (the fear of the unknown) that makes the thought of death so painful.

Spirit, and thus is for another's sake, though appearing as if it were for the sake of Nature herself.

The different views of the cause of creation set aside.

(252). The creation is brought about by Nature; it is neither produced by a God, nor is it an evolution from Brahman; nor can it be said to be Uncaused; since, in this latter case, the Universe would be either an eternal entity or eternal non-entity (an absurdity). It cannot be said to be evolved from Brahman (the Vedânta view), for there can be no (material) modification of pure intelligence, Brahman, as postulated by Vedânta. Nor, again can creation be said to be brought about by Nature under the guiding hand of a God; for a God is naturally without action and, as such, cannot be the supervisor, just as an inactive carpenter cannot be said to manipulate his tools.

Objection:—Nature being eternally active, no emancipation possible.

(253). *Objection*:—Granted that the creation is due to Nature alone. But Nature is eternally active and, as such, her operations should never cease; and hence there would be no emancipation of any Spirit.

Reply:—The creation is for the spirit's end and ceases with the purification of these.

Reply:—"*The creation appearing as if it were for Nature's own sake, is really for the sake of another.*" A cook, having finished the cooking, retires from the work; similarly Nature being urged to action for the emancipation of the Spirit, brings about this emancipation; and thenceforth cease her operations with regard to the Spirits already liberated (and, thus emancipation is not impossible).

Objection:—An insentient Nature cannot act towards a definite end.

(254). *Objection*:—Granted all this. But it is only something sentient that can act towards the fulfilment of its own or of another's purpose; and Nature being insentient cannot act in the manner described; and, as such, she requires a sentient supervisor (over her blind force);

the Spirit residing in the body cannot be such a supervisor, because such conditioned Spirits are ignorant of the true character of Nature; consequently there must be some other sentient agent, superintending *ab extra* the operations of Nature—and to this we give the name *God.*

We *reply* :—

Kârikâ LVII.

Instance of an insentient object acting towards a definite end.

As the insentient milk flows out for the growth of the calf, so does Nature operate towards the emancipation of the Spirit.

(255). It is a fact of observation that insentient objects also act towards definite ends, *e.g.*, the action of milk towards the nourishment of the calf. Similarly Nature, though insentient, could act towards the emancipation of the Spirit.

The view of a Personal Universal Lord overthrown.

(255a). It would not be right to urge that the production of the milk being due to the superintending care of God, its action cannot afford a case parallel to the action of insentient Nature;—because all actions of an intelligent agent are due either to selfishness, or benevolence, neither of which can be said to be the cause of the creation of the Universe, which, therefore, cannot be said to be due to the action of an intelligent agent. For God, being the Lord of the Universe, has all that he requires and, as such, He can have no selfish motive; nor can His action be said to be due solely to pity; for pity consists in a desire for the removal of others' pains; but before creation, Spirits were without bodies, and, as such, without pain, for the removal of which God's compassion would be moved. And if the pain subsequent to creation were said to be the cause of creation, then we should be in the inextricable nooze of reciprocality: the creation due to pity, and pity due to the creation. And again if God were moved to creation by pity, then he would create none

but happy mortals. And if the diversity of pleasures be attributed to the past deeds of the individual Spirit, then what is the necessity of postulating a supervisor? And if you urge the incapability of mere *Karma*—an unintelligent agent—without a supervisor, towards creation, then we reply, that the creation of bodies, &c., being incapable of being produced by *Karma*, we may very easily say the same with regard to pleasure, &c., as well (and, pleasure, &c., will have to be attributed to God also).

None of the above objections apply to the case of Nature.

(256). The action of the non-intelligent Prakriti is due neither to selfishness nor to mere pity; and thus in this case, none of the above faults are applicable. The only motive of Nature is the purpose of the Spirit. Thus therefore the instance cited in the Kârikâ is quite appropriate.

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(257). It has been said—"*as if for its own purpose.*" The author explains this:—

Kârikâ LVIII.

The Spirit's end—the motive of Nature.

As people engage in acts to satisfy desires, so does the Unmanifested Principle (Nature) act for the emancipation of the Spirit.

Desire is satisfied on the attainment of the desired object which is the purpose of the agent; because an end of action is only that which is desired.

The similarity is pointed out: "*So does the Unmanifested Principle act for the Emancipation of Spirit.*"

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(258). *Objection*:—We grant that the purpose of the Spirit is the motive to the action of Nature, but whence the cessation of her operations?

We *reply*:—

KÂRIKÂ LIX.

The cause of the cessation of Nature's operations.

As a dancing girl, having exhibited herself to the spectators of the stage, ceases to dance, so does Nature cease to operate when she has made herself manifest to the Spirit.

The word "stage,"—the place—implies the spectators,—the occupiers of the place. Having *manifested herself* *i. e.*, her different modifications, sound, &c., as different from the Spirit.

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(259). *Objection:*—We grant the action of Nature for the Spirit's purpose. But she is sure to get some compensation for her pains from the Spirit—just as a servant does from his gratified master; and as such the motive of Nature cannot be said to be purely altruistic.

We *reply:*—

KÂRIKÂ LX.

Nature expects no compensation.

Generous Nature, endowed with attributes, causes by manifold means, without benefit to herself, the good of the Spirit, who is devoid of attributes, and as such ungrateful.

As a qualified servant accomplishes the good of his unqualified master, through purely unselfish motives, without any benefit to himself; so does generous Nature, endowed with the three Attributes, benefit the Spirit without any good in return to herself. Thus the pure unselfishness of Nature's motives is established.

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(260). *Objection:*—We grant all this: But a dancing girl having retired from the stage after her exhibition, returns to it

again, if so desired by the spectators; similarly would Nature act even after having manifested herself to Spirit.

We *reply*:—

KÂRIKÂ LXI.

The reason why Nature does not revert to her actions.

Nothing is more modest than Nature: such is my opinion. Once aware of having been seen, she does not again expose herself to the view of the Spirit.

By *modesty* here is meant delicacy (of manners), the inability to suffer exposure to the *Purusha's* view. As a well-bred lady unvisible to the Sun, with her eyes cast down, having her body uncovered by chance, happening to be seen by a stranger, tries to hide herself in such a way as not to be seen again; so Nature—even more modest than such a lady—having once been seen by the Purusha, will is no case show herself again.

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(261). *Objection:*—Let this be so. But *Purusha*, being devoid of Attributes and Modifications, how is his emancipation possible? For emancipation consists in the removal of bondage; and bondage being only another name for the karmic residua imbued with dispositions and troubles, it is not possible to the unmodifying *Purusha*. And as the *Purusha* is devoid of action it can have no migration—which latter is only another name for *death*. Hence it is a meaningless assertion that the creation is for the purpose of *Purusha*.

The author meets the above objection by accepting it:

KÂRIKÂ LXII.

Bondage and release in reality apply to Nature.

Verily no Spirit is bound, or is emancipated, or migrates; it is Nature alone which has many receptacles, that is bound, or is released, or migrates.

(262). No Spirit is bound; not any migrates; nor is any emancipated. Nature alone, having many receptacles (bodily

forms of being), is bound, migrates and is released. Bondage, migration and release are ascribed to the Spirit, in the same manner as defeat and victory are attributed to the king, though actually occurring to his soldiers; because it is the servants that take part in the undertaking, the effects of which—gain or loss—accrue to the king. In the same manner, experience and release, though really belonging to Nature, are attributed to the Spirit, on account of the non-discrimination of Spirit from Nature. Thus the objection above urged loses all its force.

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(263). *Objection:*—We understand that bondage, migration and release, are ascribed to the Spirit; but of what good are these to Nature?

We *reply*:—

KÂRIKÂ LXIII.

Nature binds and releases herself by means of her own developments.

Nature by herself binds herself by means of seven forms; she causes deliverance for the benefit of the Spirit, by means of one form.

"*Nature binds herself by means of seven forms*" (*i. e.* dispositions) all the properties of *Buddhi*, save discriminative wisdom. For the benefit of the Spirit she releases herself by herself, by means of one form, *viz.*, discriminative wisdom. That is to say, she does not again bring about the experience or emancipation of the same Spirit.

Objection:—We grant all this. What then?

KÂRIKÂ LXIV.

The form and character of discriminative wisdom.

Thus it is that by the practice of truth, wisdom is attained, which is complete, incontrovertible, (and hence) pure, and absolute: (by means of which the idea is obtained that) "I am not, naught is *mine*, and *I* do not exist."

(264). The word "truth" indicates the knowledge thereof. By means of practice of truth, in the manner described above, through a long course of repeated, uninterrupted and respectful exercise of true knowledge, the wisdom manifesting the distinction of Spirit from Matter, is attained. All exercise brings about the knowledge of its object, so in the present case the exercise being one of truth results in the cognition thereof. It is for this reason of its leading to truth that the knowledge is called *pure*.

The purity of the wisdom explained.

(265). Why *pure?* Because "*incontrovertible*" (or unmistaken). Doubt and error are the two impurities of knowledge; and the above knowledge being free from these is said to be *pure*. Doubt consists in thinking a decided fact to be undecided; and as such it is only a form of error. Thus by saying, "*hence incontrovertible*" the absence of both doubt and contradiction is implied; this absence being due also to the fact of the exercise belonging to *truth*.

(266). *Objection*:—We grant all this, but the eternal tendency towards false knowledge is sure to bring about its results in the shape of false knowledge, which will lead to its inevitable effect, the miseries of metempsychosis, of which thus there would be no end.

Absoluteness explained.

In reply to the above, it is declared "*Absolute*," *i.e.*, unmixed with error. Though tendency towards error is eternal, yet it is capable of removal by means of true wisdom, though this has a beginning in time. For partiality towards *truth* is natural to *Buddhi*, as declare also outsiders (here, the Bauddhas): "No amount of contradiction can set aside the flawless (knowledge of) the character of objects, for such is the partiality of *Buddhi*."

The form of the knowledge.

(267). The form of the cognition is stated:—*I am not, naught is mine*, and *I do not exist*. '*I am not*' merely precludes the possibility of action from the Spirit. As is declared

(by grammarians), "The root *As* together with *Bhu* and *Kri* signify *action* in general." Hence all actions, external as well as internal, determination, self-consciousness, reflection, observation, &c., are all precluded from the Spirit. And since there is no action of the Spirit, there arises the idea that "I am not." "I" here implies *agency*, such as in "I give," "I eat," &c.; and no such agency can belong to the Spirit, who is without any action. And from this follows the idea that "*naught is mine*." For it is only an agent that can have any *possession*; and hence the preclusion of action implies that of *possession* as well.

Or we may interpret the three forms in another way. The sentence "I do not exist," means that "I am the Spirit, not productive;" and because non-productive "I have no action" —'I am not'; and since without action, "I can have no possessions," hence "naught is mine."

(268). *Objection:*—Even after such a knowledge, there might be left something yet unknown, which would lead to re-birth.

We *reply*:—"*It is complete*," *i. e.*, there is nothing left unknown after the attainment of such knowledge as the above. Hence there is no re-birth.

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(269). *Question:*—What is accomplished by this knowledge of truth?

We *reply*:—

Kârikâ LXV.

The cause of the cessation of Nature's operation.

Possessed of this knowledge, Spirit, as a spectator, pure, at leisure and at ease, beholds Nature, which has now reverted from the seven forms (to her primitive state) after her prolific fruition has ceased, under the force of true wisdom.

The two things for the production of which Nature had begun action were *experience* and *the perception of truth*; and

when these two have been accomplished there is nothing left to be done, and hence Nature ceases from prolific activity.

"Under *the force (of true wisdom)*." The seven forms—Virtue, &c.—are all due to erroneous knowledge. Dispassion, too, of those who have it through mere contentment, is due to erroneous knowledge. And this erroneous knowledge is removed by its contradictory—true knowledge. And thus the cause, erroneous knowledge, being removed, its effects, the seven forms are also removed, and hence from these Nature desists.

"*At ease*," *i. e.*, Inactive; "*Pure*" *i. e.*, Unmixed with the impurities of *Buddhi*, due to the Attributes,—though to the last moment the Spirit continues to be in contact with the Attribute of Goodness; or else no (perception, and hence no) wisdom would be possible.

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(270). *Objection*:—Let this be so. We have nothing to say against your statement as to Nature desisting from productions. But the production has been said to be due to the connection (of Spirit and Matter); and this connection is only a form of capability; and the capability to experience constitutes the intelligence of the Spirit, as the capacity of being the object of experience constitutes the non-intelligence and objectivity of Nature; and these two capabilities can never be said to cease; and you cannot urge that they cease, because there is nothing left to be done, for though one set of objects has been experienced by the Spirit, there are others of the same kind still to be experienced. (Thus no emancipation is possible).

We *reply*:—

KÂRIKÂ LXVI.

No birth after attainment of wisdom, for want of motive.

"She has been seen by me," says the one and so retires; "I have been seen," says the other, and ceases to act. Hence though there is still their conjunction, it affords no motive towards further creation.

(271). So long as nature has not manifested truth, she may bring about the enjoyment of the various objects of sense; but she cannot do this after she has once brought about discriminative wisdom. For experience is due to erroneous knowledge, and when this latter, the cause, has ceased under the force of wisdom, there can be no enjoyment; just as the sprout is not possible in the absence of the seed. The Spirit mistakes the various objects of sense—the modifications of Nature—to belong to himself. And discriminative wisdom also is a modification of Nature, and as such is taken by the Spirit to belong to himself. When however such wisdom has been brought about, the connection of the Spirit with Nature ceases, and so he ceases to feel. Nor is the Spirit by himself capable of bringing about discriminative wisdom, which is a development* of Nature. And the Spirit who has attained to wisdom, cannot accept any purpose as his own. And further, experience and emancipation being the purpose of the Spirit, supply the motive to the operations of Nature; but when these two have ceased to be the purpose of the Spirit, they cease to be motives also. With this view it is declared—"*There is no motive*, &c." A motive is that which moves Nature to act towards creation; and this is not possible, when there is no purpose of the Spirit.

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(272). *Objection*:—We grant all this. But no sooner would wisdom be attained than the body would dissolve; and then how could the bodiless Spirit behold Nature (as distinct from himself)? If it be asserted that emancipation does not follow immediately on the attainment of wisdom, on account of the unspent residuum of *Karma*—then we ask,—how is this residuum destroyed? If by mere fruition (*i. e.*, by experience), then you tacitly imply the inability of wisdom alone to bring about emancipation. And hence the assertion that "emancipation follows from a knowledge of the distinction between the Manifested, the Unmanifested, and the Spirit"

* Because wisdom is a property of Buddhi which is an emanation from Nature.

becomes meaningless. And the hope too—that emancipation would be obtained on the destruction of the residua of *Karma*, by means of experience extending to a limitless period of time—is too sanguine ever to be realised.

To this we *reply*:—

KÂRIKÂ LXVII.

Reason why the body does not dissolve immediately on the attainment of wisdom.

By the attainment of perfect wisdom, Virtue and the rest become devoid of causal energy; yet the Spirit remains awhile invested with body, as a potter's wheel continues to revolve by the force of the impulse previously imparted to it.

(273). The unlimited residua of Karma also having their prolificness destroyed by the force of true knowledge, they do not lead to any further experience. The seeds of action produce sprouts only on the ground of *Buddhi*, damp with the waters of pain. The ground, however, becomes barren by having its dampness of pain dried up by the extreme heat of true wisdom, and hence the Karmic seeds cease to sprout forth into experience. With this view it is said—"*Virtue and the rest become devoid of causal energy.*" Even when wisdom has been attained, the body continues for a while, on account of the previous impulse; just as even after the action of the potter has ceased, the wheel continues to revolve on account of the momentum imparted to it. In due time, however, the impulse having exhausted itself it stops. In the continuance of the body, the impulse is supplied by virtue and vice whose fruition has already commenced, as is declared by *S'ruti*—"Other (actions) having been destroyed by itself experience, the soul attains beatitude" and "The delay is only so long as beatitude is not attained" [*Chhândogya* VI, i, 2]. This impulse (or impression) is a peculiar one, in which all illusion has been destroyed; and in consequence of this impulse, the Spirit remains awhile invested with the body.

(274). *Question:*—Let this be so: if the Spirit remains invested with body by some sort of impulse, when will be his final release?

We *reply:*—

KÂRIKÂ LXVIII.

Final beatitude.

When the separation of the informed Spirit from his corporeal frame at length takes place, and Nature ceases to act in respect to it, then is final and absolute emancipation accomplished.

The prolificness of those actions, whose fruition has not commenced, being destroyed, and those also whose fruition has commenced, having been spent by experience, Nature has her purpose fulfilled, and hence ceases with respect to that particular Spirit, who thus obtains absolute and eternal cessation of the triad of pain.

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(275). Though the doctrine has been proved by reasoning, yet in order to inspire respect towards it, the precedence of the great Rishi is stated:

KÂRIKÂ LXIX.

The precedence of Kapila.

This abstruse knowledge adapted to the emancipation of the Spirit, wherein the origin duration, and dissolution of beings are considered, has been thoroughly expounded by the great Rishi.

"*Abstruse,*" *i. e.*, hard to be grasped by dull-brained people.

"*By the great Rishi*" *i. e.*, by Kapila.

The feeling of reverence thus roused is strengthened by basing the doctrines on the Veda: "*Wherein are considered, &c.,*" *i. e.*, in which knowledge (*i. e.*, for the sake of which knowledge).* These, *origin* &c., are also considered in the Veda.

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* As in *Charmani dvipinam hanti.*

(276). Let this be so: We shall respect the direct sayings of the great Rishi (Kapila); wherefore should we pay attention to the assertions made by Íśvarakrishna?

We *reply*:—

Kârikâ LXX—LXXI.

Importance of the Science.

This supreme, purifying (doctrine) the sage imparted to Âsuri, who taught it to Panchasikha, by whom the science was extensively propagated.

Handed down by tradition of pupils, it has been compendiously written in Âryâ metre by the noble-minded I'śvarakrishna who has thoroughly investigated the truth.

Purifying, purifying the Spirit from all sins, the cause of the triad of pain.

Supreme, *i. e.*, chief among all purifying doctrines.

(277). "Ârya = that which has arrived at truth; one whose intellect is such is called Âryamati."

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(278). This science is a whole in itself,—not a mere section—because it treats of all branches of knowledge:—

Kârikâ LXXII.

The sixty topics of science.

The subjects that are treated of in the seventy distiches are those of the complete science comprising sixty topics, exclusive of illustrative tales, and omitting controversies.

The sixty topics are thus laid down in the *Râja-Vârtika*: 1 The existence of Prakriti (Kârikâ XIV); 2 its singleness (XIV); 3 Objectiveness (XI); 4 Distinctiveness (of Spirit from Matter) (XI); 5 Subserviency (of Matter to Spirit) (XVII);

6 Plurality (of spirits) (XVIII) ; 7 Disjunction (of Spirit from Matter in the end) (XX) ; 8 Conjunction (of Spirit and Matter in the beginning) (XXI) ; 9 Relation of subserviency (of Matter with Spirit) (XIX) ; 10 Inactivity (of the Spirit) (XIX) ; these are the ten radical categories. (In addition to these) are the five kinds of error (XLVII), nine of contentment (L), and twenty-eight of disability of the organs (XLIX) ; these, together with the eight sorts of power (LI), make up the sixty "topics." All these sixty topics are treated of in the above seventy distiches, which therefore form a complete science and cannot be said to be only a portion thereof.

Of the above (ten radical categories), singleness, objectivity, and subordination relate to Nature ; distinctness, inactivity and plurality to Spirit ; and existence, disjunction, and conjunction to both ; and existence of the relation of subserviency relates to gross bodies also.

May this work of Vâchaspati Miśra, the *Tattva-Kaumudî* (the *Moonlight of Truth*), continue to please (cause to bloom) the clear (lily-like) hearts of good men !

Thus ends the Tattva-Kaumudî of Vâchaspati Miśra.

ALPHABETICAL INDEX.

श्रीः

तत्त्वकौमुदी

(साङ्ख्य ।)

निखिलतन्त्रापरतन्त्रप्रतिभ-द्वादशदर्शनटीकाकृ-
न्मैथिलवर्य-श्रीमद्वाचस्पतिमिश्रकृता

क्वाचित्कटिप्पणीसहिता

मिथिलामण्डनभूततपस्विवर्यझोपनामकश्रीमत्तीर्थनाथशर्मतनूजन्मना
मध्यमेन "मास्टर् आफ् आर्ट्स" इत्युपाधिभाजा दरभङ्गा-
राजकीयसरस्वतीसदनाध्यक्षेण झोपनामकेन श्रीमद्-
गङ्गानाथशर्मणा मैथिलेन संस्कृता ।

मुम्बइनगरनिवासि-विद्यारसिक-
श्रीमत्तुकारामतात्याभिधेन प्रकाशिता

तन्नगरस्थ "तत्त्वविवेचक" नाम्नि मुद्रणयंत्रालये मुद्रिता च ।

१८९६.

भूमिका.

निखिलतन्त्रापरतन्त्रप्रतिभः श्रीमान् वाचस्पतिमिश्रः कदा कन्देशमलङ्करोति सम्यङ्निश्चेतुन्नैव शक्यते । किन्तु निश्चितप्रायमेव सम्भाव्यते यदयं विद्वदग्रणीः खिष्टाब्दीयसहस्रतमवर्षात् प्रागेव मिथिलाजनपदम् मण्डयामासेति । यतोऽस्य तात्पर्यटीकायाः परिशुद्धिनाम्नी व्याख्या श्रीमदुदयनाचार्यकृताऽद्यापि वरीवर्ति । अयञ्चोदयनो वङ्गाधिपलक्ष्मणसेनसमये आसीदिति गोवर्धनाचार्यकृतसप्तशतीतस्तथा च वङ्गोपलब्धशिलालेखान्निश्चीयते । यत्तु "खण्डनखण्डखाद्यकृतः श्रीहर्षादयमर्वाचीन" इति तारानाथतर्कवाचस्पतयस्तद्भ्रान्तिविलसितम्। यतः खण्डनखाद्ये उदयनकृतकारिकाणान्तथा च चिन्तामण्युक्तलक्षणानां खण्डनं बहुशः कृतमस्ति । उदयनेन च वाचस्पतिग्रन्थेषु टीका निरमायि, गङ्गेशेनापि 'टीकाकार' इति व्यपदेशेन प्रामाण्येनोपन्यस्तो वाचस्पतिः। तर्कवाचस्पतीनाम्भ्रान्तिबीजं खण्डनोद्धारनामकोग्रन्थः, किन्त्वस्य कर्ता त्रिंशद्धर्मशास्त्रनिबन्धनिर्माताऽपरो वाचस्पतिर्मिथिलास्थसुगौना-नगरनिवासीत्यवधेयम् ।

यदयम् महात्मा मैथिलब्राह्मण इति निश्चितप्रायमेव । अद्यापि मिथिलायाम् "भामा" (भामती) नाम्नी नगरी, तत्र च भामतीनामैकः पुरातनो जलाशयो वरीवर्ति । दशशताधिकोनविंशतितमशकाब्दकालीनमिथिलाभूपतिना*न्यदेवप्राग्भूतमिथिलानरपतिकिराताधिपतिराजधानी नेपालप्रान्त• आसीदिति प्राचीनप्राकारशेषादिभिरनुमीयते । किराताश्च नरवाहना इति सुप्रसिद्धमेव । ततश्च "श्रीमन्नृगेऽकारि मया निबन्ध" इति भामत्युपसंहारोक्तिरपि सङ्गच्छते । अपरश्च हेतुस्तस्य मैथिलत्वे-न्यायसूत्रकारो गौतमो मैथिलः न्यायवार्तिककार उद्योतकराचार्यो मैथिलः, वार्तिकतात्पर्यपरिशुद्धिकर्ता उदयनो मैथिलः, अतस्तन्मध्यगस्तात्पर्यकर्ता देशान्तरीयोऽन्तर्गडुभूत इति संशयपदवीमप्यारोढुं न शक्नोति । किञ्च पक्षधरमिश्रसमकालीन–(खिष्टाब्दीय पञ्चदशशतप्रान्तभूत)–शिरोमणेः प्राङ् मिथिलावर्यमन्यत्र न्यायशास्त्रस्य चर्चाऽपि नासीदिति सुप्रसिद्धमेव विदुषाम् । अपरश्च—

'शङ्करवाचस्पत्योः सदृशौ शङ्करवाचस्पती एव ।

पक्षधरप्रतिपक्षी लक्ष्यीभूतः पुनः क्वापि' इति मैथिलानां स्वदेशीयविद्वज्जन–सम्बन्धिनी गौरवोक्तिरपि वाचस्पतेर्मैथिलत्वसाधनकोटौ प्रवेशमर्हति ।

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* तथा च मिथिलादेशस्थ–'सिमरौनगढी '–गतवास्तुशिलायां श्लोकः–" नन्देन्दुविन्दुविधुसम्मितशाकवर्षे तच्छ्रावणे सितदले मुनिसिद्धतिथ्याम् । स्वातीशनैश्चरदिने करिवैरिलग्ने श्रीनान्यदेवन्टपतिर्विदधीत वास्तुम् ॥ "

वर्तमानेष्वपि साङ्ख्यप्रवचनभाष्य–साङ्ख्यचन्द्रिका–साङ्ख्यसारादिषु नानाविधसाङ्ख्यशास्त्रनिबन्धेषु पठनपाठनादिषु तत्त्वकौमुद्येवाद्रियते विद्वद्वर्यैरिति समुचितमेव । यतः शब्दार्थ गाम्भीर्येणार्थपुष्कलत्वेन रमणीयतयाच वाचस्पतेर्लेखस्सर्वशास्त्रीयसकलनिबन्धमौलिमेवावलम्बते । अतो बहुशो मुद्रितेऽप्यस्मिन् ग्रन्थरत्ने नैव परितुष्टा महाशया इति पुनरपि मुद्रयितुमुत्सुका मुम्बानगरस्थतुकारामतात्यामहाशयाः काशीस्थविद्याविलास्यग्रेसरबाबूश्रिमद्गोविन्ददासमहाशयद्वारा मय्येव संशोधनादिभारमर्पितवन्तः । सङ्कलितानि च मया लिखितानि मुद्रितानि च पुस्तकानि । किन्त्वस्य ग्रन्थस्य बहुपठनपाठनप्रचारतया निरूपणयोग्याः पाठभेदा नैवोपलब्धाः । यद्यपि तत्त्वार्णवादिटीका अप्युपलब्धास्तथाऽपि वाचस्पतिमिश्रस्य लेख आधुनिकटीकाभिर्मलिनीक्रियत इति मत्वा ता नैव संगृहीताः । किन्तु ग्रन्थवैशद्यार्थमाधुनिकप्रश्नादिचिन्हैर्योजनादिकम् यथामति प्रदर्शितम्, अस्य च समुचितत्वे सहृदयाणां विदुषां हृदमेव प्रमाणम्, इत्यलम् पल्लवितेन ॥

अस्य च महात्मनो ग्रन्थाः स्वयमेव वर्णिता भामत्या उपसंहारश्लोकेषु—

"यन्न्यायकणिका. (१)–तत्त्वसमीक्षा. (२)–तत्त्वबिन्दभिः (३)–यन्न्याय. (४)–साङ्ख्य. (५)–योगानां. (६)–वेदान्तानां. (७)–निबन्धनैः"

इत्यादिना ॥ तत्र (१) न्यायकणिकानाम्नी मण्डनमिश्रकृतविधिविवेकव्याख्याऽधुना संङ्गृह्यते ऽस्माभिर्मिथिलाधीशयन्त्रालये मुद्रितुम् ॥ (२) तत्त्वसमीक्षा नैवास्मिर्दृष्टिगोचरीकृता ॥ (३) तत्त्वबिन्दुः–मुद्रितोऽयम् विद्यारसिकैः काशीस्थमेडिकलहाल–नामकयन्त्रालयाधिपतिभिः ॥ (४) न्यायवार्तिकतात्पर्यटीका, उद्योतकरकृतन्यायवार्तिकव्याख्यारूपा–मुद्रयितुमुपक्रान्तोऽयम् काश्याम् विजयनगरसंस्कृतग्रन्थावल्यर्थम् संस्कृतविद्योत्साहकैः श्रीयुत–वेनिसाख्यमहाशयैः ॥ (५) साङ्ख्यतत्त्वकौमुदी ॥ (६) तत्त्ववैशारदी, योगभाष्यटीकाऽपि बहुशो मुद्रिता ॥ (७) भामती–शाङ्करशारीरकभाष्यटीका–मुद्रितेयमेशियटसोसाइटीत्यभिधसमाजेन ॥

काशीस्थमिथिलेशसंस्थापितसंस्कृतविद्यालयाध्यापकसन्मिश्रश्रीजयदेवशर्मसकाशादधीत्यामुं ग्रन्थरत्नम् टिप्पण्यादिषु तदीयोपकारभारमहम्भजे । तथा च शोधनादिषु मन्मित्रवर्येण श्रीयुतकालीचरणमित्रेण बहूपकृतोऽस्मि ॥ तथाऽपि सुलभान्येव मनुष्यस्य स्खलितानि इति विचिन्त्य मर्षन्तु सुधियः स्खलितानि, सफलयन्तु च नः परिश्रमम् कृपाकटाक्षक्षेपेणेति मुहरभ्यर्थयते ॥

दरभङ्गाराजकीय- सरस्वतीसदने १ जुलाई १८९६.	मिथिलामण्डनभूततपस्विवर्य– झोपनामकश्रीमत्तीर्थनाथशर्मतनूजन्मा मध्यमः **श्रीगङ्गानाथः.**

तत्त्वकौमुद्याः सूचीपत्रम्.

तत्त्वकौमुदी.

(सांख्य.)

(१) मङ्गलाचरणम् ॥

अजामेकां लोहितशुक्लकृष्णां बह्वीः प्रजाः सृजमानां नमामः ।
अजा ये तां जुषमाणां भजन्ते जहत्येनां भुक्तभोगां नुमस्तान् ॥ १ ॥
कपिलाय महामुनये मुनये शिष्याय तस्य चासुरये ।
पञ्चशिखाय तथेश्वरकृष्णायैतान्नमस्यामः ॥ २ ॥

(२) शास्त्रविषयकजिज्ञासावतरणम् ॥

इह खलु प्रतिपित्सितमर्थं प्रतिपादयन् प्रतिपादयिता ऽवधेयवचनो भवति प्रेक्षावताम् । अप्रतिपित्सितमर्थं तु प्रतिपादयन् 'नायं लौकिको नापि परीक्षक' इति प्रेक्षावद्भिरुन्मत्तवदुपेक्ष्येत । स चैषां प्रतिपित्सितो ऽर्थो यो ज्ञातः सन् परमपुरुषार्थाय कल्पते । इति प्रारिप्सितशास्त्रविषयज्ञानस्य परमपुरुषार्थसाधनहेतुत्वात् तद्विषयजिज्ञासामवतारयति—

दुःखत्रयाभिघाताज्जिज्ञासा तदपघातके हेतौ ।
दृष्टे सा ऽपार्था चेन्नैकान्तात्यन्ततो ऽभावात् ॥ १ ॥

(३) शास्त्रविषयकजिज्ञासाया आवश्यकत्वशङ्का ॥

"दुःख-" इति । एवं हि शास्त्रविषयो न जिज्ञास्येत, यदि दुःखं नाम जगति न स्यात्, सद्वा न जिहासितम्, जिहासितं वा अशक्यसमुच्छेदम् । (अशक्यसमुच्छेदता च द्वेधा, दुःखस्य नित्यत्वात्, तदुच्छेदोपायापरिज्ञानाद्वा) । शक्यसमुच्छेदत्वेऽपि च शास्त्रविषयस्य ज्ञानस्यानुपायभूतत्वाद्वा, सुकरस्योपायान्तरस्य सद्भावाद्वा ॥

तत्र न तावद्दुःखन्नास्ति नाप्यजिहासितमित्युक्तम्—"दुखत्रयाभिघातात्" इति । दुःखानां त्रयं दुःखत्रयम् । तत् खलु आध्यात्मिकम्, आधिभौतिकम्, आधिदैविकञ्च । तत्राध्यात्मिकम् द्विविधम्, शारीरं मानसं च ।

(४) त्रयाणां दुःखानां व्युत्पादनम्, तदस्तित्व-साधनं च ॥

शारीरं वातपित्तश्लेष्मणां वैषम्यनिमित्तम्, मानसं कामक्रोधलोभमोहभयेर्ष्याविषादविषयविशेषादर्शननिबन्धनम् । सर्वञ्चैतदान्तरिकोपायसाध्यत्वादाध्यात्मिकं दुःखम् । बाह्योपायसाध्यं दुःखं द्वेधा, आधिभौतिकम्, आधिदैविकञ्च । तत्राधिभौतिकं मानुषपशुमृगपक्षिसरीसृपस्थावरनिमित्तम्, आधिदैविकं तु यक्षराक्षसविनायकग्रहाद्यावेशनिबन्धनम् । तदेतत् प्रत्यात्मवेदनीयं दुःखं रजःपरिणामभेदो न शक्यते प्रत्याख्यातुम् । तदनेन दुःखत्रयेणान्तःकरणवर्तिना चेतनाशक्तेः प्रतिकूलवेदनीयतया ऽभिसम्बन्धो ऽभिघात इति । एतावता प्रतिकूलवेदनीयत्वं जिहासाहेतुरुक्तः । यद्यपि न सन्निरुध्यते दुःखम्, तथापि तदभिभवः शक्यः कर्तुमित्युपरिष्टादुपपादयिष्यते । तस्मादुपपन्नम्, "तदपघातके हेतौ" इति । तस्य दुःखत्रयस्य अपघातकः तदपघातकः । उपसर्जनस्यापि[1] बुद्ध्या सन्निकृष्टस्य 'तदा[2]' परामर्शः । अपघातकश्च हेतुः शास्त्रप्रतिपाद्यो, नान्य इत्याशयः ॥

अत्र शङ्कते—"दृष्टे सा ऽपार्था चेत्" इति । अयमर्थः । अस्तु तर्हि दुःखत्रयम्, जिहासितं च तद्भवतु, भवतु च तच्छक्यहानम्, सहतां च शास्त्रगम्य उपायस्तदुच्छेत्तुम् । तथा ऽप्यत्र प्रेक्षावतां जिज्ञासा न युक्ता,

(५) सुकरस्य दृष्टस्योपायस्य सत्त्वे शास्त्रविषयकजिज्ञासाया वैयर्थ्यापत्तिः॥

दृष्टस्यैवोपायस्य तदुच्छेदकस्य सुकरस्य विद्यमानत्वात्, तत्त्वज्ञानस्य तु अनेकजन्माभ्यासपरम्परायाससाध्यतया ऽतिदुष्करत्वात् । तथा च लौकिकानामाभाणकः,

'अक्के चेन्मधु विन्देत किमर्थं पर्वतं व्रजेत् ।
इष्टस्यार्थस्य संसिद्धौ को विद्वान् यत्नमाचरेत्' इति ।

१ समासगौणावयवस्य । २ समासस्थतत्पदेन ।

सन्ति चोपायाः शतशः शारीरदुःखप्रतीकारायेषत्करा भिषजां वरै-रुपदिष्टाः । मानसस्यापि सन्तापस्य प्रतीकाराय मनोज्ञस्त्रीपानभोजन-विलेपनवस्त्रालङ्कारादिविषयसम्प्राप्तिरुपायः सुकरः । एवमाधिभौतिकस्यापि दुःखस्य नीतिशास्त्राभ्यासकुशलतानिरत्ययस्थानाध्यासनादिः प्रतीकारहेतुरीषत्करः । तथा ऽऽधिदैविकस्यापि मणिमन्त्रौषधाद्युपयोगः सुकरः प्रतीकारोपाय इति ॥

निराकरोति—"न" इति । कुतः? "एकान्तात्यन्ततो ऽभावात्" ।

(६) वैयर्थ्यापत्तिनिराकरणम्—परिगणितोपायेभ्य आत्यन्तिकैकान्तिकदुःखनिवृत्तेरदर्शनम् ॥

"एकान्तो" दुःखनिवृत्तेरवश्यम्भावः; "अत्यन्तो" निवृत्तस्य दुःखस्य पुनरनुत्पादः, तयोः एकान्तात्यन्तयोरभावः "एकान्तात्यन्ततो ऽभावः" । षष्ठीस्थाने सार्वविभक्तिकस्तसिः । एतदुक्तं भवति, यथाविधिरसायनादिकामिनीनीतिशास्त्राभ्यासमन्त्राद्युपाययोगे ऽपि तस्य तस्याध्यात्मिकादेर्दुःखस्य निवृत्तेरदर्शनात् अनैकान्तिकत्वम्, निवृत्तस्यापि पुनरुत्पत्तिदर्शनात् अनात्यन्तिकत्वम्, इति सुकरोऽपि ऐकान्तिकात्यन्तिकदुःखनिवृत्तेर्न दृष्ट उपाय इति ना ऽपार्था जिज्ञासेत्यर्थः ॥

(७) दुःखापघातकीर्तनम् मङ्गलमेव ॥

यद्यपि दुःखममङ्गलम्, तथाऽपि तत्परिहारार्थत्वेन तदपघातो मङ्गलमेवेति युक्तं शास्त्रादौ तत्कीर्तनमिति ॥ १ ॥

स्यादेतत्[1] । मा भूद्दृष्ट उपायः, वैदिकस्तु ज्योतिष्टोमादिः संवत्सरपर्यन्तः कर्मकलापस्तापत्रयमेकान्तमत्यन्तञ्चापनेष्यति । श्रुतिश्च, "स्वर्गकामो यजेत" इति । स्वर्गश्च—

(८) वैदिकस्य दुःखापकघातकस्य सुकरस्य सत्त्वे शास्त्रविषयजिज्ञासायाः पुनर्वैयर्थ्यापत्तिः ॥

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१ एतत् (वक्ष्यमाणम्, आशङ्कितम्) स्यात्—इति ग्रन्थकारोक्तिः । अथवा, एतत् (भवदुक्तम्) स्यात् (भवतु), स्वीकृतमस्माभिरिति शङ्काकृदुक्तिः । उभयथा ऽपि युज्यते । द्वितीयस्तु साधीयान् ।

"यन्न दुःखेन सम्भिन्नं न च ग्रस्तमनन्तरम् ।
अभिलाषोपनीतं च तत् सुखं स्वःपदास्पदम्" इति ।

[तन्त्रवार्तिकम्]

दुःखविरोधी सुखविशेषश्च स्वर्गः । स च स्वशक्त्या समूलघातमपहन्ति दुःखम् । न चैष क्षयी । तथा हि श्रूयते—"अपाम सोमममृता अभूम" इति [अथर्वशिरस् ३]। तत्क्षये कुतोऽस्यामृतत्वसम्भवः? तस्माद्वैदिकस्योपायस्य तापत्रयप्रतीकारहेतोर्मुहूर्तयामाहोरात्रमाससंवत्सरनिर्वर्तनीयस्यानेकजन्मपरम्परायाससम्पादनीयात् विवेकज्ञानात् ईषत्करत्वात् पुनरपि व्यर्था जिज्ञासा इत्याशङ्क्याह—

दृष्टवदानुश्रविकः, स ह्यविशुद्धिक्षयातिशययुक्तः ।
तद्विपरीतः श्रेयान्, व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानात् ॥ २ ॥

"दृष्ट-" इति। गुरुपाठादनुश्रूयते इत्यनुश्रवो वेदः। एतदुक्तं भवति—'श्रूयत एव परं न केनापि क्रियत' इति । तत्र भव आनुश्रविकः, तत्र प्राप्तो ज्ञात इति यावत्। आनुश्रविकोऽपि कर्मकलापो दृष्टेन तुल्यो वर्तते, ऐकान्तिकात्यन्तिकदुःखत्रयप्रतीकारानुपायत्वस्योभयत्रापि तुल्यत्वात् । यद्यपि च "आनुश्रविक" इति सामान्याभिधानं, तथापि कर्मकलापाभिप्रायं द्रष्टव्यम्, विवेकज्ञानस्याप्यानुश्रविकत्वात् । तथा च श्रूयते—"आत्मा वा ऽरे ज्ञातव्यः प्रकृतितो विवेक्तव्यः" [बृहदारण्यक], "न स पुनरावर्तते न स पुनरावर्तते" [छान्दोग्य] इति ॥

(९) वैदिकानामप्युपायानां दृष्टोपायैस्सह तुल्यत्वम् ॥

अस्यां प्रतिज्ञायां हेतुमाह—"स ह्यविशुद्धिक्षयातिशययुक्तः" इति । "अविशुद्धिः" सोमादियागस्य पशुबीजादिवधसाधनता । यथा ऽऽह स्म भगवान् पञ्चशिखाचार्यः—"स्वल्पसङ्करः सपरिहारः सप्रत्यवमर्षः" इति । 'स्वल्पसङ्करो' ज्योतिष्टोमादिजन्मनः प्रधानापूर्वस्य स्वल्पेन पशुहिंसादिजन्मना

(१०) दृष्टवैदिकयोरुपाययोः अविशुद्धिक्षयातिशययुक्तत्वम् तुल्यम् ॥

ऽनर्थहेतुना ऽपूर्वेण सङ्करः । 'सपरिहारः,' कियता ऽपि प्रायश्चित्तेन परिहर्तुं शक्यः । अथ च प्रमादतः प्रायश्चित्तमपि नाचरितं, प्रधानकर्मविपाकसमये स पच्यते । तथा ऽपि यावदसावनर्थं सूते तावत् प्रत्यवमर्षेण (सहिष्णुतया) सह वर्तत इति "सप्रत्यमवर्षः" । मृष्यन्ते हि पुण्यसम्भारोपनीतस्वर्गसुधामहाह्रदावगाहिनः कुशलाः पापमात्रोपसादितां दुःखवह्निकणिकाम् ॥

(११) याज्ञिकहिंसाया अप्यनर्थहेतुत्वसाधनम् ॥

न च—"मा हिंस्यात् सर्वा भूतानि" इति सामान्यशास्त्रं विशेषशास्त्रेण "अग्नीषोमीयं पशुमालभेत" इत्यनेन बाध्यत—इति युक्तम्, विरोधाभावात् । विरोधे हि बलीयसा दुर्बलं बाध्यते । न चेहास्ति कश्चिद्विरोधः, भिन्नविषयत्वात् । तथा हि—"मा हिंस्यात्" इति निषेधेन हिंसाया अनर्थहेतुभावो ज्ञाप्यते, न त्वक्रत्वर्थत्वमपि, "अग्नीषोमीयं पशुमालभेत" इत्यनेन वाक्येन च पशुहिंसायाः क्रत्वर्थत्वमुच्यते, नानर्थहेतुत्वाभावः, तथा सति वाक्यभेदप्रसङ्गात्[1] । न चानर्थहेतुत्वक्रतूपकारकत्वयोः कश्चिद्विरोधो ऽस्ति । हिंसा हि पुरुषस्य दोषमावक्ष्यति, क्रतोश्चोपकरिष्यतीति ॥

(१२) वैदिकोपायस्य सातिशयत्वप्रदर्शनम् ॥

क्षयातिशयौ च फलगतावप्युपाये उपचरितौ । क्षयित्वं च स्वर्गादेः सत्त्वे सति कार्यत्वादनुमितम् ॥ ज्योतिष्टोमादयः स्वर्गमात्रस्य साधनम्, वाजपेयादयस्तु स्वाराज्यस्येत्यतिशययुक्तत्वम् । परसम्पदुत्कर्षो हि हीनसम्पदं पुरुषं दुःखाकरोति ॥

(१३) अमृतत्वश्रुतिविरोधपरिहारः—अमृतत्वस्य चिरस्थैर्य उपलक्षकत्वात् ॥

"अपाम सोमममृता अभूम" इति चामृतत्वाभिधानम् चिरस्थेमानमुपलक्षयति । यदाहुः—

"आभूतसम्प्लवं स्थानममृतत्वं हि भाष्यते" इति ॥

अत एव च श्रुतिः—"न कर्मणा न प्रजया धनेन त्यागेनैकेनामृतत्वमानशुः । परेण नाकं

१ विधेयद्वयापत्तेः ।

निहितं गुहायां विभ्राजते यद्यतयो विशन्ति" इति [महानारायण. १०।५] तथा "कर्मणा मृत्युमृषयो निषेदुः प्रजावन्तो द्रविणमीहमानाः । तथा परे ऋषयो ये मनीषिणः परं कर्मभ्यो ऽमृतत्वमानशुः" इति च ॥

तदेतत् सर्वमभिप्रेत्याह—"तद्विपरीतः श्रेयान्, व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानात्" इति। तस्मात् (आनुश्रविकात् दुःखापघातकोपायात् सोमपानादेरविशुद्धात् अनित्यसातिशयफलात्) विपरीतः विशुद्धः हिंसादिसङ्कराभावात्, नित्यनिरतिशयफलः, असकृत् पुनरावृत्तिश्रुतेः। न च कार्यत्वेनानित्यता फलस्य युक्ता, भावरूपस्य कार्यस्य तथा[१]भावात्, दुःखप्रध्वंसनस्य तु कार्यस्यापि तद्वै[२]परीत्यात् । न च दुःखान्तरोत्पादः, कारणाप्रवृत्तौ कार्यस्यानुत्पादात्, विवेकज्ञानोपजननपर्यन्तत्वाच्च कारणप्रवृत्तेः । एतच्चो[३]परिष्टादुपपादयिष्यते ॥

(१४) लौकिकवैदिकोपायेभ्यः शास्त्रविषयज्ञानस्य श्रेयस्त्वप्रदर्शनम् ॥

अक्षरार्थस्तु—तस्मात् (आनुश्रविकात् दुःखापघातकात् हेतोः) विपरीतः (सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताप्रत्ययः साक्षात्कारो) दुःखापघातको हेतुः, अत एव श्रेयान् । आनुश्रविको हि वेदविहितत्वात् मात्रया दुःखापघातकत्वाच्च प्रशस्यः । सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताप्रत्ययोऽपि प्रशस्यः । तदनयोः प्रशस्ययोर्मध्ये सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताप्रत्ययः श्रेयान् ॥

(१५) "तद्विपरीतः श्रेयान्" इत्यस्याक्षरार्थः ॥

कुतः पुनरस्योत्पत्तिरित्यत आह—"व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानात्" इति । व्यक्तं च अव्यक्तं च ज्ञश्च व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञाः, तेषां विज्ञानम् विवेकेन ज्ञानम्, व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानम् । व्यक्तज्ञानपूर्वकमव्यक्तस्य तत्कारणस्य ज्ञानम् । तयो[४]श्च पारार्थ्येनात्मा परो ज्ञायते, इति ज्ञानक्रमेणाभिधानम् । एतदुक्तं भवति—श्रुतिस्मृतीतिहासपुराणेभ्यो व्यक्तादीन् विवेकेन श्रुत्वा,

(१६) शास्त्रविषयस्य दुःखापघातकस्य तत्त्वज्ञानस्योत्प्रात्तिप्रदर्शनम् ॥

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१ अनित्यत्वात् । २ अभावरूपत्वात् । ३ (६६) कारिकायाम् । ४ व्यक्ताव्यक्तयोः परार्थत्वेन । व्यक्ताव्यक्ते अचेतने कस्यचिच्चेतनस्यार्थाय वर्तेते स च चेतन आत्मेत्यादिक्रमणः।

शास्त्रयुक्त्या च व्यवस्थाप्य, दीर्घकालादरनैरन्तर्यसत्कारसेवितात् भावनामयात् विज्ञानादिति । तथा च वक्ष्यति—

"एवं तत्त्वाभ्यासान्नास्मि न मे नाहमित्यपरिशेषम् ।
अविपर्ययाद्विशुद्धं केवलमुत्पद्यते ज्ञानम्" इति [कारिका. ६४]॥२॥

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(१७) शास्त्रार्थसंक्षेपः–प्रकृति–प्रकृतिविकृति–विकृत्यनुभयरूप–क्रमेण ॥

तदेवं प्रेक्षावदपेक्षितार्थत्वेन शास्त्रारम्भं समाधाय शास्त्रमारभमाणः श्रोतृबुद्धिसमवधानाय तदर्थं संक्षेपतः प्रतिजानीते–

मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिर्महदाद्याः प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त ।
षोडशकस्तु विकारो, न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुषः ॥ ३ ॥

"मूल-" इति । संक्षेपतो हि शास्त्रार्थस्य चतस्रो विधाः । कश्चिदर्थः प्रकृतिरेव, कश्चिदर्थो विकृतिरेव, कश्चित्प्रकृतिविकृतिः, कश्चिदनुभयरूपः ।

तत्र का प्रकृतिरित्युक्तम्—"मूलप्रकृतिरविकृतिः" इति । प्रकरोतीति

(१८) प्रकृतिकथनम् ॥ प्रकृतिः प्रधानम्, सत्त्वरजस्तमसां साम्यावस्था, सा अविकृतिः, प्रकृतिरेवेत्यर्थः । कुत इत्युक्तम्—, "मूलेति" मूलश्चासौ प्रकृतिश्चेति मूलप्रकृतिः । विश्वस्य कार्यसंघातस्य सा मूलम्, न त्वस्या मूलान्तरमस्ति, अनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात् । न चानवस्थायां प्रमाणमस्तीति भावः॥

कतमाः पुनः प्रकृतिविकृतयः, कियन्त्यश्चेत्यत उक्तम्—"महदाद्याः

(१९) प्रकृतिविकृति-कथनम् ॥

प्रकृतिविकृतयः सप्त" इति । प्रकृतयश्च विकृतयश्च ता इति "प्रकृतिविकृतयः", सप्त । तथा हि महत्तत्त्वम् अहङ्कारस्य प्रकृतिः, विकृतिश्च मूलप्रकृतेः । एवमहङ्कारतत्त्वं तन्मात्राणामिन्द्रियाणां च प्रकृतिः, विकृतिश्च महतः । एवं पञ्चतन्मात्राणि तत्त्वानि भूतानामाकाशादीनां प्रकृतयो विकृतयश्चाहङ्कारस्य ॥

अथ का विकृतिरेव, कियती चेत्यत उक्तम्—"षोडशकस्तु विकारः" इति। षोडशसंख्यापरिमितो गणः षोडशकः। 'तु' शब्दो ऽवधारणे भिन्नक्रमः—पञ्चमहाभूतानि एकादश इन्द्रियाणीति षोडशको गणो विकार एव, न प्रकृतिरिति। यद्यपि पृथिव्यादीनां गोघटवृक्षादयो विकाराः, एवन्तद्विकारभेदानां पयोबीजादीनां दध्यङ्कुरादयः, तथाऽपि गवादयो बीजादयो वा न पृथिव्यादिभ्यस्तत्त्वान्तरम्। तत्त्वान्तरोपादानत्वं च प्रकृतित्वमिहाभिप्रेतम्, इति न दोषः। सर्वेषां गोघटादीनां स्थूलतेन्द्रियग्राह्यता च समेति न तत्त्वान्तरम् ॥

(२०) विकृतिकथनम् ॥

अनुभयरूपमाह—"न प्रकृतिर्न विकृतिः पुरुषः" इति। एतत् सर्वमुपरिष्टादुपपादयिष्यते ॥ ३ ॥

(२१) अनुभयरूपकथनम् ॥

तमिममर्थं प्रामाणिकं कर्तुमभिमताः प्रमाणभेदा लक्षणीयाः। न च सामान्यलक्षणमन्तरेण शक्यते विशेषलक्षणम् कर्तुम्। इति प्रमाणसामान्यं तावल्लक्षयति—

(२२) प्रमाणसामान्यलक्षणम् ॥

दृष्टमनुमानमाप्तवचनं च, सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात्।
त्रिविधम्प्रमाणमिष्टं, प्रमेयसिद्धिः प्रमाणाद्धि ॥ ४ ॥

"प्रमाणमिष्टम्" इति। अत्र—च 'प्रमाणम्' इति समाख्या लक्ष्यपदम्। तन्निर्वचनं च लक्षणम्। प्रमीयते ऽनेनेति निर्वचनात् प्रमां प्रति करणत्वमवगम्यते। तच्चासन्दिग्धाविपरीतानधिगतविषया चित्तवृत्तिः। बोधश्च[1] पौरुषेयः फलम् प्रमा, तत्साधनम् प्रमाणमिति। एतेन संशयविपर्ययस्मृतिसाधनेष्वप्रमाणेष्वप्रसङ्गः ॥

(२३) प्रमाणपदस्य निर्वचनम् ॥

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१ नैयायिकानामनुव्यवसायः—घटज्ञाने "घटमहं जानमीति"—पुरुषगतः।

संख्याविप्रतिपत्तिं निराकरोति—"त्रिविधम्" इति । तिस्रो विधा यस्य प्रमाणसामान्यस्य तत् त्रिविधम्, न न्यूनम्, नाप्यधिकमित्यर्थः । विशेषलक्षणानन्तरञ्चैतदुपपादयिष्यामः ॥

(२४) प्रमाणसंख्या ॥

कतमाः पुनस्तास्तिस्रो विधा इत्यत आह—"दृष्टमनुमानमाप्तवचनम्" इति । एतच्च लौकिकप्रमाणाभिप्रायम्, लोकव्युत्पादनार्थत्वाच्छास्त्रस्य, तस्यैवात्राधिकारात् । आर्षं तु विज्ञानं योगिनामूर्ध्वस्रोतसां न लोकव्युत्पादनायालमिति सदपि नाभिहितम्, अनधिकारात् ॥

(२५) प्रमाणत्रयपरिगणनम् ॥

स्यादेतत्—मा भून्न्यूनम्, अधिकं तु कस्मान्न भवति? सङ्गिरन्ते हि प्रतिवादिनः उपमानादीन्यपि प्रमाणानि, इत्यत आह—"सर्वप्रमाणसिद्धत्वात्" इति । एष्वेव दृष्टानुमानाप्तवचनेषु सर्वेषां प्रमाणानां सिद्धत्वात्, अन्तर्भावादित्यर्थः । एतच्चोपपादयिष्यत इत्युक्तम् ॥

(२६) प्रमाणसंख्याऽऽधिक्यशङ्का, तत्परिहारश्च ॥

अथ प्रमेयव्युत्पादनाय प्रवृत्तं शास्त्रं कस्मात् प्रमाणं सामान्यतो विशेषतश्च लक्षयति? इत्यत आह—"प्रमेयसिद्धिः प्रमाणाद्धि" इति । सिद्धिः प्रतीतिः ॥

(२७) प्रमेयवर्णनात् प्रागेव प्रमाणनिर्वचनस्यावश्यकत्वम् ॥

सेयमार्या ऽर्थक्रमानुरोधेन पाठक्रममनादृत्यैव व्याख्याता ॥ ४ ॥

(२८) कारिकापाठक्रमपरिवर्तनहेतुः ॥

सम्प्रति प्रमाणविशेषलक्षणावसरे प्रत्यक्षस्य सर्वप्रमाणेषु ज्येष्ठत्वात् तदधीनत्वाच्चानुमानादीनाम्, सर्ववादिनामविप्रतिपत्तेश्च, तदेव तावल्लक्षयति—

(२९) प्रमाणानां विशेषलक्षणम् ॥

प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायो दृष्टं, त्रिविधमनुमानमाख्यातम् ।
तल्लिङ्गलिङ्गिपूर्वकम्, आप्तश्रुतिराप्तवचनं तु ॥ ५ ॥

"प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायो दृष्टम्" इति । अत्र "दृष्टम्" इति लक्ष्यनिर्देशः, परिशिष्टं तु लक्षणम् । समानासमानजातीयव्यवच्छेदो लक्षणार्थः ॥

(३०) प्रत्यक्षलक्षणावयवार्थः ॥

अवयवार्थस्तु—विषिण्वन्ति, विषयिणमनुबध्नन्ति, स्वेन रूपेण निरूपणीयं कुर्वन्तीति यावत्="विषयाः", पृथिव्यादयः सुखादयश्चास्मदादीनाम् अविषयाः तन्मात्रलक्षणाः योगिनामूर्ध्वस्रोतसां च विषयाः । विषयं विषयं प्रति वर्तते इति प्रतिविषयम्=इन्द्रियम् । वृत्तिश्च सन्निकर्षः । अर्थसन्निकृष्टमिन्द्रियमित्यर्थः । तस्मिन् अध्यवसायः, तदाश्रित इत्यर्थः । अध्यवसायश्च बुद्धिव्यापारो ज्ञानम् । उपात्तविषयाणामिन्द्रियाणां वृत्तौ सत्याम्, बुद्धेस्तमोऽभिभवे सति यः सत्त्वसमुद्रेकः सो ऽध्यवसाय इति । वृत्तिरिति ज्ञानमिति चाख्यायते । इदं तावत् प्रमाणम्, अनेन यश्चेतनाशक्तेरनुग्रहस्तत्फलं प्रमाबोधः ॥

(३१) ज्ञानानामचेतनत्वम् ॥

बुद्धितत्त्वं हि प्राकृतत्वादचेतनम्, इति तदीयो ऽध्यवसायो ऽप्यचेतनो, घटादिवत् । एवं बुद्धितत्त्वस्य सुखादयो ऽपि परिणामभेदा अचेतनाः । पुरुषस्तु सुखाद्यननुषङ्गी चेतनः । सो ऽयं बुद्धितत्त्ववर्तिना ज्ञानसुखादिना तत्प्रतिबिम्बितस्तच्छायापत्त्या ज्ञानसुखादिमानिव भवतीति—चेतनो ऽनुगृह्यते । चितिच्छायापत्त्या ऽचेतना ऽपि बुद्धिस्तदध्यवसायो ऽप्यचेतनश्चेतनवद्भवतीति । तथा च वक्ष्यति—

"तस्मात्तत्संयोगादचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम् ।
गुणकर्तृत्वे ऽपि तथा कर्तेव भवत्युदासीनः ॥" इति [कारिका. २०].

अत्राध्यवसायग्रहणेन संशयं व्यवच्छिनत्ति, संशयस्यानवस्थितग्रहणेना-

(३२) प्रत्यक्षलक्षणान्तर्गतानां शब्दानां व्यावृत्तिः ॥

निश्चितरूपत्वात् । निश्चयो ऽध्यवसाय इति चा[1]नर्थान्तरम् । विषयग्रहणेन चासद्विषयं विपर्ययमपाकरोति । प्रतिग्रहणेन चेन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षसूचनादनुमानस्मृत्यादयश्च पराकृता भवन्ति ॥

तदेवं समानासमानजातीयव्यवच्छेदकत्वात् "प्रतिविषयाध्यवसाय"

(३३) प्रत्यक्षस्य पर्यवसितं लक्षणम् ॥

इति दृष्टस्य सम्पूर्णं लक्षणम् । तन्त्रान्तरेषु लक्षणान्तराणि तैर्थिकानां न भूषितानि न दूषितानि, विस्तरभयादिति ॥

नानुमानम्प्रमाणामिति वदता लोकायतिकेनाप्रतिपन्नः सन्दिग्धो

(३४) अनुमानस्य प्रमाणत्वसाधनम् ॥

विपर्यस्तो वा पुरुषः कथं प्रतिपद्येत? न च पुरुषान्तरगता अज्ञानसंदेहविपर्ययाः शक्या अर्वाग्दृशा प्रत्यक्षेण प्रतिपत्तुम् । नापि प्रमाणान्तरेण, अनभ्युपगमात् । अनवधृताज्ञानसंशयविपर्ययस्तु यं कंचन पुरुषं प्रति वर्तमानो ऽनवधेयवचनतया प्रेक्षावद्भिरुन्मत्तवदुपेक्ष्येत । तदनेनाज्ञानादयः परपुरुषवर्तिनो ऽभिप्रायभेदाद्वचनभेदाद्वा लिङ्गादनुमातव्याः, इत्यकामेनाप्यनुमानप्रमाणमभ्युपेयम् ॥

तत्र प्रत्यक्षकार्यत्वात् अनुमानं प्रत्यक्षानन्तरं लक्षणीयम् । तत्रापि

(३५) अनुमानस्य सामान्यलक्षणम् ॥

सामान्यलक्षणपूर्वकत्वाद्विशेषलक्षणस्यानुमानसामान्यं तावल्लक्षयति—"तत् लिङ्गलिङ्गिपूर्वकम्" इति । लिङ्गम् व्याप्यम् । लिङ्गि व्यापकम् । शङ्कितसमारोपितोपाधिनिराकरणेन च स्वभावप्रतिबद्धं व्याप्यम्, येन प्रतिबद्धं तद्व्यापकम् । लिङ्गलिङ्गिग्रहणेन विषयवाचिना विषयिणं प्रत्ययमुपलक्षयति । धूमादिर्व्याप्यो वह्न्यादिर्व्यापक इति यः प्रत्ययस्तत्पूर्वकम् । लिङ्गिग्रहण चावर्तनीयम् । तेन च लिङ्गमस्यास्तीति पक्षधर्मताज्ञानमपि दर्शितम्भवति । तद्व्याप्यव्यापकभावपक्षधर्मताज्ञानपूर्वकमनुमानामित्यनुमानसामान्यं लक्षितम् ॥

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१ समानार्थकमेवेति ।

अनुमानविशेषान् तन्त्रान्तरलक्षितान् अभिमतान् स्मारयति—“ त्रिविधमनुमानमाख्यातम् ” इति । तत् सामान्यतो लक्षितमनुमानं विशेषतस्त्रिविधं, पूर्ववत्—शेषवत्—सामान्यतो दृष्टञ्चेति ॥

(३६) अनुमानस्य विशेषलक्षणम्—त्रैविध्यम् पूर्ववच्छेषवत्सामान्यतोदृष्टभेदात् ॥

तत्र प्रथमं[1] तावत् द्विविधम्—वीतमवीतं च । अन्वयमुखेन प्रवर्तमानं विधायकं वीतम्, व्यतिरेकमुखेन प्रवर्तमानं निषेधकमवीतम् ॥

(३७) वीतावीतरूपणानुमानस्य द्वैविध्यम् ॥

तत्रावीतं शेषवत् । शिष्यते परिशिष्यते इति शेषः, स एव विषयतया यस्यास्त्यनुमानज्ञानस्य तच्छेषवत् । यदाहुः[2]—“ प्रसक्तप्रतिषेधे, अन्यत्राप्रसङ्गात् शिष्यमाणे सम्प्रत्ययः परिशेष ” इति [वात्स्यायन—न्यायभाष्य] । अस्य चावीतस्य व्यतिरेकिण उदाहरणमग्रे ऽभिधास्यते ॥

(३८) अवीतनिरूपणम् ॥

वीतं द्वेधा—पूर्ववत् सामान्यतो दृष्टं च । तत्रैकम् दृष्टस्वलक्षणसामान्यविषयं यत्तत्पूर्ववत्, पूर्वं प्रसिद्धं, दृष्टस्वलक्षणसामान्यमिति यावत्, तदस्य विषयत्वेनास्त्यनुमानज्ञानस्येति पूर्ववत् । यथा धूमाद्वह्नित्वसामान्यविशेषः पर्वते ऽनुमीयते, तस्य वह्नित्वसामान्यविशेषस्य स्वलक्षणं वह्निविशेषो दृष्टो रसवत्याम् । अपरं च वीतं सामान्यतो दृष्टमदृष्टस्वलक्षणसामान्यविषयम् । यथेन्द्रियविषयमनुमानम् । अत्र हि रूपादिविज्ञानानां क्रियात्वेन करणवत्त्वमनुमीयते । यद्यपि करणत्वसामान्यस्य छिदादौ वास्यादि स्वलक्षण-

(३९) वीतनिरूपणम्—तद्द्वैविध्यम् ॥

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१ अनुमानम् प्रथमं द्विविधमिति भावः । २ अत्राहू राघवानन्दतीर्थाः—“सतां सम्मतिमाह—यथाहुरिति—गुणत्वात् पृथिव्याश्रयः शब्दः स्यादिति प्रसक्तस्य शब्दस्य न पृथिवीगुणत्वम्, अपाकजविशेषगुणत्वात्, तद्विशेषगुणेन गन्धेन च सहावृत्तित्वात् । एवं निषेधे कृते आकाशादन्यत्र भूम्याद्यष्टस्वप्रसङ्गात्, शिष्यमाणे आकाशे एव शब्दस्य गुणत्वेन सम्यक्प्रत्ययः”—इति ॥

मुपलब्धम्, तथा ऽपि यज्जातीयं रूपादिज्ञाने करणत्वमनुमीयते तज्जातीयस्य करणस्य न दृष्टं स्वलक्षणं प्रत्यक्षेण । इन्द्रियजातीयं हि तत्करणम्, नचेन्द्रियत्वसामान्यस्य स्वलक्षणमिन्द्रियविशेषः प्रत्यक्षगोचरो ऽर्वाग्दृशाम्, यथा वह्नित्वसामान्यस्य स्वलक्षणं वह्निः । सो ऽयं पूर्ववतः सामान्यतो दृष्टात् सत्यपि वीतत्वेन तुल्यत्वे विशेषः । अत्र च दृष्टं दर्शनम्, सामान्यत इति सामान्यस्य, सार्वविभक्तिकस्तसिल् । अदृष्टस्वलक्षणस्य सामान्यविशेषस्य दर्शनम् सामान्यतो दृष्टमनुमानमित्यर्थः । सर्वं चैतदस्माभिर्न्यायवार्तिकतात्पर्यटीकायां व्युत्पादितमिति नेहोक्तं विस्तरभयात् ॥

(४०) शब्दप्रमाणलक्षणम् ॥

प्रयोजकवृद्धशब्दश्रवणसमनन्तरं प्रयोज्यवृद्धप्रवृत्तिहेतुज्ञानानुमानपूर्वकत्वाच्छब्दार्थसम्बन्धग्रहणस्य, स्वार्थसम्बन्धज्ञानसहकारिणश्च शब्दस्यार्थप्रत्यायकत्वादनुमानपूर्वकत्वमित्यनुमानानन्तरं शब्दं लक्षयति—"आप्तश्रुतिराप्तवचनं तु" इति । आप्तवचनमिति लक्ष्यनिर्देशः, परिशिष्टं लक्षणम् । आप्ता प्राप्ता युक्तेति यावत् । आप्ता चासौ श्रुतिश्चेति 'आप्तश्रुतिः' । श्रुतिः वाक्यजनितं वाक्यार्थज्ञानम् ॥

(४१) तस्य स्वतः प्रामाण्यम् ॥

तच्च स्वतः प्रमाणम् । अपौरुषेयवेदवाक्यजनितत्वेन सकलदोषाशङ्काविनिर्मुक्तेर्युक्तं भवति । एवं वेदमूलस्मृतीतिहासपुराणवाक्यजनितमपि ज्ञानं युक्तं भवति ॥

(४२) कपिलस्य पूर्वजन्माधीतश्रुतिस्मरणम् ॥

आदिविदुषश्च *कपिलस्य कल्पादौ कल्पान्तराधीतश्रुतिस्मरणसम्भवः, सुप्तप्रबुद्धस्येव पूर्वेद्युरवगतानामर्थानामपरेद्युः । तथा चावट्यजैगीषव्यसंवादे भगवान् जैगीषव्यो दशमहाकल्पवर्तिजन्मस्मरणमात्मन उवाच "दशसु महाकल्पेषु विपरिवर्तमानेन मया" इत्यादिना ग्रन्थसन्दर्भेण ॥

आप्तग्रहणेनायुक्ताः शाक्यभिक्षुनिर्ग्रन्थकसंसारमोचकादीनामागमाभासाः

(४३) आगमाभासनिरूपणम् ॥

परिहृता भवन्ति । अयुक्तत्वं चैतेषां विगानात् विच्छिन्नमूलत्वात् प्रमाणविरुद्धार्थाभिधानाच्च केश्चिदेव म्लेच्छादिभिः पुरुषापसदैः पशुप्रायैः परिग्रहाद्बोद्धव्यम् ।

(४४) आप्तश्रुतेरनुमानाद्व्यवच्छेदः ॥

'तु' शब्देनानुमानाद्व्यवच्छिनत्ति । वाक्यार्थो[1] हि प्रमेयो, न तु तद्धर्मो वाक्यम्, येन तत्र लिङ्गं भवेत् । न च वाक्यं वाक्यार्थं बोधयत् सम्बन्धग्रहणमपेक्षते, अभिनवकविरचितस्य वाक्यस्यादृष्टपूर्वस्याननुभूतचरवाक्यार्थबोधकत्वादिति ॥

(४५) शास्त्रान्तरोक्तप्रमाणान्तराणामुक्तेष्वन्तर्भावः ॥

एवं प्रमाणसामान्यलक्षणेषु तद्विशेषलक्षणेषु च सत्सु, यानि प्रमाणान्तराण्युपमानादीनि प्रतिवादिभिरभ्युपेयन्ते तान्युक्तलक्षणेष्वेव प्रमाणेष्वन्तर्भवन्ति ॥

(४६) उपमानस्य शब्दे ऽनुमाने चान्तर्भावः॥

तथा हि—उपमानं तावद्यथा गौस्तथा गवय इति वाक्यम् । तज्जनिता धीरागम एव । यो ऽप्ययं गवयशब्दो गोसदृशस्य वाचक इति प्रत्ययः, सो ऽप्यनुमानमेव । यो हि शब्दो यत्र वृद्धैः प्रयुज्यते, सो ऽसति वृत्त्यन्तरे, तस्य वाचकः, यथा गोशब्दो गोत्वस्य । प्रयुज्यते चैवं गवयशब्दो गोसदृशे, इति तस्यैव

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१ अत्राहुर्भारतीयत्यादयः—"कथं 'तु' शब्देनानुमानाद्व्यवच्छेद आप्तवचनस्येत्यत आह –'वाक्यार्थोहि' इति । नन्वस्तु तावद्वाक्यार्थस्य प्रमेयत्वम्, एतावता कथमनुमाद्व्यवच्छेदः स्यात्, शब्दस्य तत्कारणत्वात्, यथा धूमेन लिङ्गेन लिङ्गी वह्निर्ज्ञायते तथा वाक्येन लिङ्गेन शब्दार्थलिङ्ग्यनुमानं भवेदित्याशङ्क्याह–'न तु तद्धर्म' इति । धूमस्य वह्निधर्मत्वात् तल्लिङ्गत्वम्, न तु वाक्यस्य अर्थधर्मत्वम्, येन तल्लिङ्गं वाक्यं स्यादिति यावत् । ननु यद्यपि धूमाग्निवत् वाक्यवाक्यार्थयोर्धर्मधर्मिभावो नास्ति, तथा ऽपि यथा धूमो ऽग्निना सम्बन्धिना सम्बन्धग्रहणापेक्ष एव तद्गमकः, तथा वाक्यमपि अर्थेन सम्बन्धग्रहणापेक्षमेव तद्बोधकमिति घट्टकुट्यामेव प्रभात इति चेत्तत्राह-"न च" इति औत्पत्तिकसूत्रे जैमिनिना शब्दार्थयोर्नित्यसम्बंन्धे साधिते ऽपि शब्दस्यैव वृद्धव्यवहारतः सम्बन्धग्रहणापेक्षस्यैवार्थबोधकत्वात्, पदार्थपूर्वकत्वात्तु वाक्यार्थस्य स्वार्थबोधकत्वे सम्बन्धग्रहणापेक्षा नास्ति । विशिष्टार्थसंप्रत्ययो हि वाक्यार्थः" इति ।

वाचक, इति तत् ज्ञानमनुमानमेव । यत्तु गवयस्य चक्षुःसन्निकृष्टस्य गोसादृश्यज्ञानं तत् प्रत्यक्षमेव । अत एव स्मर्यमाणायां गवि, गवयसादृश्यज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम् । न त्वन्यद्गवि सादृश्यमन्यच्च गवये । भूयोऽवयवसामान्ययोगो हि जात्यन्तरवर्ती जात्यन्तरे सादृश्यमुच्यते । सामान्ययोगश्चैकः । स चेद्गवये प्रत्यक्षो, गव्यपि तथेति नोपमानस्य प्रमेयान्तरमस्ति, यत्र प्रमाणान्तरमुपमानं भवेत्, इति न प्रमाणान्तरमुपमानम् ॥

(४७) अर्थापत्तेरनुमाने ऽन्तर्भावः ॥

एवमर्थापत्तिरपि न प्रमाणान्तरम् । तथा हि—जीवतश्चैत्रस्य गृहाभावदर्शनेन बहिर्भावस्यादृष्टस्य कल्पनमर्थापत्तिरभिमता वृद्धानाम् । सा ऽप्यनुमानमेव । यदा खल्वव्यापकः सन्नेकत्र नास्ति तदा ऽन्यत्रास्ति । यदा ऽव्यापक एकत्रास्ति तदा ऽन्यत्र नास्तीति सुकरः स्वशरीरे व्याप्तिग्रहः । तथा च सतो गृहाभावदर्शनेन लिङ्गेन बहिर्भावदर्शनमनुमानमेव । न च चैत्रस्य क्वचित्सत्त्वेन गृहाभावः शक्यो ऽपह्नोतुम्, येनासिद्धो गृहाभावो बहिर्भावे न हेतुः स्यात् । न च गृहाभावेन वा सत्त्वमपह्नूयते, येन सत्त्वमेवानुपपद्यमानमात्मानं न बहिरवस्थापयेत् । तथा हि—चैत्रस्य गृहासत्त्वेन सत्त्वमात्रं विरुध्यते, गृहसत्त्वं वा? न तावद्यत्र क्वचन सत्त्वस्यास्ति विरोधो गृहासत्त्वेन, भिन्नविषयत्वात् । "देश[1]सामान्येन गृहविशेषाक्षेपो ऽपि पाक्षिक इति

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१ "देशसामान्यप्रविष्टगृहविशेषमादाय समानविषयतया विरोध इति शङ्कते" इति राघवानन्दाः । सत्त्वं हि गृहबहिस्साधारणतया सामान्यप्रवृत्तं विशेषगृहासत्त्वेन विरुद्धमिति शङ्काकृद्भावः । क्वचिदस्तीति कथनेन स्थलविशेषविनिगमनाविरहात् गृहाभावो ऽपि बाध्यते, गृहस्यापि क्वचित्पदे ऽतन्र्भावात्, अतएव गृहसत्त्वेन विरोध इति हृदयम् ।

"देशसामान्येनेति" सामान्यस्य साधारणधर्मतया तज्ज्ञानस्य संशयहेतुतया उच्चैस्तरत्वज्ञानेन स्थाणुत्वपुरुषत्वयोरिव गृहबहिर्देशयोराधेयतासम्बन्धेन चैत्रे संशये गृहत्वावच्छिन्नप्रकारकज्ञानस्य गृहाभावज्ञानविरोधितया गृहाभावरूपहेतोर्ज्ञानं न सम्भवतीत्यभिप्रायः । शब्दार्थस्तु "देशसामान्येन" देशसामान्यज्ञानेन, "गृहाविशेषाक्षेपः" गृहात्मकविशेषसम्बन्धः, "पाक्षिकः" संशयविषयः, "समानविषयतया" गृहाभावप्रतियोगितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नतया, "विरोधः" एकसत्त्वे ऽपरासत्त्वनियमः ।

"प्रमाणेति" प्रतियोगितावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नप्रकारकनिश्चयस्यैवाभावधीहेतुतया संशयस्य न विरोधितेत्यभिसन्धिः, अक्षरार्थस्तु स्पष्टः ।

समानविषयतया विरोध" इति चेत्, न, प्रमाणविनिश्चितस्य गृहे ऽसत्त्वस्य पाक्षिकतया सांशयिकेन गृहसत्त्वेन प्रतिक्षेपायोगात्। नापि प्रमाणनिश्चितो गृहाभावः पाक्षिकमस्य गृहसत्त्वं प्रतिक्षिपन् सत्त्वमपि प्रतिक्षेप्तुं सांशयिकत्वं च व्यपनेतुमर्हतीति युक्तम्। गृहावच्छिन्नेन चैत्राभावेन गृहसत्त्वं विरुद्धत्वात् प्रतिक्षिप्यते, न तु सत्त्वमात्रम्, तस्य तत्रौदासीन्यात्। तस्माद्गृहाभावेन लिङ्गेन सिद्धेन सतो बहिर्भावो ऽनुमीयत इति युक्तम्। एतेन 'विरुद्धयोः प्रमाणयोर्विषयव्यवस्थया ऽविरोधापादनमर्थापत्तेर्विषय' इति निरस्तम्, अवच्छिन्नानवच्छिन्नयोर्विरोधाभावात्। उदाहरणान्तराणि चार्थापत्तेरेवमेवानुमाने ऽन्तर्भावनीयानि। तस्मान्नानुमानात्प्रमाणान्तरमर्थापत्तिरिति सिद्धम्॥

(४८) अभावस्य प्रत्यक्षे ऽन्तर्भावः॥

एवमभावो ऽपि प्रत्यक्षमेव। न हि भूतलस्य परिणामविशेषात् कैवल्यलक्षणादन्यो घटाभावो नाम। प्रतिक्षणपरिणामिनो हि सर्व एव भावाः, ऋते चितिशक्तेः। स च परिणामभेद ऐन्द्रियक इति नास्ति प्रत्यक्षानवरुद्धो विषयो यत्राभावाह्वयं प्रमाणान्तरमभ्युपेयेतेति॥

(४९) सम्भवस्यानुमाने ऽन्तर्भावः॥

सम्भवस्तु, यथा-खार्यां द्रोणाढकप्रस्थाद्यवगमः। स चानुमानमेव। खारीत्वं हि द्रोणाद्यविनाभूतं प्रतीतम् खार्यां द्रोणादिसत्त्वमवगमयति॥

(५०) ऐतिह्यस्य प्रमाणत्वाभावः॥

यच्चानिर्दिष्टप्रवक्तृकं प्रवादपारम्पर्यमात्रम्—'इति होचुर्वृद्धाः,'—इत्यैतिह्यम्, यथा 'इह वटे यक्षः प्रतिवसति' इति, न तत् प्रमाणान्तरम्, अनिर्दिष्टप्रवक्तृकत्वेन सांशयिकत्वात्। आप्तवक्तृकत्वनिश्चये त्वागम एव। इत्युपपन्नम् "त्रिविधम्प्रमाणम्" इति॥ ९॥

एवं तावद्व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञलक्षणप्रमेयसिद्धयर्थं प्रमाणानि लक्षितानि । तत्र

(५१) प्रमाणानां शक्तिनिर्णयः॥

व्यक्तं पृथिव्यादि स्वरूपतः पांसुलपादको हालिको ऽपि प्रत्यक्षतः प्रतिपद्यते, पूर्ववता चानुमानेन धूमादिदर्शनात् वह्न्यादीनि चेति, तद्व्युत्पादनाय मन्दप्रयोजनं शास्त्रम् इति दुरधिगममनेन व्युत्पाद्यम् । तत्र यत्प्रमाणं यत्र शक्तम् तदुक्तलक्षणेभ्यः प्रमाणेभ्यो निष्कृष्य दर्शयति—

सामान्यतस्तु दृष्टात् अतीन्द्रियाणाम्प्रतीतिरनुमानात् ।
तस्मादपि चासिद्धं परोक्षमाप्तागमात् सिद्धम् ॥ ६ ॥

"सामान्यत" इति । 'तु' शब्दः प्रत्यक्षपूर्ववद्भ्यां विशिनष्टि ।

(५२) अतीन्द्रियाणां सामान्यतो दृष्टादनुमानात् प्रतीतिः ॥

सामान्यतो दृष्टादनुमानादतीन्द्रियाणां प्रधानपुरुषादीनां प्रतीतिः—चितिच्छायापत्तिर्बुद्धेरध्यवसाय इत्यर्थः । उपलक्षणं चैतत्, शेषवदित्यपि द्रष्टव्यम् ॥

तत्किं सर्वेष्वतीन्द्रियेषु सामान्यतोदृष्टमेव प्रवर्तते? । तथा च यत्र

(५३) सामान्यतो दृष्टादनुमानादसिद्धानामाप्तागमात् सिद्धिः॥

तन्नास्ति, महदाद्यारम्भक्रमे स्वर्गापूर्वदेवतादौ च, तत्र तेषामभावः प्राप्त इत्यत आह— "तस्मादपि" इति । तस्मादित्येतावतैव सिद्धे 'च' कारेण शेषवदित्यपि समुच्चितम् ॥ ६ ॥

स्यादेतत्, यथा[1] गगनकुसुमकूर्मरोमशशविषाणादिषु प्रत्यक्षमप्रवर्तमानम्

(५४) प्रत्यक्षाभावात् प्रधानादीनामभावशङ्का ॥

तदभावमवगमयति, एवं प्रधानादिष्वपि । तत्कथं तेषां सामान्यतो दृष्टादिभ्यः सिद्धिरित्यत आह—

अतिदूरात् सामीप्यात् इन्द्रियघातान्मनोऽनवस्थानात् ।
सौक्ष्म्याद्व्यवधानात् अभिभवात् समानाभिहाराच्च ॥ ७ ॥

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१ धूलिधूसरचरणः हलवाही, ग्राम्यजन इति यावत् ।

"अतिदूरात्" इति । अनुपलब्धिरिति वक्ष्यमाणं सिंहावलोकनन्याये-नानुषञ्जनीयम् । यथा उत्पतन् वियति पतत्री अतिदूरतया, सन्नपि, प्रत्यक्षेण नोपलभ्यते । सामीप्यादित्यत्राप्यतिरनुवर्तनीयः, यथा लोचनस्थमञ्जनमतिसामीप्यान्न दृश्यते । इन्द्रियघातोऽन्धत्वबधिरत्वादिः । "मनोऽनवस्थानात्," यथा कामाद्युपहतमनाः स्फीतालोकमध्यवर्तिनमिन्द्रियसन्निकृष्टमर्थं न पश्यति । "सौक्ष्म्यात्", यथेन्द्रियसन्निकृष्टम् परमाण्वादि प्रणिहितमना अपि न पश्यति । "व्यवधानात्", यथा कुड्यादिव्यवहितं राजदारादि न पश्यति । "अभिभवात्", यथा ऽहनि सौरीभिर्भाभिरभिभूतं ग्रहनक्षत्रमण्डलं न पश्यति । "समानाभिहारात्", यथा तोयदविमुक्तानुदबिन्दून् जलाशये न पश्यति ॥

(५५) तन्निरासः, अतिदूरातिसामीप्येन्द्रियघातमनोऽनवस्थानसौक्ष्म्यव्यवधानाभिभवसमानाभिहारेभ्यः प्रत्यक्षाभावः॥

'च'कारो ऽनुक्तसमुच्चयार्थः । तेनानुद्भवो ऽपि संगृहीतः । तद्यथा क्षीराद्यवस्थायां दध्याद्यनुद्भवान्न पश्यति ॥

(५६) अनुद्भवादपि प्रत्यक्षनिवृत्तिः ॥

एतदुक्तं भवति । न प्रत्यक्षनिवृत्तिमात्राद्वस्त्वभावो भवति, अतिप्रसङ्गात् । तथा हि गृहाद्विनिर्गतो गृहजनमपश्यंस्तदभावं विनिश्चिनुयात्, न त्वेवम् । अपि तु योग्यप्रत्यक्षनिवृत्तेरयमभावं विनिश्चिनोति । न च प्रधानपुरुषादीनामस्ति प्रत्यक्षयोग्यता, इति न तन्निवृत्तिमात्रात्तदभावनिश्चयो युक्तः प्रामाणिकानाम् इति ॥ ७ ॥

(५७) प्रत्यक्षनिवृत्तिरेव नाभावस्य कारणम् अपि तु योग्यप्रत्यक्षनिवृत्तिः॥

कतमत्पुनरेतेषु कारणं प्रधानादीनामनुपलब्धावित्यत आह—

सौक्ष्म्यात्तदनुपलब्धिर्नाभावात्, कार्यतस्तदुपलब्धेः।
महदादि तच्च कार्यं प्रकृतिसरूपं विरूपं च ॥ ८ ॥

"सौक्ष्म्यात्" इति । अथाभावादेव सप्तमरसवदेतेषामनुपलब्धिः

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१ यथा सिंहः पुरतो गत्वा पश्चात् पश्यति तथा ऽग्रिमपदस्य यत्र प्राग्गतशब्दैः सम्बन्धस्तत्रास्य न्यायस्य प्रवृत्तिरित्यादिकमस्मदीयन्यायलतिकायां द्रष्टव्यम् ।

(५८) प्रधानानुपलब्धौ सौक्ष्म्यम् कारणम् ॥

कस्मान्न भवतीत्यत आह—“नाभावात्” इति। कुतः ? “कार्यतस्तदुपलब्धेः। ‘तत्’ इति प्रधानं परामृशति। पुरुषोपलब्धौ तु प्रमाणं वक्ष्यति, “सङ्घातपरार्थत्वात्” (कारिका १७) इति। दृढतरप्रमाणावधारिते हि प्रत्यक्षमप्रवर्तमानमयोग्यत्वान्न प्रवर्तते इति कल्प्यते। सप्तमस्तु रसो न प्रमाणेनावधारित इति न तत्र प्रत्यक्षस्य योग्यता शक्या ऽध्यवसितुमित्यभिप्रायः॥

(५९) प्रधानास्तित्वसाधनकारणभूतमहदादिकार्यम् ॥

किं पुनस्तत्कार्यं यतः प्रधानानुमानमित्यत आह—“महदादि तच्च कार्यम्” इति। एतच्च यथा गमकम् तथोपरिष्टादुपपादयिष्यते। तस्य च कार्यस्य विवेकज्ञानोपयोगिनी सारूप्यवैरूप्ये आह—“प्रकृतिसरूपं विरूपं च” इति। एते तूपरिष्टाद्विभजनीये इति॥ ८॥

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(६०) कार्यकारणसम्बन्धे वादिविप्रतिपत्तयः॥

कार्यात् कारणमात्रं गम्यते। सन्ति चात्र वादिनां विप्रतिपत्तयः। तथा हि केचिदाहुः, ‘असतः सत् जायते’ इति, ‘एकस्य सतो विवर्तः कार्यजातं न वस्तु सत्’ इत्यपरे, अन्ये तु ‘सतः असत् जायते’ इति, ‘सतः सत् जायते’ इति वृद्धाः॥

(६१) सत्कार्यपक्ष एव प्रधानास्तित्वसाधकः॥

तत्र पूर्वस्मिन् कल्पत्रये प्रधानं न सिध्यति। सुखदुःखमोहभेदवत्स्वरूपपरिणामशब्दाद्यात्मकं हि जगत् कारणस्य प्रधानस्य प्रधानत्वं सत्त्वरजस्तमस्स्वभावत्वमवगमयति। यदि पुनरसतः सज्जायेत असन्निरुपाख्यं कारणं सुखादिरूपशब्दाद्यात्मकं कथं स्यात्, सदसतोस्तादात्म्यानुपपत्तेः ? अथैकस्य सतो विवर्तः शब्दादिप्रपञ्चः, तथा ऽपि सतः सज्जायत इति न स्यात्। न चास्याद्वयस्य प्रपञ्चात्मकत्वम्, अपि त्वप्रपञ्चस्य प्रपञ्चात्मकतया प्रतीतिर्भ्रम एव। येषामपि कणभक्षाक्षचरणादीनां सत एव कारणादसतो जन्म तेषामपि सदसतोरेकत्वानुपपत्तेर्न कार्यात्मकं कारणमिति न तन्मते प्रधानसिद्धिः॥

(६२) सत्कार्यप्रतिपादनम् ॥

अतः प्रधानसिद्ध्यर्थं प्रथमं तावत्सत्कार्यं प्रतिजानीते—

असदकरणादुपादानग्रहणात् सर्वसंभवाभावात् ।
शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात्, कारणभावाच्च सत् कार्यम् ॥ ९ ॥

"असदकरणात्" इति । "सत् कार्यम्"—कारणव्यापारात् प्रागपीति शेषः । तथा च न सिद्धसाधनं नैयायिकतनयैरुद्भावनीयम् ।

(६३) बौद्धसिद्धान्तनिरासः ॥

यद्यपि बीजमृत्पिण्डादिप्रध्वंसानन्तरमङ्कुरघटाद्युत्पत्तिरुपलभ्यते, तथा ऽपि न प्रध्वंसस्य कारणत्वम्, अपि तु भावस्यैव बीजाद्यवयवस्य । अभावात्तु भावोत्पत्तौ, तस्य सर्वत्र सुलभत्वात्, सर्वदा सर्वकार्योत्पादप्रसङ्ग इत्यादि न्यायवार्तिकतात्पर्यटीकायामस्माभिः प्रतिपादितम् ॥

(६४) वेदान्तमतनिरासः ॥

प्रपञ्चप्रत्ययश्चासति बाधके न शक्यो मिथ्येति वदितुम् इति ॥

कणभक्षाक्षचरणमतमत्रशिष्यते । तत्रेदं प्रतिज्ञातम्, "सत् कार्यम्" इति । अत्र हेतुमाह "असदकरणात्" इति ।

(६५) न्यायमतनिरासः । असतः करणायोग्यत्वात् सत् कार्यमिति प्रथमो हेतुः (१)॥

असत् चेत् कारणव्यापारात् पूर्वं कार्यम्, नास्य सत्त्वं कर्तुं केनापि शक्यम्, नहि नीलं शिल्पिसहस्रेणापि पीतं कर्तुं शक्यते । 'सदसत्त्वे घटस्य धर्मौ' इति चेत्, तथा ऽप्यसति धर्मिणि न तस्य धर्म इति सत्त्वं तदवस्थमेव । तथा च नासत्त्वम्, असम्बद्धेनातदात्मना चासत्त्वेन कथमसन् घटः? तस्मात् कारणव्यापारादूर्ध्वमिव ततः प्रागपि सदेव कार्यमिति ।

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१ धर्मिणि (घटे) । नासत्त्वम् (घटस्य) ॥ "असत्त्वं घटे संबद्धं तदात्मकं भवति न वा? आद्ये असदात्मकस्य घटस्य असत्त्वं धर्मो न स्यात् । सम्बन्धस्य तदात्मकस्य घटसापेक्षत्वात् सत्त्वं स्यात् घटस्येति सत्त्वं तदवस्थमेव । द्वितीयं प्रत्याह—"असम्बद्धेन" इति, तस्यासत्त्वे ऽभ्युपगम्यमाने ऽतिप्रसङ्गः स्यादित्युभयथा ऽपि सत्त्वं घटस्येति भारतीयत्यादयः ॥

कारणाच्चास्य सतोऽभिव्यक्तिरेवावशिष्यते । सतश्चाभिव्यक्तिरुपपन्ना, यथा पीडनेन तिलेषु तैलस्यावघातेन धान्येषु तण्डुलानां दोहनेन सौरभेयीषु पयसः । असतः करणे तु न निदर्शनं किञ्चिदस्ति । न खल्वभिव्यज्यमानं चोत्पद्यमानं वा क्वचिदसद्दृष्टम् ॥

इतश्च कारणव्यापारात् प्राक् सदेव कार्यम्—"उपादानग्रहणात्" ।

(६६) कार्यकारणसम्बन्धाच्च सत्कार्यमिति द्वितीयो हेतुः (२) ॥

उपादानानि कारणानि, तेषां ग्रहणं, कार्येण सम्बन्धः । उपादानैः कार्यस्य सम्बन्धादिति यावत् । एतदुक्तं भवति—कार्येण सम्बद्धं कारणम् कार्यस्य जनकम्, सम्बन्धश्च कार्यस्यासतो न सम्भवति, तस्मादिति ॥

स्यादेतत्—असम्बद्धमेव कार्यं कारणैः कस्मान्न जन्यते? तथा चासदेवोत्पत्स्यत इत्यत आह—"सर्वसम्भवाभावात्" इति ।

(६७) कार्यकारणयोर्नियतसम्बन्धाभावे सर्वकार्यकारणभावविप्लवापत्तिः ॥

असम्बद्धस्य जन्यत्वे, असम्बद्धत्वाविशेषेण सर्वं कार्यजातं सर्वस्माद्भवेत् । न चैतदस्ति, तस्मान्नासम्बद्धमसम्बद्धेन जन्यते अपि तु सम्बद्धं सम्बद्धेन जन्यत इति । यथाहुः सांख्यवृद्धाः[1]—

"असत्त्वे नास्ति सम्बन्धः कारणैः सत्त्वसङ्गिभिः ।
असम्बद्धस्य चोत्पत्तिमिच्छतो न व्यवस्थितिः" इति ॥

स्यादेतत्—असम्बद्धमपि सत् तदेव करोति यत्र यत् कारणं शक्तम् ।

(६८) कारणशक्तेः कार्यपरत्वाच्च सत्कार्यम् (३) ॥

शक्तिश्च कार्यदर्शनादवगम्यते । तेन नाव्यवस्थेत्यत आह—"शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात्" इति । सा शक्तिः शक्तकारणाश्रया सर्वत्र वा स्यात्, शक्ये एव वा? सर्वत्र चेत्तदवस्थैवाव्यवस्था, शक्ये चेत्, कथमसति शक्ये

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१ पञ्चशिखादयः ।

तत्र, इति वक्तव्यम् । शक्तिभेद एव एतादृशो यतः किञ्चिदेव कार्यं जनयेत् न सर्वमिति चेत्, हन्त भोः शक्तिविशेषः कार्यसम्बद्धो वा ऽसम्बद्धो वा? सम्बद्धत्वे नासता सम्बन्धः इति सत् कार्यम् । असम्बद्धत्वे सैवाव्यवस्था, इति सुष्ठूक्तं "शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात्" इति ॥

(६९) कारणात्मकत्वात् कार्यस्य सत् कार्यम् (४) ॥

इतश्च सत् कार्यमित्याह—"कारणभावाच्च" । कार्यस्य कारणात्मकत्वात् । नहि कारणाद्भिन्नं कार्यम्, कारणं च सत्, इति कथं तदभिन्नं कार्यमसत् भवेत् ॥

कार्यस्य कारणाभेदसाधनानि च प्रमाणानि—(१) न पटस्तन्तुभ्यो भिद्यते, तन्तुधर्मत्वात् । इह यत् यतो भिद्यते तत् तस्य धर्मो न भवति, यथा गौरश्वस्य । धर्मश्च पटस्ततूनां, तस्मान्नार्थान्तरम् । (२) उपादानोपादेयभावाच्च नार्थान्तरत्वं तन्तुपटयोः । ययोरर्थान्तरत्वम् न तयोरुपादानोपादेयभावः, यथा घटपटयोः । उपादानोपादेयभावश्च तन्तुपटयोः । तस्मान्नार्थान्तरत्वम् । (३)[१]इतश्च नार्थान्तरत्वं तन्तुपटयोः, संयोगाप्राप्त्यभावात् । अर्थान्तरत्वे हि संयोगो दृष्टो यथा कुण्डबदरयोः, अप्राप्तिर्वा यथा हिमवद्विन्ध्ययोः । न चेह संयोगाप्राप्ती, तस्मान्नार्थान्तरत्वमिति । (४) इतश्च पटस्तन्तुभ्यो न भिद्यते, गुरुत्वान्तरकार्याग्रहणात् । इह यत् यस्माद्भिन्नम्, तत् तस्मात् तस्य गुरुत्वान्तरं कार्यं गृह्यते, यथैकपलिकस्य स्वस्तिकस्य यो गुरुत्वकार्यो ऽवनतिविशेषस्तस्माद्द्विपलिकस्य स्वस्तिकस्य गुरुत्वकार्यो ऽवनतिभेदो ऽधिकः । न च तथा तन्तुगुरुत्वकार्यात् पटगुरुत्वकार्यान्तरं दृश्यते । तस्मादभिन्नस्तन्तुभ्यः पट इति । तान्येतान्यभेदसाधनान्यवीतानि ॥

(७०) कार्यकारणाभेदसाधनानि ॥

एवमभेदे सिद्धे,तन्तव एव तेन तेन संस्थानभेदेन परिणताः पटो, न

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१ व्यतिरेकानुमानानि ।

(७१) कार्यकारणयोरभेदात् कारणपरिणामभेद एव कार्यम्। तन्मते विरोधादिपरिहारः ॥

तन्तुभ्यो ऽर्थान्तरं पटः। [1]स्वात्मनि क्रियाविरोधसबन्धबुद्धिव्यपदेशार्थक्रियाभेदाश्च नैकान्तिकं भेदं साधयितुमर्हन्ति, एकस्मिन्नपि तत्तद्विशेषाविर्भावतिरोभावाभ्यामेतेषामविरोधात्, यथा हि कूर्मस्याङ्गानि कूर्मशरीरे निविशमानानि तिरोभवन्ति, निःसरन्ति चाविर्भवन्ति। न तु कूर्मतस्तदङ्गान्युत्पद्यन्ते प्रध्वंसन्ते वा। एवमेकस्या मृदः सुवर्णस्य वा घटमुकुटादयो विशेषाः निःसरन्त आविर्भवन्त उत्पद्यन्त इत्युच्यन्ते, निविशमानास्तिरोभवन्ति विनश्यन्तीत्युच्यन्ते। न पुनरसतामुत्पादः सतां वा निरोधः। यथाह भगवान् कृष्णद्वैपायनः—

"नासतो विद्यते भावो नाभावो विद्यते सतः" इति। (भगवद्गीता. २।१६)

यथा कूर्मः स्वावयवेभ्यः सङ्कोचविकासिभ्यो न भिन्नः, एवं घटमुकुटादयो ऽपि मृत्सुवर्णादिभ्यो न भिन्नाः। एवञ्चेह तन्तुषु पट इति व्यपदेशो, यथेह वने [2]तिलका इत्युपपन्नः। न चार्थक्रियाभेदो ऽपि भेदमापादयति, एकस्यापि नानार्थक्रियादर्शनात्। यथैक एव वह्निर्दाहकः पाचकः प्रकाशकश्चेति। नाप्यर्थक्रियाव्यवस्था वस्तुभेदे हेतुः, तेषामेव समस्तव्यस्तानामर्थक्रियाव्यवस्थादर्शनात्। यथा प्रत्येकं विष्टयो वर्त्मदर्शनलक्षणामर्थक्रियां कुर्वन्ति, न तु शिबिकावहनम्, मिलितास्तु शिबिकामुद्वहन्ति, एवं तन्तवः प्रत्येकं प्रावरणमकुर्वाणा अपि मिलिता आविर्भूतपटभावाः प्रावरिष्यन्ति ॥

स्यादेतत्—आविर्भावः पटस्य कारणव्यापारात् प्राक् सन् असन्

१ स्वात्मनि उत्पत्तिविनाशलक्षणाविरुद्धक्रिया, इह तन्तुषु पट इति व्यपदेशः, प्रावरणार्थक्रियाभेदश्च। २ तिलकवृक्षमयवनविषये यथा "इहवने तिलका" इति सङ्गच्छते तथा तन्तुमयपटेऽपीति।

(७२) कार्यस्य कारणपरिणामविशेषत्वे कारणव्यापारस्याप्रयोजकत्वमनवस्थापत्तिश्च ॥

वा? असंश्चेत् प्राप्तं तर्ह्यसदुत्पादनम् । अथ सन्, कृतं तर्हि कारण[1]व्यापारेण । नहि सति कार्ये कारणव्यापारप्रयोजनं पश्यामः । आविर्भावे चाविर्भावान्तरकल्पने ऽनवस्थाप्रसङ्गः । तस्मादाविर्भूतपटभावास्तन्तवः क्रियन्त इति रिक्तं वचः ॥

(७३) तत्परिहारः । उक्तदोषस्योभयमते तुल्यत्वम् ॥

मैवम् । अथासदुत्पद्यत इति मते केयमसदुत्पत्तिः? सती, असती वा? सती चेत्, कृतं तर्हि कारणैः । असती चेत्, तस्या अप्युत्पत्त्यन्तरमित्यनवस्था ॥

(७४) पटतदुत्पत्त्योरैक्यशङ्का–तत्परिहारश्च ॥

[2]अथ–‘ उत्पत्तिः पटान्नार्थान्तरम्, अपि तु पट एवासौ ’, तथा ऽपि यावदुक्तं भवति ‘ पट ’ इति तावदुक्तं भवति ‘ उत्पद्यते ’ इति । ततश्च ‘ पट ’ इत्युक्ते, ‘ उत्पद्यते ’ इति न वाच्यम्, पौनरुक्त्यात् । ‘ विनश्यति ’ इत्यपि न वाच्यम्, उत्पत्तिविनाशयोर्युगपदेकत्र विरोधात् ॥

[3]तस्मादियं पटोत्पत्तिः स्वकारणसमवायो वा, स्वसत्ता समवायो वा,

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१ एवं च शङ्काकृदुद्भावितो दोषः समान एव पक्षद्वये । ततश्च नैकेनापरम्प्रत्युद्भावनीय इति । यथाहुर्ब्रह्मसूत्रकाराः—स्वपक्षदोषाच्चेति— । २ उक्तानवस्थालक्षणदोषपरिजिहीर्षया पटोत्पत्त्योरैक्यं शङ्क्यते । तर्हि पर्यायशब्दावेतावित्यभिप्रेत्य परिहरति च । ३ पटोत्पत्तौ सत्यामपि कारणव्यापारस्य प्रयोजनमित्यभिप्रेत्याह–‘ तस्मात् ’ इति । पटोत्पत्तिः स्वकारणभूततन्तुभिरयुतसिद्धा, स्वसत्तामात्रेणायुतसिद्धा वा भवितुमर्हति । उभयथाऽपि तु कारणव्यापारमन्तरेण न पटोत्पत्तिरुपपद्यते ।

“ उपसंहरति “ तस्मादिति ” उत्पत्त्युत्पत्तेरङ्गीकारे ऽनवस्थाप्रसङ्गेनानुत्पन्नाया अप्युत्पत्तेः कारणव्यापारापेक्षित्ववदस्मन्मते ऽपि सत एव घटस्याविर्भावाय कारणव्यापारापेक्षा घटोत्पत्तिमङ्गीकुर्वाणेन घटे कारणव्यापारापेक्षत्वस्य प्रयोज्यत्वरूपस्यैवादरणीयतया ऽऽविर्भावे एव तदङ्गीकारमात्रेण निर्वाहे कृतमुत्पत्त्यङ्गीकारेण, युक्तं चैतत्, अन्यथोत्पत्तिवादे च कार्यस्येव कारणसापेक्षतया तस्य च क्रियात्वाभावे क्रियासम्बन्धित्वप्रयुक्तकारकत्वकारणत्वव्यवहारानुपपत्तेः सत्कार्यवाद एव साधीयानित्याशयः” इति काचित् ।

(७५) पटोत्पत्तौ सत्यामपि कारणव्यापारापेक्षा ॥

उभयथाऽपि नोत्पद्यते, अथ च तदर्थानि कारणानि व्यापार्यन्ते । एवं सत एव पटादेराविर्भावाय कारणापेक्षेत्युपपन्नम् ॥ न[1] च पटरूपेण कारणानां सम्बन्धः, तद्रूपस्याक्रियात्वात्, क्रियासम्बन्धित्वाच्च कारणानाम् अन्यथा कारणत्वाभावात् ॥

(७६) कारिकोपसंहारः ॥

तस्मात् सत् कार्यमिति पुष्कलम् ॥ ९ ॥

तदेवं प्रधानसाधनानुगुणं सत् कार्यमुपपाद्य यादृशं तत् प्रधानं साधनीयं तादृशमादर्शयितुं विवेकज्ञानोपयोगिनी व्यक्ताव्यक्तसारूप्यवैरूप्ये तावदाह—

(७७) व्यक्ताव्यक्तसारूप्यवैरूप्ये ॥

हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकमाश्रितं लिङ्गम् ।
सावयवं परतन्त्रं व्यक्तं, विपरीतमव्यक्तम् ॥ १० ॥

(७८) व्यक्तानां सारूप्यम् । तत्र हेतुमत्त्वम् ॥ (१)

"हेतुमत्" इति । व्यक्तं हेतुमत्, हेतुः कारणम्, तद्वत्, यस्य च यो हेतुः तमुपरिष्टाद्वक्ष्यति ॥

(७९) अनित्यत्वम् ॥ (२)

"अनित्यम्," विनाशि, तिरोभावीति यावत् ॥

(८०) अव्यापित्वम् ॥ (३)

"अव्यापि", 'सर्वं परिणामिनं न व्याप्नोति । कारणेन हि कार्यमाविष्टम्, न कार्येण कारणम् । न च बुद्ध्यादयः प्रधानं वेविषन्तीत्यव्यापकाः ॥

"सक्रियम्", परिस्पन्दवत् । यथा हि बुद्ध्यादयः उपात्तमुपात्तं देहं

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१ ननु 'अस्मत्पक्षे–पटरूपाणि कारणानि कुर्वन्ति इति सदुक्तिस्त्वत्पक्षबाधिका' इति चेत्, तत्राह "न च" इति ।

(८१) सक्रियत्वम् ॥ (४) त्यजन्ति देहान्तरं चोपाददत, इति तेषां परिस्पन्दः । शरीरपृथिव्यादीनां च परिस्पन्दः प्रसिद्ध एव ।

(८२) अनेकत्वम् ॥ (५) "अनेकम्", प्रतिपुरुषं बुद्ध्यादीनां भेदात् । पृथिव्याद्यपि शरीरघटादिभेदेनानेकमेव ॥

"आश्रितम्", स्वकारणमाश्रितम् । बुद्ध्यादिकार्याणामभेदे ऽपि कथ-
(८३) आश्रितत्वम् ॥ (६) ञ्चिद्भेदविवक्षया ऽऽश्रयाश्रयिभावः, यथेह वने तिलका इत्युक्तम् ॥

"लिङ्गम्", प्रधानस्य । यथा चैते बुद्ध्यादयः प्रधानस्य लिङ्गम्
(८४) लिङ्गत्वम् ॥ (७) तथोपरिष्टाद्वक्ष्यति । प्रधानं तु न प्रधानस्य लिङ्गम् पुरुषस्य लिंगम्भवदपीति भावः ॥

"सावयवम्" अवयवावयविसंयोगसंयोगि । अथवा अवयवनम्[१] अव-
(८५) सावयवत्वम् ॥ (८) यवः, अवयवानामवयविनां मिथः संश्लेषो मिश्रणम् संयोग इति यावत् । अप्राप्तिपूर्विका प्राप्तिः संयोगः । तेन सह वर्तत इति सावयवम् । तथाहि पृथिव्यादयः परस्परं संयुज्यन्ते, एवमन्ये ऽपि । न तु प्रधानस्य बुद्ध्यादिभिः संयोगः, तादात्म्यात् । नापि सत्त्वरजस्तमसां परस्परं संयोगः, अप्राप्तेरभावात् ॥

"परतन्त्रम्" बुद्ध्यादि । बुद्ध्या स्वकार्ये ऽहङ्कारे जनयितव्ये प्रकृत्या
(८६) परतन्त्रत्वम् ॥ (९) पूरो ऽपेक्ष्यते, अन्यथा क्षीणा सती नालमहङ्कारं जनयितुमिति स्थितिः । एवमहङ्कारादिभिरपि स्वकार्यजनने । इति सर्वं स्वकार्येषु प्रकृत्या पूरमपेक्षते । तेन परां प्रकृतिमपेक्षमाणं कारणमपि स्वकार्यजनने परतन्त्रं व्यक्तम् ॥

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१ अवयव् + अनट् ।

"विपरीतमव्यक्तम्"—व्यक्तात्। अहेतुमन्नित्यं व्यापि निष्क्रियम्, [यद्यप्यव्यक्तस्यास्ति परिणामलक्षणा क्रिया तथा ऽपि परिस्पन्दो नास्ति ॥] एकमनाश्रितमलिङ्गमनवयवम् स्वतन्त्रमव्यक्तम् ॥ १० ॥

(८७) अव्यक्तस्य वैपरीत्यम् ॥

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(८८) व्यक्ताव्यक्तयोस्साधर्म्याणि पुरुषाच्च तयोर्वैधर्म्यम् ॥

तदनेन प्रबन्धेन व्यक्ताव्यक्तयोर्वैधर्म्यमुक्तम्। सम्प्रति तयोः साधर्म्यम्, पुरुषाच्च वैधर्म्यम्, आह—

त्रिगुणमविवेकि विषयः सामान्यमचेतनम्प्रसवधर्मि ।
व्यक्तं, तथा प्रधानम्, तद्विपरीतस्तथा च पुमान् ॥ ११ ॥

"त्रिगुणम्" इति। त्रयो गुणाः सुखदुःखमोहा अस्येति त्रिगुणम्। तदनेन सुखादीनामात्मगुणत्वम् पराभिमतमपाकृतम्।[1]

(८९) त्रिगुणत्वम् प्रथमम् साधर्म्यम् ॥ (१)

"अविवेकि"। यथा प्रधानं न स्वतो विविच्यते, एवम्महदादयो ऽपि न प्रधानात् विविच्यन्ते, तदात्मकत्वात्। अथ वा सम्भूयकारिता ऽत्राविवेकिता। न हि किञ्चिदेकं पर्याप्तम् स्वकार्ये, अपि तु सम्भूय। तत्र नैकस्मात् यस्य कस्यचित् केनचित्सम्भव इति ॥

(९०) अविवेकित्वम् द्वितीयम् ॥ (२)

ये[2] त्वाहुः—'विज्ञानमेव हर्षविषादमोहशब्दाद्यात्मकम्, न पुनरितो ऽन्यस्तद्धर्मा' इति—तान् प्रत्याह—"विषय" इति। 'विषयो' ग्राह्यः, विज्ञानाद्बहिरिति यावत्। अत एव "सामान्यम्" साधारणम्, अनेकैः पुरुषैर्गृहीतमित्यर्थः। विज्ञानाकारत्वे तु, असाधारण्याद्विज्ञानानां वृत्तिरू-

(९१) विषयत्वम् सामान्यत्वं च तृतीयचतुर्थे (३) (४)

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१ नैयायिकाद्यभिमतम्। २ विज्ञानवादिनो बौद्धाः।

पाणां, ते ऽप्यसाधारणाः स्युः। तथा च नर्तकीभ्रूलताभङ्गे एकस्मिन् बहूनां प्रतिसन्धानं युक्तम्। अ[1]न्यथा तन्न स्यात् इति भावः ॥

(९२) अचेतनत्वम् पञ्चमम् ॥ (५)

" अचेतनम् " । सर्व एव प्रधानबुद्ध्यादयो ऽचेतनाः, न तु वैनाशिकवत् चैतन्यम्बुद्धेरित्यर्थः ॥

(९३) प्रसवधर्मित्वम् षष्ठम् ॥ (६)

" प्रसवधर्मि " । प्रसवरूपो धर्मो यः सो ऽस्यास्तीति प्रसवधर्मि । [प्रसवधर्मेति वक्तव्ये मत्वर्थीयः प्रसवधर्मस्य नित्ययोगमाख्यातुम् ।] सरूपविरूपपरिणामाभ्यां न कदाचिदपि वियुज्यत इत्यर्थः ॥

(९४) उक्तव्यक्तधर्माणामव्यक्ते ऽतिदेशः ॥

व्यक्तवृत्तमव्यक्ते ऽतिदिशति, " तथा प्रधानम् " इति । यथा व्यक्तंतथा ऽव्यक्तमि[3]त्यर्थः ॥

(९५) व्यक्ताव्यक्तयोः पुरुषात् वैधर्म्यम् ॥

ताभ्यां वैधर्म्यं पुरुषस्याऽऽह–" तद्विपरीतः पुमान् " इति ॥

(९६) साधर्म्यं च ॥

स्यादेतत्–अहेतुमत्त्वंनित्यत्वादि प्रधानसाधर्म्यमस्ति पुरुषस्य, एवमनेकत्वं व्यक्तसाधर्म्यम्, तत्कथमुच्यते ' तद्विपरीतः पुमान् ' इति ? अत आह–" तथा च " इति । चकारो ऽ[4]प्यर्थः । यद्यप्यहेतुमत्त्वादिकं साधर्म्यम्, तथाप्यत्रैगुण्यादि वैपरीत्यमस्त्येवेत्यर्थः ॥ ११ ॥

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(९७) गुणनिरूपणम् ॥

त्रिगुणमित्युक्तम्, तत्र के ते त्रयो गुणाः, किं च तदुपलक्षणमित्यत आह–

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१ विज्ञानं परेण न गृह्यते परबुद्धेरप्रत्यक्षत्वात् इत्यभिप्राय इत्येतावानपि पाठो मुद्रितपुस्तके लभ्यते, किं तु तदसमञ्जसमिति विचार्य टिप्पणीगतमेव मूलप्रविष्टमिति मन्यामहे। अस्य समीचीनत्वे विद्वत्प्रतिभैव प्रमाणम् । २ तेषां विज्ञानाकारत्वे। ३ त्रिगुणत्वादिसाधर्म्यं व्यक्ताव्यक्तयोरितियावत् । ४ च=अपि ।

प्रीत्यप्रीतिविषादात्मकाः प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमार्थाः ।
अन्योन्याभिभवाश्रयजननमिथुनवृत्तयश्च गुणाः ॥ १२ ॥

(९८) गुणानां स्वरूपाणि, सुखदुःखयोः परस्पराभावरूपताव्युदासश्च॥

" गुणाः " [परार्थाः] " सत्त्वं लघु प्रकाशकम् " [कारिका १३] इत्यत्र निर्देक्ष्यन्ते । तदनागतावेक्षणेन तन्त्रयुक्त्या वा प्रीत्यादीनां यथासंख्यं वेदितव्यम् ॥

(९९) उक्तलक्षणसमन्वयः ॥

एतदुक्तं भवति—प्रीतिः सुखम्, प्रीत्यात्मकः सत्त्वगुणः; अप्रीतिर्दुःखम्, अप्रीत्यात्मको रजोगुणः; विषादो मोहः, विषादात्मकस्तमोगुणः इत्यर्थः । ये तु मन्यन्ते " न प्रीतिर्दुःखाभावादतिरिच्यते, एवं दुःखमपि न प्रीत्यभावादन्यदिति," तान् प्रति " आत्म "—ग्रहणम् । नेतरेतराभावाः सुखादयः, अपि तु भावाः, आत्मशब्दस्य भाववचनत्वात् । प्रीतिः आत्मा भावो येषां ते प्रीत्यात्मानः । एवमन्यदपि व्याख्येयम् । भावरूपता चैषामनुभवसिद्धा । परस्पराभावात्मकत्वे तु परस्पराश्रयापत्तेरेकस्याप्यसिद्धेरुभयासिद्धिरिति भावः ॥

(१००) गुणानां प्रयोजनम्-यथासख्यं प्रकाशप्रवृतिनियमरूपम् ॥

स्वरूपमेषामुक्त्वा प्रयोजनमाह—" प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमार्थाः " इति । अत्रापि यथासंख्यमेव । रजः प्रवर्तकत्वात् सर्वत्र लघु सत्त्वं प्रवर्तयेत्, यदि तमसा गुरुणा न नियम्येत । तमोनियतन्तु क्वचिदेव प्रवर्तयतीति भवति तमो नियमार्थम् ॥

(१०१) गुणानां क्रियाः, अन्योन्याभिभव-अन्योन्यापेक्षा-अन्योन्यापेक्षजनन-अन्योन्यमिथुनवृत्तिरूपाः ॥

प्रयोजनमुक्त्वा क्रियामाह—" अन्योन्याभिभवाश्रयजननमिथुनवृत्तयश्च " इति । वृत्तिः क्रिया, सा च प्रत्येकमभिसम्बध्यते । ' अन्योन्याभिभववृत्तयः ' । एषामन्यतमेनार्थवशादुद्भूतेनान्यदभिभूयते । तथा हि सत्त्वं रजस्तमसी अभिभूय शान्तामात्मनो वृत्तिं प्रतिलभते, एवं रजः सत्त्वतमसी अभिभूय घोराम्, एवं तमः सत्त्वरजसी

अभिभूय मूढामिति । 'अन्योन्याश्रयवृत्तयः' । यद्यप्याधाराधेयभावेन नायमर्थो घटते, तथा ऽपि यदपेक्षया यस्य क्रिया स तस्याश्रयः। तथा हि, सत्त्वं प्रवृत्तिनियमावाश्रित्य रजस्तमसोः प्रकाशेनोपकरोति, रजः प्रकाशनियमावाश्रित्य प्रवृत्त्येतरयोः, तमः प्रकाशप्रवृत्ती आश्रित्य नियमेनेतरयोरिति। 'अन्योन्यजननवृत्तयः'। अन्यतमो ऽन्यतममपेक्ष्य जनयति। जननं च परिणामः, स च गुणानां सदृशरूपः। अत एव न हेतुमत्त्वम्, तत्त्वान्तरस्य हेतोरसम्भवात्; नाप्यनित्यत्वम्, तत्त्वान्तरे लयाभावात्। 'अन्योन्यमिथुनवृत्तयः'। अन्योन्यसहचराः, अविनाभाववृत्तय इति यावत्। 'चः' समुच्चये। भवति चात्रागमः—

"अन्योन्यमिथुनाः सर्वे सर्वे सर्वत्रगामिनः ।
रजसो मिथुनं सत्त्वं सत्त्वस्य मिथुनं रजः ॥
तमसश्चापि मिथुने ते सत्त्वरजसी उभे ।
उभयोः सत्त्वरजसोर्मिथुनं तम उच्यते ॥
नैषामादिः सम्प्रयोगो वियोगो वोपलभ्यते" ॥ इति देवीभागवत—३।८. ॥ १२ ॥

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(१०२) गुणत्रयनिरूपणम्, तेषां पृथक्स्वभावश्च ॥

"प्रकाशप्रवृत्तिनियमार्थाः" इत्युक्तम्, तत्र के ते इत्थम्भूताः कुतश्चेत्यत आह—

सत्त्वं लघु प्रकाशकमिष्टमुपष्टम्भकं चलं च रजः ।
गुरु वरणकमेव तमः, प्रदीपवच्चार्थतो वृत्तिः ॥ १३ ॥

"सत्त्वम्" इति। सत्त्वमेव लघु प्रकाशकमिष्टम्—सांख्याचार्यैः । तत्र

(१०३) सत्त्वगुणस्वभावः—लाघवम्, प्रकाशकत्वम् ॥

कार्योद्गमने हेतुर्धर्मो लाघवम् गौरवप्रतिद्वन्द्वि यतो ऽग्नेरूर्ध्वज्वलनं भवति, तदेव लाघवम् कस्यचित्तिर्यग्गमने हेतुर्भवति, यथा वायोः। एवं करणानां वृत्तिपटुत्वहेतुर्लाघवम्, गुरुत्वे हि मन्दानि स्युरिति सत्त्वस्य प्रकाशात्मकत्वमुक्तम् ॥

सत्त्वतमसी स्वयमक्रियतया स्वकार्यप्रवृत्तिं प्रत्यवसीदन्ती रजसोपष्टभ्येते अवसादात् प्रच्याव्य स्वकार्ये उत्साहं प्रयत्नं कार्येते । तदिदमुक्तम्—"उपष्टम्भकं रजः" इति । कस्मादित्यत उक्तम्—"चलम्" इति । तदनेन रजसः प्रवृत्त्यर्थत्वं दर्शितम् ॥

(१०४) रजोगुणस्वभावाः-उपष्टम्भकत्वम्, चलत्वम् ॥

रजस्तु चलतया परितस्त्रैगुण्यं चालयेत्, गुरुणा ऽऽवृण्वता च तमसा तत्र तत्र प्रवृत्तिप्रतिबन्धकेन क्वचिदेव प्रवर्त्यते इति ततस्ततो व्यावृत्त्या तमो नियामकमुक्तम्—"गुरु वरणकमेव तमः" इति । एवकारः प्रत्येकं भिन्नक्रमः सम्बध्यते, सत्त्वमेव, रज एव, तम एवेति ॥

(१०५) तमोगुणस्वभावः—गुरुत्वम् आवरकत्वम् ॥

ननु 'एते परस्परविरोधशीला गुणाः सुन्दोपसुन्दवत् परस्परं ध्वंसन्त इत्येव युक्तम्, प्रागेव[1] त्वेतेषामेकक्रियाकर्तृता'—इत्यत आह—"प्रदीपवच्चार्थतो वृत्तिः" इति । दृष्टमेवैतत्, यथा वर्त्तितैले ऽनलविरोधिनी, अथ मिलिते सहानलेन रूपप्रकाशलक्षणं कार्यं कुरुतः; तथा च वातपित्तश्लेष्माणः परस्परविरोधिनः शरीरधारणलक्षणकार्यकारिणः; एवं सत्त्वरजस्तमांसि मिथोविरुद्धान्यप्यनुवर्त्स्यन्ति स्वकार्यं करिष्यन्ति च । "अर्थत" इति पुरुषार्थत इति यावत्, यथा च वक्ष्यति—

(१०६) परस्परविरुद्धानामपि गुणानामर्थवशात् सहवृत्तित्वम् ॥

"पुरुषार्थ एव हेतुर्न केनचित् कार्यते करणम्" इति ॥ [कारिका३१]

अत्र च सुखदुःखमोहा[2] परस्परविरोधिनः स्वस्वानुरूपाणि सुखदुःखमोहात्मकान्येव निमित्तानि कल्पयन्ति । तेषां च परस्परमभिभाव्याभिभावकभावान्नानात्वम् । तद्यथा एकैव स्त्री रूपयौवनकुलशीलसम्पन्ना स्वा-

(१०७) सुखदुःखमोहानां परस्परविरुद्धत्वात्तेषां निमित्तरूपेण गुणत्रयस्या ऽऽवश्यकत्वम् ॥

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१ दूर एव । का कथा परस्परध्वंसकानामेकक्रियाकारितायां इति भावः । २ सत्त्वरजस्तमोरूपाणि ।

मिनं सुखाकरोति ; तत्कस्य हेतोः ? स्वामिनं प्रति तस्याः सुखरूपसमुद्भवात् । सैव स्त्री सपत्नीर्दुःखाकरोति; तत् कस्य हेतोः ? ताः प्रति तस्याः दुःखरूपसमुद्भवात् । एवं पुरुषान्तरं तामविन्दमानं सैव मोहयति ; तत् कस्य हेतोः ? तम्प्रति तस्याः मोहरूपसमुद्भवात् । अनया च स्त्रिया सर्वे भावा व्याख्याताः । तत्र यत् सुखहेतुः तत् सुखात्मकम् सत्त्वम् , यत् दुःखहेतुः तत् दुःखात्मकं रजः , यन्मोहहेतुस्तन्मोहात्मकं तमः । सुखप्रकाशलाघवानां[1] त्वेकस्मिन् युगपदुद्भूताववि‍रोधः, सहदर्शनात् । तस्मात्[2] सुखदुःखमोहैरिव विरोधिभिः अविरोधिभिरेकैकगुणवृत्तिभिः सुखप्रकाशलाघवैर्न निमित्तभेदा उन्नीयन्ते । एवं दुःखोपष्टम्भकत्वप्रवर्तकत्वैः, एवं मोहगुरुत्वावरणैः—इति सिद्धं त्रैगुण्यमिति ॥ १३ ॥

स्यादेतत्—अनुभूयमानेषु पृथिव्यादिष्वनुभवसिद्धाः भवन्त्वविवेकित्वादयः । ये पुनः सत्त्वादयो नानुभवपथमधिरोहन्ति तेषां कुतस्त्यमविवेकित्वम् , विषयत्वमचेतनत्वम् प्रसवधर्मित्वं च ? इत्यत आह—

(१०८) अननुभवसिद्धेषु सत्त्वादिष्वविवेकित्वादिगुणासम्भवशङ्का ॥

अविवेक्यादेः सिद्धिस्त्रैगुण्यात्तद्विपर्ययाभावात् ।
कारणगुणात्मकत्वात्कार्यस्याव्यक्तमपि सिद्धम् ॥ १४ ॥ ?

" अविवेक्यादेः " इति । अविवेकित्वमविवेकि—यथा ' द्व्येकयोर्द्विवचनैकवचने ' [पाणिनिसूत्र. १।४।२२] इत्यत्र द्वित्वैकत्वयोरिति अन्यथा द्व्येकेष्विति स्यात् । कुतः पुनरविवेकित्वादेः सिद्धिरित्यत आह—

(१०९) तन्निरासः—गुणत्रयाविवेकित्वसाधनान्वयव्यतिरेकौ ॥

" त्रैगुण्यात् " इति । ' यद्यत् सुखदुःखमोहात्मकं तत्तदविवेकित्वादि-

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१ सत्त्वरजस्तमांसीव सुखदुःखमोहानाम् , सुखप्रकाशलाघवानामपि भिन्नानि निमित्तानि कस्मान्नोक्तानीत्याशङ्क्याऽऽह—" सुखेति "। २ यथा सुखदुःखमोहाः परस्परविरुद्धाः भिन्नानि निमित्तानि सत्त्वरजस्तमोरूपाणि कल्पयन्ति—न तथा सुखप्रकाशलाघवादीनामेकैकगुणवृत्तित्त्वे कश्चिद्विरोधोऽस्ति, येन भिन्नानि निमित्तानि कल्पेरन् इति भावः । अविरोधिनामपि भिन्ननिमित्तकल्पने ऽनवस्थाऽपि ।

योगि यथेदमनुभूयमानं[1] व्यक्तम् '–इति स्फुटत्वादन्वयो नोक्तः । व्यतिरेकमाह–" तद्विपर्ययाभावात् " इति । अविवेक्यादिविपर्यये पुरुषे त्रैगुण्याभावात् । अथ वा व्यक्ताव्यक्तं पक्षीकृत्यान्वयाभावेनावीत एव हेतुस्त्रैगुण्यादिति वक्तव्यः ॥

स्यादेतत्–अव्यक्तसिद्धौ सत्यां तस्याविवेकित्वादयो धर्माः सिध्यन्ति । अव्यक्तमेव त्वद्यापि न सिध्यति, तत्कथमविवेकित्वादिसिद्धिरत आह–" कारणगुणात्मकत्वात् " इति । अयमभिसन्धिः–कार्यं हि कारणगुणात्मकं दृष्टम्, यथा तन्त्वादिगुणात्मकं पटादि । तथा महदादिलक्षणेनापि कार्येण सुखदुःखमोहरूपेण स्वकारणगतसुखदुःखमोहात्मना भवितव्यम् । तथा च तत्कारणं सुखदुःखमोहात्मकं प्रधानमव्यक्तं सिद्धम् भवति ॥ १४ ॥

(११०) अव्यक्तसाधनम् ॥

स्यादेतत्–' व्यक्तात् व्यक्तमुत्पद्यते ' इति कणभक्षाक्षिचरणतनयाः, परमाणवो हि व्यक्ताः, तैर्द्व्यणुकादिक्रमेण पृथिव्यादिलक्षणं कार्यं व्यक्तमारभ्यते । पृथिव्यादिषु च कारणगुणक्रमेण रूपाद्युत्पत्तिः । तस्मात् व्यक्तात् व्यक्तस्य तद्गुणस्य चोत्पत्तेः कृतमदृष्टचरेणाव्यक्तेनेत्यत आह—

(१११) व्यक्तादेव सर्वकार्यकारणभावोपपत्तेरव्यक्तकारणकल्पनावैयर्थ्यशङ्का ॥

भेदानां परिमाणात् समन्वयात् कार्यतः प्रवृत्तेश्च । शक्तितः
कारणकार्यविभागादविभागाद्वैश्वरूप्यस्य ॥ १५ ॥

" भेदानाम् " इति । भेदानाम् विशेषाणां महदादीनां भूतानां कार्याणां कारणं मूलकारणमस्त्यव्यक्तम् । कुतः ? " कारणकार्यविभागादविभागाद्वैश्वरूप्यस्य " । कारणे सत् कार्यमिति स्थितम् । तथा च यथा कूर्मशरीरे सन्त्येवाङ्गानि निःसरन्ति विभज्यन्ते—

(११२) तत्परिहारः । अव्यक्तकारणसाधनानि । तत्र कारणकार्ययोर्विभागाविभागाभ्यामव्यक्तसिद्धिरिति प्रथमम् (१) ॥

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[1] पृथिव्यादि ।

'इदं कूर्मशरीरं, एतान्येतस्याङ्गानि'—इति; एवं निविशमानानि तस्मिन् अव्यक्तीभवन्ति । एवं कारणान्मृत्पिण्डाद्धेमपिण्डाद्वा कार्याणि घटमुकुटादीनि सन्त्येवाविर्भवन्ति विभज्यन्ते । सन्त्येव पृथिव्यादीनि कारणात्तन्मात्रादाविर्भवन्ति विभज्यन्ते, सन्त्येव च तन्मात्राण्यहङ्कारात् कारणात्, सन्नेवाहङ्कारः कारणान्महतः, सन्नेव च महान् परमाव्यक्तात् । सो ऽयं कारणात् परमाव्यक्तात् साक्षात् पारम्पर्येणान्वितस्य विश्वस्य कार्यस्य विभागः । प्रतिसर्गे तु मृत्पिण्डं सुवर्णपिण्डं वा घटमुकुटादयो विशन्तो ऽव्यक्तीभवन्ति । तत्कारणरूपमेवानभिव्यक्तं कार्यमपेक्ष्याव्यक्तं भवति । एवं पृथिव्यादयस्तन्मात्राणि विशन्तः स्वापेक्षया तन्मात्राण्यव्यक्तयन्ति, एवं तन्मात्राण्यहङ्कारं विशन्त्यहङ्कारमव्यक्तयन्ति, एवमहाङ्कारो महान्तमाविशन् महान्तमव्यक्तयति, महान् प्रकृतिं स्वकारणं विशन् प्रकृतिमव्यक्तयति । प्रकृतेस्तु[1] न क्वचिन्निवेश इति सा सर्वकार्याणामव्यक्तमेव । सो ऽयमविभागः प्रकृतौ वैश्वरूप्यस्य नानारूपस्य कार्यस्य [स्वार्थिकः[2] ष्यञ्] । तस्मात् कारणे कार्यस्य सत एव विभागाविभागाभ्यामव्यक्तं कारणमस्ति ॥

(११३) कारणस्य शक्तिस्तस्मिन् कार्यस्याव्यक्ततया स्थितिरेवेति च द्वितीयम् (२) ॥

इतश्चाव्यक्तमस्तीत्यत आह—"शक्तितः प्रवृत्तेश्च" इति । कारणशक्तितः कार्यं प्रवर्तत इति सिद्धम्, अशक्तात् कारणात् कार्यस्यानुपपत्तेः, शक्तिश्च कारणगता न कार्यस्याव्यक्तत्वादन्या[3] । न हि सत्कार्यपक्षे कार्यस्याव्यक्तताया ऽन्यस्यां शक्तौ प्रमाणमस्ति । अयमेव हि सिकताभ्यस्तिलानां तैलोपादानानां भेदो यदेतेष्वेव तैलमस्त्यनागतावस्थं न सिकतास्विति ॥

स्यादेतत्—शक्तितः प्रवृत्तिः कारणकार्यविभागाविभागौ च महत एव

१ अनवस्थाभयात् । २ वैश्वरूप्यपदे । ३ कारणे कार्यस्याव्यक्तरूपेण स्थितिरेव तस्य (कारण) शक्तिरिति भावः ।

(११४) महदादिपर्यन्तस्य कार्यजातस्य परिमितत्वाच्चेति तृतीयम् (३)॥

परमाव्यक्तत्वं साधयिष्यतः, कृतं ततः परेणाव्यक्तेनेत्यत आह—“परिमाणात्” इति। परिमितत्वात्, अव्यापित्वादिति यावत्। विवादाध्यासिता महदादिभेदा अव्यक्तकारणवन्तः, परिमितत्वात्, घटादिवत्। घटादयो हि परिमिताः मृदाद्यव्यक्तकारणका दृष्टाः। उक्तमेतद्यथा कार्यस्याव्यक्तावस्था कारणमेवेति, यन्महतः कारणं तत् परमाव्यक्तम्, ततः परतराव्यक्तकल्पनायां प्रमाणाभावात्[१]॥

इतश्च विवादाध्यासिता भेदाः अव्यक्तकारणवन्तः—“समन्वयात्”।

(११५) समन्वयाच्चेति चतुर्थम् (४)॥

भिन्नानां समानरूपता समन्वयः। सुखदुःखमोहसमन्विता हि बुद्ध्यादयोऽध्यवसायादिलक्षणाः प्रतीयन्ते। यानि च यद्रूपसमनुगतानि, तानि तत्स्वभावाव्यक्तकारणानि, यथा मृद्धेमपिण्डसमनुगताः घटमुकुटादयो मृद्धेमपिण्डाव्यक्तकारणका इति—कारणमस्त्यव्यक्तं भेदानामिति सिद्धम्॥ १५॥

अव्यक्तं साधयित्वा अस्य प्रवृत्तिप्रकारमाह—

कारणमस्त्यव्यक्तम्, प्रवर्तते त्रिगुणतः समुदयाच्च।
परिणामतः सलिलवत् प्रतिप्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषात्॥ १६॥

“प्रवर्तते त्रिगुणतः” इति। प्रतिसर्गावस्थायां सत्त्वं रजस्तमश्च सदृशपरिणामानि भवन्ति। परिणामस्वभावा हि गुणा नापरिणमय्य क्षणमप्यवतिष्ठन्ते। तस्मात् सत्त्वं सत्त्वरूपतया रजो रजोरूपतया तमस्तमोरूपतया प्रतिसर्गावस्थायामपि प्रवर्तते। तदिदमुक्तम् “त्रिगुणतः” इति॥

(११६) प्रकृतेस्त्रिगुणतः प्रवृत्तिः प्रथमा (१)॥

प्रवृत्त्यन्तरमाह—“समुदयाच्च” इति। समेत्य उदयः ‘समुदयः’ सम-

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[१] अनवस्थापाताच्च।

(११७) प्रकृतेस्समुदयात् प्रवृत्तिर्द्वितीया(२)॥ वायः । समुदयश्च गुणानाम् न गुणप्रधानभावमन्तरेण सम्भवति, न च गुणप्रधानभावो वैषम्यं विना, न च वैषम्यमुपमर्दोपमर्दकभावादृते, इति महदादिभावेन प्रवृत्तिर्द्वितीया ॥

स्यादेतत्—कथमेकरूपाणां गुणानामनेकरूपा प्रवृत्तिरित्यत आह—"परिणामतः सलिलवत्" इति । यथा हि वारिदविमुक्तमुदकमेकरसमपि तत्तद्भूविकारानासाद्य नारिकेलतालतालीबिल्वचिरबिल्वतिन्दुकामलकप्राचीनामलककपित्थफलरसतया परिणमन्मधुराम्ललवणातिक्तकषायकटुतया विकल्प्यते, एवमेकैकगुणसमुद्भवात् प्रधानगुणाः परिणामभेदान् प्रवर्तयन्ति । तदिदमुक्तम्—"प्रतिप्रतिगुणाश्रयविशेषात्" । एकैकगुणाश्रयेण यो विशेषस्तस्मादित्यर्थः ॥ १६ ॥

(११८) प्रकृतेः प्रवृत्तिः परिणामतो नानाप्रकारा॥

ये तु तौष्टिका अव्यक्तं वा महान्तं वा ऽहङ्कारं वा इन्द्रियाणि वा भूतानि वा ऽऽत्मानमभिमन्यमानास्तान्येवोपासते तान् प्रत्याह—

(११९) पुरुषास्तित्वसाधनम् ॥

संघातपरार्थत्वात् त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययादधिष्ठानात् ।
पुरुषो ऽस्ति भोक्तृभावात्कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेश्च ॥ १७ ॥

"संघातपरार्थत्वात्" इति । पुरुषो ऽस्ति, अव्यक्तादेर्व्यतिरिक्तः । कुतः? "संघातपरार्थत्वात्" । अव्यक्तमहदहङ्कारादयः परार्थाः, संघातत्वात्, शयनासनाभ्यङ्गादिवत्, सुखदुःखमोहात्मकतया ऽव्यक्तादयः सर्वे संघाताः ॥

(१२०) संघातानां परार्थत्वादिति प्रथमं साधनम् (१) ॥

स्यादेतत्—शयनासनादयः संघाताः संहतशरीरार्था दृष्टाः, न त्वात्मा-

(१२१) संघातानां संघातान्तरार्थत्वे ऽनवस्था त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययश्च ॥

नमव्यक्ताद्यतिरिक्तं प्रति परार्थाः । तस्मात् संघातान्तरमेव परं गमयेयुः, न त्वसंहतात्मानम् इत्यत आह—"त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययात्" इति । अयमभिप्रायः—संघातान्तरार्थत्वे हि तस्यापि संघातत्वात् तेनापि संघातान्तरार्थेन भवितव्यम्; एवं तेन तेनेत्यनवस्था स्यात् । न च व्यवस्थायां सत्यामनवस्था युक्ता, कल्पनागौरवप्रसङ्गात् । न च 'प्रमाणबलेन कल्पनागौरवमपि मृष्यत' इति युक्तम्, संहतत्वस्य पारार्थ्यमात्रेणान्वयात् । दृष्टान्तदृष्टसर्वधर्मानुरोधेन त्वनुमानमिच्छतः सर्वानुमानोच्छेदप्रसङ्ग इत्युपपादितं न्यायवार्तिकतात्पर्यटीकायामस्माभिः । तस्मादनवस्थाभिया ऽस्यासंघातत्वमिच्छता ऽत्रिगुणत्वमविवेकित्वमविषयत्वमसामान्यत्वं चेतनत्वमप्रसवधर्मित्वञ्चाभ्युपेयम् । त्रिगुणत्वादयो हि धर्माः संहतत्वेन व्याप्ताः । तत्संहतत्वमस्मिन् परे व्यावर्तमानं त्रैगुण्यादि व्यावर्तयति, ब्राह्मणत्वमिव व्यावर्तमानं कठत्वादिकम् । तस्मादाचार्येण 'त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययात्' इति वदता ऽसंहतः परो विवक्षितः, स चात्मेति सिद्धम् ॥

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इतश्च परः पुरुषो ऽस्ति—"अधिष्ठानात्", त्रिगुणात्मकानामधिष्ठीयमानत्वात् । यद्यत्सुखदुःखमोहात्मकं तत्सर्वं परेणाधिष्ठीयमानं दृष्टम्, यथा रथादिर्यन्त्रादिभिः । सुखदुःखमोहात्मकं चेदं बुद्ध्यादि, तस्मादेतदपि परेणाधिष्ठातव्यम् । स च परस्त्रैगुण्यादन्य आत्मेति ॥

(१२२) त्रिगुणात्मकानामधिष्ठीयमानत्वादिति द्वितीयं साधनम् (२)॥

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इतश्चास्ति पुरुषो—"भोक्तृभावात्" । भोक्तृभावेन भोग्ये सुखदुःखे उपलक्षयति । भोग्ये हि दुखदुःखे अनुकूलप्रतिकूलवेदनीये प्रत्यात्ममनुभूयेते । तेनानयोरनुकूलनीयेन, प्रतिकूलनीयेन च केनचिदप्यन्येन भवितव्यम् । न चानुकूल-

(१२३) भोक्तृभावादिति तृतीयम् (३) ॥

नीयाः प्रतिकूलनीया वा बुद्ध्यादयः, तेषां सुखदुःखाद्यात्मकत्वेन स्वात्मनि वृत्तिविरोधात् । तस्मात् यो ऽसुखाद्यात्मा सो ऽनुकूलनीयः प्रतिकूलनीयो वा, स चा ऽऽत्मेति ॥

(१२४) भोक्तृभावादित्यस्य द्रष्टृभावादित्यर्थो ऽपि सम्भवति ॥

अन्ये त्वाहुः—भोग्या दृश्या बुद्ध्यादयः । न च द्रष्टारमन्तरेण दृश्यता युक्ता तेषाम् । तस्मादस्ति द्रष्टा दृश्यबुद्ध्याद्यतिरिक्तः, स चा ऽऽत्मेति । भोक्तृभावात् द्रष्टृभावात्, दृश्येन द्रष्टुरनुमानादित्यर्थः । दृश्यत्वं च बुद्ध्यादीनां सुखाद्यात्मकतया पृथिव्यादिवदनुमितम् ॥

(१२५) शास्त्राणां कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेरिति चतुर्थं साधनम्–(४) ॥

इतश्चास्ति पुरुष इत्याह–"कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेश्च" इति । शास्त्राणां महर्षीणां दिव्यलोचनानां च कैवल्यमात्यन्तिकदुःखत्रयप्रशमलक्षणं न बुद्ध्यादीनां सम्भवति । ते हि दुःखाद्यात्मकाः कथं स्वभावाद्वियोजयितुं शक्यन्ते । तदतिरिक्तस्य त्वतदात्मनस्ततो वियोगः शक्यसम्पादः, तस्मात् कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेरागमानां महाधियां चास्ति बुद्ध्यादिव्यतिरिक्त आत्मेति सिद्धम् ॥ १७ ॥

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(१२६) पुरुषबहुत्वसाधनानि ॥

तदेवं पुरुषास्तित्वं प्रतिपाद्य, स किं सर्वशरीरेष्वेकः किमनेकः प्रतिक्षेत्रमिति संशये, तस्य प्रतिक्षेत्रमनेकत्वमुपपादयति—

जननमरणकरणानां प्रतिनियमादयुगपत्प्रवृत्तेश्च ।
पुरुषबहुत्वं सिद्धं त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययाच्चैव ॥ १८ ॥

(१२७) जन्ममरणप्रतिनियमादिति प्रथमम् (१) ॥

जननेत्यादिना । "पुरुषबहुत्वं सिद्धम्" । कस्मात्? "जननमरणकरणानां प्रतिनियमात्" । निकायविशिष्टाभिरपूर्वाभिर्देहेन्द्रियमनोऽहङ्कारबुद्धिवेदनाभिः पुरुषस्याभिसम्बधो जन्म, न तु पुरुषस्य परि-

णामः, तस्यापरिणामित्वात् । तेषामेव च देहादीनामुपात्तानां परित्यागो मरणम्, नत्वात्मनो विनाशः, तस्य कूटस्थनित्यत्वात् । करणानि बुद्ध्यादीनि त्रयोदश । तेषां जन्ममरणकरणानां प्रतिनियमो व्यवस्था । सा खल्वियं सर्वशरीरेष्वेकस्मिन् पुरुषे नोपपद्यते । तदा खल्वेकस्मिन् पुरुषे जायमाने सर्वे जायेरन्, म्रियमाणे च म्रियेरन्, अन्धादौ चैकस्मिन् सर्व एव अन्धादयो, विचित्ते चैकस्मिन् सर्व एव विचित्ताः स्युरित्यव्यवस्था स्यात् । प्रतिक्षेत्रं तु पुरुषभेदे भवति व्यवस्था । न च 'एकस्यापि पुरुषस्य देहोपादानभेदाद्व्यवस्था' इति युक्तम्, पाणिस्तनाद्युपाधिभेदेनापि जन्ममरणादिव्यवस्थाप्रसङ्गात् । न हि पाणौ वृक्णे जाते वा स्तनादौ महत्यवयवे युवतिर्मृता जाता वा भवतीति ॥

इतश्च प्रतिक्षेत्रं पुरुषभेद इत्याह—"अयुगपत्प्रवृत्तेश्च" इति । प्रवृत्तिः प्रयत्नलक्षणा यद्यप्यन्तःकरणवर्तिनी, तथा ऽपि पुरुषे उपचर्यते । तथा च तस्मिन्नेकत्र शरीरे प्रयतमाने, स एव सर्वशरीरेष्वेक इति सर्वत्र प्रयतेत, ततश्च सर्वाण्येव शरीराणि युगपच्चालयेत् । नानात्वे तु नायं दोष इति ॥

(१२८) पुरुषाणामयुगपत्प्रवृत्तेरिति द्वितीयम् (२) ॥

इतश्च पुरुषभेद इत्याह—"त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययाच्चैव" इति । एवकारो भिन्नक्रमः 'सिद्धम्' इत्यस्यानन्तरं द्रष्टव्यः, सिद्धमेव नासिद्धम् । त्रयो गुणास्त्रैगुण्यम्, तस्य विपर्ययो ऽन्यथात्वम् । केचित्खलु सत्त्वनिकायाः सत्त्वबहुलाः, यथोर्ध्वस्रोतसः; केचिद्रजोबहुलाः, यथा मनुष्याः; केचित्तमोबहुलाः, तथा तिर्यग्योनयः । सो ऽयमीदृशस्त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययो ऽन्यथाभावस्तेषु सत्त्वनिकायेषु न भवेत् यद्येकः पुरुषः स्यात्, पुरुषभेदे त्वयमदोष इति ॥ १८ ॥

(१२९) त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययादिति तृतीयम् (३) ॥

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(१३०) पुरुषधर्माः ॥ एवं पुरुषबहुत्वं प्रसाध्य विवेकज्ञानोपयोगितया तस्य धर्मानाह—

तस्माच्च विपर्यासात्सिद्धं साक्षित्वमस्य पुरुषस्य ।
कैवल्यम्माध्यस्थ्यं द्रष्टृत्वमकर्तृभावश्च ॥ १९ ॥

"तस्माच्च" इति । 'च' शब्दः पुरुषस्य बहुत्वेन सह धर्मान्तराणि समुच्चिनोति । 'विपर्यासादस्मात्' इत्युक्ते त्रैगुण्यविपर्ययादित्यनन्तरोक्तं सम्बध्येत; अतस्तन्निरासाय 'तस्मात्' इत्युक्तम् । अनन्तरोक्तं हि सन्निधानादिदमो विषयो, विप्रकृष्टं च तदः, इति विप्रकृष्टं त्रिगुणमविवेकीत्यादि सम्बध्यते ॥

(१३१) तस्मात्पदस्य सम्बन्धप्रदर्शनम् ॥

तस्मात्त्रिगुणादेर्यो विपर्यासः स पुरुषस्यात्रिगुणत्वं विवेकित्वमविषयत्वमसाधारणत्वं चेतनत्वमप्रसवधर्मित्वञ्च । तत्र चेतनत्वेनाविषयत्वेन च साक्षित्वद्रष्टृत्वे दर्शिते । चेतनो हि द्रष्टा भवति, नाचेतनः; साक्षी च दर्शितविषयो भवति; यस्मै प्रदर्श्यते विषयः स साक्षी, तथा हि लोकेऽर्थिप्रत्यर्थिनौ विवादविषयं साक्षिणे दर्शयतः, एवं प्रकृतिरपि स्वचरितं विषयं पुरुषाय दर्शयतीति पुरुषः साक्षी, न चाचेतनो विषयो वा शक्यो विषयं दर्शयितुम्, इति चैतन्यादविषयत्वाच्च भवति साक्षी । अत एव द्रष्टाऽपि भवति ॥

(१३२) अत्रैगुण्यादेः पुरुषस्य साक्षित्वम् द्रष्टृत्वं च ॥

अत्रैगुण्याच्चास्य कैवल्यम् । आत्यन्तिको दुःखत्रयाभावः कैवल्यम् । तच्च तस्य स्वाभाविकादेवात्रैगुण्यात् सुखदुःखमोहरहितत्वात्सिद्धम् ॥

(१३३) कैवल्यम् ॥

अत एवात्रैगुण्यान्माध्यस्थ्यम् । सुखी हि सुखेन तृप्यन् दुःखी हि दुःखं द्विषन् मध्यस्थो न भवति । तदुभयरहितस्तु मध्यस्थ इत्युदासीन इति चाख्यायते । विवेकित्वादप्रसवधर्मित्वाच्चाकर्तेति सिद्धम् ॥ १९ ॥

(१३४) माध्यस्थ्यम्, अकर्तृत्वं च ॥

स्यादेतत्—प्रमाणेन कर्तव्यमर्थमवगम्य 'चेतनोऽहं चिकीर्षन् करोमि'

(१३५) चैतन्यकर्तृत्वयोर्वैयधिकरण्योपपत्तिशङ्का॥ इति कृतिचैतन्ययोः सामानाधिकरण्यमनुभवसिद्धम्; तदेतस्मिन्मते नावकल्पते, चेतनस्याकर्तृत्वात् कर्तुश्चाचैतन्यात् इत्यत आह—

तस्मात्तत्संयोगादचेतनं चेतनावदिव लिङ्गम्।
गुणकर्तृत्वे च तथा कर्तेव भवत्युदासीनः॥ २०॥

"तस्मात्" इति। यतश्चैतन्यकर्तृत्वे भिन्नाधिकरणे युक्तितः सिद्धे, (१३६) इष्टापत्तिः। सामानाधिकरण्यज्ञानं भ्रान्तिविलसितम्॥ तस्मात् भ्रान्तिरियमित्यर्थः। 'लिङ्गम्' महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तं वक्ष्यति। भ्रान्तिबीजम् तत्संयोगः तत्सन्निधानम्। अतिरोहितार्थमन्यत्[१]॥२०॥

'तत्संयोगात्' इत्युक्तम्, न च भिन्नयोः संयोगो ऽपेक्षां विना, न (१३७) पुरुषप्रधानयोः संयोगे शङ्का॥ चेयमुपकार्योपकारकभावं विनेत्यपेक्षाहेतुमुपकारमाह—

पुरुषस्य दर्शनार्थं कैवल्यार्थं तथा प्रधानस्य।
पङ्ग्वन्धवदुभयोरपि संयोगस्तत्कृतः सर्गः॥ २१॥

"पुरुषस्य" इति। प्रधानस्येति कर्मणि षष्ठी। प्रधानस्य सर्वकारणस्य यद्दर्शनं पुरुषेण तदर्थम्। (१३८) प्रधानस्य पुरुषापेक्षा–भोक्त्रपेक्षा॥ तदनेन भोग्यता प्रधानस्य दर्शिता। ततश्च भोग्यं प्रधानं भोक्तारमन्तरेण न सम्भवतीति युक्ता ऽस्य भोक्त्रपेक्षा॥

पुरुषस्यापेक्षां दर्शयति–"पुरुषस्य कैवल्यार्थम्" इति। तथा हि भोग्येन (१३९) कैवल्यार्थं पुरुषस्य प्रधानापेक्षा॥ प्रधानेन सम्भिन्नः पुरुषस्तद्गतं दुःखत्रयं स्वात्मन्यभिमन्यमानः कैवल्यम् प्रार्थयते। तच्च सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताख्यातिनिबन्धनम्। न च सत्त्वपुरुषान्यताख्यातिः प्रधानमन्तरे-

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१ कारिकास्थाः पदार्थाः स्पष्टा एवेत्यर्थः।

णेति कैवल्यार्थम् पुरुषः प्रधानमपेक्षते । अनादित्वाच्च संयोगपरम्पराया भोगाय संयुक्तो ऽपि कैवल्याय पुनः संयुज्यत इति युक्तम् ॥

ननु भवत्वनयोः संयोगो, महदादिसर्गस्तु कुत इत्यत आह—"तत्कृतः सर्गः" इति। संयोगो हि न महदादिसर्गमन्तरेण भोगाय कैवल्याय च पर्याप्त इति संयोग एव भोगापवर्गार्थं सर्गं करोतीत्यर्थः ॥ २१ ॥

(१४०) भोगापवर्गार्थमेव महदादिसर्गस्यावश्यकत्वम् ॥

सर्गक्रममाह—

प्रकृतेर्महांस्ततो ऽहङ्कारस्तस्माद्गणश्च षोडशकः।
तस्मादपि षोडशकात्पञ्चभ्यः पञ्च भूतानि ॥ २२ ॥

"प्रकृतेः" इति। प्रकृतिरव्यक्तम्। महदहङ्कारौ वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणौ। एकादशेन्द्रियाणि वक्ष्यमाणानि, तन्मात्राणि च पञ्च, सो ऽयं षोडशसंख्यापरिमितो गणः षोडशकः। तस्मादपि षोडशकादपकृष्टेभ्यः पञ्चभ्यस्तन्मात्रेभ्यः पञ्च भूतान्याकाशादीनि ॥

(१४१) प्रकृतेर्महानित्यादि सर्गक्रमः ॥

तत्र शब्दतन्मात्रादाकाशं शब्दगुणम्, शब्दतन्मात्रसहितात् स्पर्शतन्मात्राद्वायुः शब्दस्पर्शगुणः, शब्दस्पर्शतन्मात्रसहिताद्रूपतन्मात्रात्तेजः शब्दस्पर्शरूपगुणम्, शब्दस्पर्शरूपतन्मात्रसहिताद्रसतन्मात्रादापः शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगुणाः, शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसतन्मात्रसहिताद्गन्धतन्मात्राच्छब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धगुणा पृथिवी, जायत इत्यर्थः ॥ २२ ॥

(१४२) तन्मात्रेभ्यो गुणक्रमेण भूतसर्गः ॥

अव्यक्तं सामान्यतो लक्षितम् "तद्विपरीतमव्यक्तम्" (कारिका १०) इत्यनेन; विशेषतश्च "सत्त्वं लघु प्रकाशकम्" (कारिका १३) इत्यनेन। व्यक्तमपि सामा-

(१४३) बुद्धिलक्षणप्रस्तावः ॥

न्यतो लक्षितम् "हेतुमत्" (कारिका १०) इत्यादिना। सम्प्रति विवेकज्ञानोपयोगितया व्यक्तविशेषं बुद्धिं लक्षयति—

अध्यवसायो बुद्धिर्धर्मो ज्ञानं विराग ऐश्वर्यम्।
सात्त्विकमेतद्रूपं तामसमस्माद्विपर्यस्तम्॥ २३॥

"अध्यवसाय" इति। 'अध्यवसायो बुद्धिः' क्रियाक्रियावतोरभेदविवक्षया। सर्वो व्यवहर्ता ऽऽलोच्य मत्वा ऽहमत्राधिकृत इत्यभिमत्य कर्तव्यमेतन्मयेत्यध्यवस्यति, ततश्च प्रवर्तत इति लोकसिद्धम्। तत्र यो ऽयं कर्तव्यमिति विनिश्चयश्चितिसन्निधानादापन्नचैतन्याया बुद्धेः सो ऽध्यवसायः, बुद्धेरसाधारणो व्यापारः; तदभेदा बुद्धिः। स च बुद्धेर्लक्षणम् समानासमानजातीयव्यवच्छेदकत्वात्॥

(१४४) बुद्धेर्लक्षणम् अध्यवसाय इति॥

तदेवं बुद्धिं लक्षयित्वा विवेकज्ञानोपयोगिनस्तस्या धर्मान्सात्त्विकतामसानाह—"धर्मो ज्ञानं विराग ऐश्वर्यम् सात्त्विकमेतद्रूपं, तामसमस्माद्विपर्यस्तम्" इति। धर्मो ऽभ्युदयनिःश्रेयसहेतुः, तत्र यागदानाद्यनुष्ठानजनितो धर्मो ऽभ्युदयहेतुः, अष्टाङ्गयोगानुष्ठानजनितश्च निःश्रेयसहेतुः। गुणपुरुषान्यताख्यातिर्ज्ञानम्। विरागो वैराग्यम् रागाभावः॥

(१४५) बुद्धेः सात्त्विका धर्माः धर्मज्ञानविरागैश्वर्याभिधानाः। तत्र धर्मज्ञानवैराग्याणां निरूपणम्॥

तस्य—यतमानसंज्ञा व्यतिरेकसंज्ञा एकेन्द्रियसंज्ञा वशीकारसंज्ञा—इति चतस्रः संज्ञाः। रागादयः कषायाश्चित्तवर्तिनः, तैरिन्द्रियाणि यथास्वं विषयेषु प्रवर्त्यन्ते। तन्मा ऽत्र प्रवर्तिषत विषयेष्विन्द्रियाणीति तत्परिपाचनायारम्भः प्रयत्नो यतमानसंज्ञा। परिपाचने चानुष्ठीयमाने केचित्कषायाः पक्काः, पक्ष्यन्ते च केचित्, तत्रैवं पूर्वापरीभावे सति पक्ष्यमाणेभ्यः कषायेभ्यः पक्कानां व्यतिरेकेणावधारणं व्यतिरेकसंज्ञा। इन्द्रियप्रवृत्त्यसमर्थतया

(१४६) विरागस्य यतमानव्यतिरेकैकेन्द्रियवशीकाररूपाश्चतस्रः संज्ञाः॥

पक्कानामौत्सुक्यमात्रेण मनसि व्यवस्थापनमेकेन्द्रियसंज्ञा। औत्सुक्यमात्रस्यापि निवृत्तिरुपस्थितेष्वापि दृष्टानुश्रविकविषयेषु, या संज्ञात्रयात् पराचीना सा वशीकारसंज्ञा। यामत्रभगवान् पतञ्जलिर्वर्णयाञ्चकार—"दृष्टानुश्रविकविषयवितृष्णस्य वशीकारसंज्ञा वैराग्यम्" इति [योगसूत्र–१।१५]। सो ऽयं बुद्धिधर्मो विराग इति॥

ऐश्वर्यमपि बुद्धिधर्मो, यतो ऽणिमादिप्रादुर्भावः। (१) अत्राणिमा ऽणुभावो, यतः शिलामपि प्रविशति। (२) लघिमा लघुभावः, यतः सूर्यमरीचीनालम्ब्य सूर्यलोकं याति। (३) गरिमा गुरुभावः, यतो गुरुर्भवति। (४) महिमा महतो भावः, यतो महान् भवति। (५) प्राप्तिः, यतो ऽङ्गुल्यग्रेण स्पृशति चन्द्रमसम्। (६) प्राकाम्यमिच्छानभिघातो यतो, भूमावुन्मज्जति निमज्जति च यथोदके। (७) वशित्वम्, यतो भूतभौतिकं वशीभवत्यवश्यम्। ईशित्वम्, यतो भूतभौतिकानां प्रभवस्थितिमीष्टे। (८) यच्च कामावसायित्वम् सा सत्यसङ्कल्पता, येन यथाऽस्य सङ्कल्पो भवति भूतेषु तथैव भूतानि भवन्ति। अन्येषां मनुष्याणां निश्चयाः निश्चेतव्यमनुविधीयन्ते, योगिनस्तु निश्चेतव्याः पदार्थाः निश्चयम्।

(१४७) ऐश्वर्यनिरूपणे अष्टसिद्धिनिरूपणम्॥

इति चत्वारः सात्त्विका बुद्धिधर्माः॥

(१४८) बुद्धेस्तामसा धर्मा अधर्मादयः॥

तामसास्तु तद्विपरीता बुद्धिधर्माः। अधर्माज्ञानावैराग्यानैश्वर्याभिधानाश्चत्वार इत्यर्थः॥ २३॥

अहङ्कारस्य लक्षणमाह—

अभिमानो ऽहङ्कारः, तस्माद्द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः।
एकादशकश्च गणस्तन्मात्रपञ्चकश्चैव॥ २४॥

"अभिमान" इति। 'अभिमानो ऽहङ्कारः'। यत् खल्वालोचितम्मतं च तत्र 'अहमधिकृतः', 'शक्तः खल्वहमत्र', 'मदर्था एवामी विषयाः', 'मत्तो नान्यो ऽत्रा-

(१४९) अहङ्कारस्य लक्षणम्॥

धिकृतः कश्चिदस्ति', 'अतो ऽहमस्मि' इति यो ऽभिमानः सो ऽसाधारणव्यापारत्वादहङ्कारः । तमुपजीव्य हि बुद्धिरध्यवस्यति–'कर्तव्यमेतन्मया' इति निश्चयं करोति ॥

(१५०) अहङ्कारस्य कार्यभेदाः ॥

तस्य कार्यभेदमाह—"तस्माद्द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः" इति । प्रकारद्वयमाह–"एकादशकश्च गणः" इन्द्रियाह्वः, तन्मात्रपञ्चकश्चैव । द्विविध एव सर्गो ऽहङ्कारात् न त्वन्य इति 'एव'–कारेणावधारयति ॥ २४ ॥

स्यादेतत्–अहङ्कारादेकरूपात्कारणात्कथं जडप्रकाशकौ गणौ विलक्षणौ भवत इत्यत आह—

सात्त्विक एकादशकः प्रवर्तते वैकृतादहङ्कारात् ।
भूतादेस्तन्मात्रः स तामसः, तैजसादुभयम् ॥ २५ ॥

(१५१) एकरूपस्याप्यहङ्कारस्य गुणभेदाद्द्विकारभेदाः-सत्त्वादिन्द्रियगणः, तामसात्तन्मात्रगणः॥

"सात्त्विक" इति । प्रकाशलाघवाभ्यामेकादशक इन्द्रियगणः सात्त्विको वैकृतादहङ्कारात्प्रवर्तते । भूतादेस्त्वहङ्कारात्तामसात्तन्मात्रो गणः प्रवर्तते । कस्मात्? यतः 'सतामसः' एतदुक्तम्भवति 'यद्यप्येको ऽहङ्कारस्तथा ऽपि गुणभेदोद्भवाभिभवाभ्यां भिन्नं कार्यं करोतीति'॥

(१५२) सत्त्वतमसोः प्रवर्तकतया रजसः सार्थकता ॥

ननु यदि सत्त्वतमोभ्यामेव सर्वं कार्यं जन्यते तदा कृतमकिञ्चित्करेण रजसेत्यत आह–"तैजसादुभयम्" इति । तैजसाद्राजसादुभयं गणद्वयं भवति । यद्यपि रजसो न कार्यान्तरमस्ति तथा ऽपि सत्त्वतमसी स्वयमक्रिये समर्थे अपि न स्वस्वकार्यं कुरुतः; रजस्तु चलतया ते यदा चालयति तदा स्वकार्यं कुरुत इति । तदुभयस्मिन्नपि कार्ये सत्त्वतमसोः क्रियोत्पादनद्वारेणास्ति रजसः कारणत्वमिति न व्यर्थं रज इति ॥ २५ ॥

सात्त्विकमेकादशमाख्यातुं बाह्येन्द्रियदशकं तावदाह—

बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि चक्षुःश्रोत्रघ्राणरसनत्वगाख्यानि।
वाक्पाणिपादपायूपस्थानि कर्मेन्द्रियाण्याहुः॥ २६॥

"बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि" इति। सात्त्विकाहङ्कारोपादानत्वमिन्द्रियत्वम्। तच्च द्विविधम् बुद्धीन्द्रियं कर्मेन्द्रियं च। उभयमप्येतदिन्द्रस्यात्मनश्चिह्नत्वादिन्द्रियमुच्यते। तानि च स्वसंज्ञाभिश्चक्षुरादिभिरुक्तानि। तत्र रूपग्रहणलिङ्गं चक्षुः, शब्दग्रहणलिङ्गं श्रोत्रम्, गन्धग्रहणलिङ्गं घ्राणम्, रसग्रहणलिङ्गं रसनम्, स्पर्शग्रहणलिङ्गं त्वक्, इति ज्ञानेन्द्रियाणां संज्ञा। एवं वागादीनां कार्यं वक्ष्यति (कारिका २८)॥ २६॥

(१५३) बाह्येन्द्रियदशकम् इन्द्रियलक्षणम् पदव्युत्पत्तिश्च॥

एकादशमिन्द्रियमाह—

उभयात्मकमत्र मनः, सङ्कल्पकमिन्द्रियं च साधर्म्यात्।
गुणपरिणामविशेषान्नानात्वं बाह्यभेदाश्च॥ २७॥

"उभयात्मकम्" इति। एकादशस्विन्द्रियेषु मध्ये मन उभयात्मकम्, बुद्धीन्द्रियं कर्मेन्द्रियं च, चक्षुरादीनां वागादीनां च मनोऽधिष्ठितानामेव स्वस्वविषयेषु प्रवृत्तेः॥

(१५४) मनसो बुद्धिकर्मोभयात्मकत्वसाधनम्॥

तदसाधारणेन रूपेण लक्षयति—"सङ्कल्पकमत्र मनः" इति। सङ्कल्पेन रूपेण मनो लक्ष्यते। 'आलोचितमिन्द्रियेण वस्त्विदम्' इति सम्मुग्धम् 'इदमेवम्, नैवम्' इति सम्यक्कल्पयति विशेषणविशेष्यभावेन विवेचयतीति यावत्। यदाहुः—

(१५५) मनसो लक्षणम्-सङ्कल्पकत्वम् लक्षणसमन्वयश्च॥

'सम्मुग्धं वस्तुमात्रं तु प्राग्गृह्णन्त्यविकल्पितम्।
तत् सामान्यविशेषाभ्यां कल्पयन्ति मनीषिणः'॥ इति॥

तथा हि, अस्ति ह्यालोचितज्ञानं प्रथमन्निर्विकल्पकम् बालमूकादिवि-

ज्ञानसदृशम् मुग्धवस्तुजमिति । ततः परं पुनर्वस्तु धर्मैर्जात्यादिभिर्यया बुद्ध्या ऽवसीयते सा ऽपि प्रत्यक्षत्वेन सम्मता। सो ऽयं सङ्कल्पलक्षणो व्यापारो मनसः समानासमानजातीयाभ्यां व्यवच्छिन्दन् मनो लक्षयति ॥

स्यादेतत्—असाधारणव्यापारयोगिनौ यथा महदहङ्कारौ नेन्द्रियम्, एवम्मनो ऽप्यसाधारणव्यापारयोगि नेन्द्रियं भवितुमर्हतीत्यत आह—"इन्द्रियं च" इति। कुतः?—"साधर्म्यात्"। इन्द्रियान्तरैः सात्त्विकाहङ्कारोपादानत्वं च साधर्म्यम् नत्विन्द्रलिङ्गत्वम्, महदहङ्कारयोरप्यात्मलिङ्गत्वेनेन्द्रियत्वप्रसङ्गात्, तस्माद्व्युत्पत्तिमात्रमिन्द्रलिङ्गत्वम् न तु प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तम् ॥

(१५६) मनस इन्द्रियत्वसाधनम्–इन्द्रियैः सह सात्त्विकाहङ्कारोपादानत्वरूपसाधर्म्यात् ॥

अथ कथं सात्त्विकाहङ्कारादेकस्मादेकादशेन्द्रियाणीत्यत आह—"गुणपरिणामविशेषात् नानात्वं बाह्यभेदाश्च" इति शब्दाद्युपभोगसम्प्रवर्तकादृष्टसहकारिभेदात्कार्यभेदः। अदृष्टभेदो ऽपि गुणपरिणाम एव।

(१५७) एकस्याहङ्कारस्य गुणपरिणामविशेषात्कार्यभेदः ॥

'बाह्यभेदाश्च' इति दृष्टान्तार्थम्—यथा बाह्यभेदास्तथैतदपीत्यर्थः ॥ २७ ॥

(१५८) बाह्यभेदाश्चेति दृष्टान्तार्थम् ॥

तदेवमेकादशेन्द्रियाणि स्वरूपत उक्त्वा दशानामप्यसाधारणीर्वृत्तीराह—

(१५९) दशेन्द्रियवृत्तिकथनम् ॥

शब्दादिषु पञ्चानामालोचनमात्रमिष्यते वृत्तिः।
वचनादानविहरणोत्सर्गानन्दाश्च पञ्चानाम् ॥ २८ ॥

बुद्धीन्द्रियाणां सम्मुग्धवस्तुदर्शनमालोचनमुक्तम्। "वचनादानविहरणोत्सर्गानन्दाश्च पञ्चानाम्" कर्मेन्द्रियाणाम्। कण्ठताल्वादिस्थानमिन्द्रियं वाक्, तस्या वृत्तिर्वचनम्, ज्ञानेन्द्रियाणां वृत्तयः स्पष्टाः ॥ २८ ॥

अन्तःकरणत्रयस्य वृत्तिमाह—

स्वालक्षण्यं वृत्तिस्त्रयस्य सैषा भवत्यसामान्या।
सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवः पञ्च ॥ २९ ॥

"स्वालक्षण्यम्" इति। स्वालक्षण्यं वृत्तिस्त्रयस्य। स्वमसाधारणं लक्षणं येषां तानि स्वलक्षणानि महदहङ्कारमनांसि, तेषां भावः स्वालक्षण्यम्, तच्च स्वानि स्वानि लक्षणान्येव। तद्यथा—महतो ऽध्यवसायो ऽहङ्कारस्याभिमानः सङ्कल्पो मनसो वृत्तिर्व्यापारः ॥

(१६०) अन्तःकरणत्रयस्य स्वस्वलक्षणरूपमसाधरणंवृत्तित्रयम् ॥

वृत्तिद्वैविध्यं साधारणासाधारणत्वाभ्यामाह—"सैषा भवत्यसामान्या" असाधारणी। "सामान्यकरणवृत्तिः प्राणाद्या वायवःपञ्च"। सामान्या चासौ करणवृत्तिश्चेति। त्रयाणामपि करणानां पञ्च वायवो जीवनं वृत्तिः, तद्भावे भावात् तदभावे चाभावात्। तत्र प्राणो नासाग्रहृन्नाभिपादाङ्गुष्ठवृत्तिः, अपानः कृकाटिकापृष्ठपादपायूपस्थपार्श्ववृत्तिः, समानो हृन्नाभिसर्वसन्धिवृत्तिः, उदानो हृत्कण्ठतालुमूर्धभ्रूमध्यवृत्तिः, व्यानस्त्वग्वृत्तिरिति पञ्च वायवः ॥ २९ ॥

(१६१) पञ्चवायुरूपा साधारणी वृत्तिः ॥

चतुर्विधकरणस्यास्यासाधारणीषु वृत्तिषु क्रमाक्रमौ सप्रकारावाह—

युगपच्चतुष्टयस्य तु वृत्तिः क्रमश्च तस्य निर्दिष्टा।
दृष्टे तथा ऽप्यदृष्टे त्रयस्य तत्पूर्विका वृत्तिः ॥ ३० ॥

"युगपत्" इति, दृष्टे यथा—यदा सन्तमसान्धकारे विद्युत्सम्पातमात्राद्व्याघ्रमभिमुखमतिसन्निहितं पश्यति तदा खल्वस्यालोचनसङ्कल्पाभिमानाध्यवसायाः युगपदेव प्रादुर्भवन्ति, यतस्तत उत्प्लुत्य तत्स्थानादेकपद अपसरति ॥

(१६२) चतुर्विधकरणस्य प्रत्यक्षे युगपद्वृत्तिः॥

"क्रमशश्च" यदा मन्दालोके प्रथमन्तावद्वस्तुमात्रं सम्मुग्धमालोचयाति, अथ प्रणिहितमनाः कर्णान्ताकृष्टसशरसिञ्जिनी-

(१६३) क्रमशश्च ॥

मण्डलीकृतकोदण्डः प्रचण्डतरः पाटच्चरो ऽयमिति निश्चिनोति, अथ च माम्प्रत्येतीत्यभिमन्यते, अथाध्यवस्यत्यपसरामीतः स्थानादिति ॥

परोऽक्षे त्वन्तःकरणत्रयस्य बाह्येन्द्रियवर्जं वृत्तिरित्याह—"अदृष्टे त्रयस्य तत्पूर्विका वृत्तिः" इति । अन्तःकरणत्रयस्य युगपत्क्रमेण वृत्तिर्दृष्टपूर्विकेति । अनुमानागमस्मृतयो हि परोक्षे ऽर्थे दर्शनपूर्वाः प्रवर्तन्ते नान्यथा । यथा दृष्टे तथा ऽदृष्टे ऽपीति योजना ॥ ३० ॥

(१६४) अन्तःकरणत्रयस्य परोक्षे वृत्तिद्वयम् दृष्टपूर्वकमेव ॥

स्यादेतत्—चतुर्णां त्रयाणां वा वृत्तयो न तावन्मात्राधीनाः, तेषां सदातनत्वेन वृत्तीनां सदोत्पादप्रसङ्गात्, आकस्मिकत्वे तु वृत्तिसङ्करप्रसङ्गो नियमहेतोरभावादित्यत आह—

(१६५) करणानां स्वतन्त्रत्वे दोषाः ॥

स्वां स्वां प्रतिपद्यन्ते परस्पराकूतहेतुकां वृत्तिम् ।
पुरुषार्थ एव हेतुर्न केनचित्कार्यते करणम् ॥ ३१ ॥

"स्वाम्" इति । करणानीति शेषः । यथा हि बहवः पुरुषाः शाक्तीकयाष्टीकधानुष्ककार्पाणिकाः कृतसङ्केताः परावस्कन्दनाय प्रवृत्ताः, तत्रान्यतमस्याकूतमवगम्यान्यतमः प्रवर्तते, प्रवर्तमानस्तु शाक्तीकः शक्तिमेवादत्ते नतु यष्ट्यादिकम्, एवं याष्टीको ऽपि यष्टिमेव, न शक्त्यादिकम् । तथा ऽन्यतमस्य १करणस्याकूतात् स्वकार्यकरणाभिमुख्यादन्यतमं करणं प्रवर्तते । तत्प्रवृत्तेश्च हेतुत्वान्न वृत्तिसङ्करप्रसङ्ग इ युक्तम्—"स्वां स्वां प्रतिपद्यन्ते" इति ॥

(१६६) तन्निराकरणम्—परस्परसापेक्षाण्येव करणानि स्वस्ववृत्तिषु ॥

स्यादेतत्—याष्टीकादयश्चेतनत्वात् परस्पराकूतमवगम्य प्रवर्तन्त इति

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१ मनस्सहकृतबाह्येन्द्रियाणाम् । अन्तःकरणत्रयाणां वा ।

(१६७) करणानामचेतनत्वेऽपि पुरुषार्थस्यैव प्रवर्तकत्वम् ॥

युक्तम् । करणानि त्वचेतनानि, तस्मान्नैवं प्रवर्तितुमुत्सहन्ते । तेनैषामधिष्ठात्रा करणानां स्वरूपसामर्थ्योपयोगाभिज्ञेन भवितव्यमित्यत आह— "पुरुषार्थ एव हेतुः, न केनचित्कार्यते करणम्" इति । भोगापवर्गलक्षणः पुरुषार्थ एवानागतावस्थः प्रवर्तयति करणानि, कृतमत्र तत्स्वरूपाभिज्ञेन कर्त्रा । एतच्च "वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तम्" (कारिका ५७) इत्यत्रोपपादयिष्यते ॥ ३१ ॥

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(१६८) करणविभागः ॥

"न केनचित् कार्यते करणम्" इत्युक्तम् । तत्र करणं विभजते—

करणं त्रयोदशविधम्, तदाहरणधारणप्रकाशकरम् ।
कार्यं च तस्य दशधाऽऽहार्यं धार्यं प्रकाश्यं च ॥ ३२ ॥

"करणं त्रयोदशविधम्" इति । इन्द्रियाण्येकादश बुद्धिरहङ्कारश्चेति

(१६९) त्रयोदशविधकरणपरिगणनम् ॥

त्रयोदशप्रकारं करणम् । कारकविशेषः करणम् । न च व्यापारावेशं विना कारकत्वमिति व्यापारावेशमाह—"तदाहरणधारणप्रकाशकरम्" इति यथायथम्[1] । तत्र कर्मेन्द्रियाणि वागादीन्याहरन्ति, यथास्वमुपाददते, स्वव्यापारेण व्याप्नुवन्तीति यावत् । बुद्ध्यहङ्कारमनांसि तु स्ववृत्त्या प्राणादिलक्षणया धारयन्ति बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि प्रकाशयन्ति ॥

आहरणधारणादिक्रियाणां सकर्मकतया किं कर्म कतिविधं चेत्यत

(१७०) करणव्यापारपरिगणनम् ॥

आह—"कार्यं च तस्य" इति । कार्यं तस्य त्रयोदशविधस्य करणस्य दशधा, आहार्यं धार्यं प्रकाश्यं च । आहार्यं व्याप्यम् । कर्मेन्द्रियाणां वचनादानविहरणोत्सर्गानन्दाः यथायथं व्याप्याः; ते च यथायथं दिव्यादिव्यतया दश—इत्याहार्यं

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१ यथाक्रममित्यर्थः ।

दशधा । एवं धार्यमप्यन्तःकरणत्रयस्य प्राणादिलक्षणया वृत्त्या शरीरम्, तच्च पार्थिवादिपाञ्चभौतिकम् । शब्दादीनां पञ्चानां समूहः पृथिवी, ते च पञ्च दिव्यादिव्यतया दशेति धार्यमपि दशधा[१]। एवं बुद्धीन्द्रियाणां शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्धा यथायथं व्याप्या; ते च यथायथं दिव्यादिव्यतया दशेति प्रकाश्यमपि दशधेति ॥ ३२ ॥

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(१७१) त्रयोदशविधकरणे ऽवान्तरविभागः- बाह्यान्तरभेदात् ॥

त्रयोदशविधकरणे ऽवान्तरविभागं करोति–

अन्तःकरणं त्रिविधं दशधा बाह्यं त्रयस्य विषयाख्यम् ।
साम्प्रतकालं बाह्यं त्रिकालमाभ्यन्तरं करणम् ॥ ३३ ॥

(१७२) अन्तःकरणस्य त्रैविध्यम् ॥

"अन्तःकरणम्" इति । अन्तःकरणं त्रिविधम्–'बुद्धिरहङ्कारो मन' इति; शरीराभ्यन्तरवर्तित्वादन्तःकरणम् ॥

"दशधा" बाह्यकरणम् "त्रयस्य" अन्तःकरणस्य "विषयाख्यम्" ।

(१७३) बाह्यकरणानां दशधात्वम् ॥

विषयमाख्याति त्रिषयसङ्कल्पाभिमानाध्यवसायेषु कर्तव्येषु द्वारीभवति । तत्र बुद्धीन्द्रियाण्यालोचनेन, कर्मेन्द्रियाणि तु यथास्वं व्यापारेण ॥

बाह्यान्तरयोः करणयोर्विशेषान्तरमाह–"साम्प्रतकालम्" इति । वर्त-

(१७४) बाह्यान्तरकरणयोर्भेदः–बाह्यकरणानां वर्तमानकालीनत्वं, अन्तःकरणानां त्रिकालीनत्वम् ॥

मानकालं बाह्यमिन्द्रियम् । वर्तमानसमीपमनागतमतीतमपि वर्तमानम्; अतो वागपि वर्तमानकालविषया भवति । "त्रिकालमाभ्यन्तरं करणम्" इति । तद्यथा–नदीपूरभेदादभूद्वृष्टिः; अस्ति

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१ द्वारीभवन्तीति शेषः ।

धूमादग्निरिह नगनिकुञ्जे, असत्युपघातके पिपीलिकाण्डसञ्चरणाद्भविष्यति वृष्टिरिति, तदनुरूपाश्च सङ्कल्पाभिमानाध्यवसाया भवन्ति ॥

(१७५) सांख्यमते कालस्य न तत्त्वान्तरत्वम्॥

कालश्च वैशेषिकाभिमत एको न अनागतादिव्यवहारभेदं प्रवर्तयितुमर्हति । तस्मादयं यैरुपाधिभेदैरनागतादिभेदं प्रतिपद्यते सन्तु त एवोपायाः, ये ऽनागतादिव्यवहारहेतवः, कृतमत्रान्तर्गडुना कालेनेति सांख्याचार्याः, तस्मान्न कालरूपतत्त्वान्तराभ्युपगम इति ॥ ३३ ॥

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(१७६) बाह्येन्द्रियविषयविवेचनम् ॥

साम्प्रतकालानां बाह्येन्द्रियाणां विषयं विवेचयति—

बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि तेषां पञ्च विशेषाविशेषविषयाणि ।
वाग्भवति शब्दविषया शेषाणि तु पञ्चविषयाणि ॥ ३४ ॥

(१७७) बुद्धीन्द्रियाणां विषयाः स्थूलसूक्ष्मरूपाः॥

"बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि" इति । "बुद्धीन्द्रियाणि" "तेषां" दशानामिन्द्रियाणाम्मध्ये "पञ्च," "विशेषाविशेषविषयाणि" विशेषाः स्थूलाः शब्दादयः शान्तघोरमूढरूपाः पृथिव्यादिरूपाः, अविशेषास्तन्मात्राणि सूक्ष्माः शब्दादयः, मात्रग्रहणेन स्थूलभूतमपाकरोति । विशेषाश्च अविशेषाश्च विशेषाविशेषाः, त एव विषया येषां बुद्धीन्द्रियाणां तानि तथोक्तानि । तत्रोर्ध्वस्रोतसां योगिनाञ्च श्रोत्रं शब्दतन्मात्रविषयं स्थूलशब्दविषयं च, अस्मदादीनां तु स्थूलशब्दविषयमेव । एवन्तेषां त्वक् स्थूलसूक्ष्मस्पर्शविषया, अस्मदादीनां तु स्थूलस्पर्शविषयैव । एवञ्चक्षुरादयो ऽपि तेषामस्मदादीनां च रूपादिषु सूक्ष्मस्थूलेषु द्रष्टव्याः ॥

एवं कर्मेन्द्रियेषु मध्ये "वाग्भवति शब्दविषया" स्थूलशब्दविषया, तद्धे-

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१ तन्मात्रपदे । २ 'भूतभाविनावपाकरोति' इति पाठान्तरम् ।

(१७८) कर्मेन्द्रियाणां विषयाः ॥ तुत्वात् । नतु शब्दतन्मात्रस्य हेतुस्तस्याहङ्कारिकत्वेन वागिन्द्रियेण सहैककारणकत्वात् । "शेषाणि तु" चत्वारि पायूपस्थपाणिपादाख्यानि "पञ्चविषयाणि" पाण्याद्याहार्याणां घटादीनां पञ्चशब्दाद्यात्मकत्वादिति ॥ ३४ ॥

साम्प्रतं त्रयोदशसु करणेषु केषाञ्चित्प्रधानभावं सहेतुकमाह—

सान्तःकरणा बुद्धिः सर्वं विषयमवगाहते यस्मात् ।
तस्मात्त्रिविधं करणं द्वारि, द्वाराणि शेषाणि ॥ ३५ ॥

"सान्तःकरणा" इति । "द्वारि" प्रधानम् । "द्वाराणि" करणानि, बाह्येन्द्रियाणि द्वाराणि । तैरुपनीतं सर्वं विषयं समनोऽहङ्कारा बुद्धिः यस्मादवगाहतेऽध्यवस्यति तस्माद्बाह्येन्द्रियाणि द्वाराणि, द्वारवती च सान्तःकरणा बुद्धिरिति ॥ ३५ ॥

(१७९) सर्वविषकरणेषु अन्तःकरणानां प्राधान्यम् ॥

न केवलं बाह्यानीन्द्रियाण्यपेक्ष्य प्रधानं बुद्धिः, अपि तु ये ऽप्यहङ्कारमनसी द्वारिणी ते अप्यपेक्ष्य बुद्धिः प्रधानमित्याह—

एते प्रदीपकल्पाः परस्परविलक्षणा गुणविशेषाः ।
कृत्स्नं पुरुषस्यार्थं प्रकाश्य बुद्धौ प्रयच्छन्ति ॥ ३६ ॥

"एते" इति । यथा हि ग्रामाध्यक्षः कौटुम्बिकेभ्यः करमादाय विषयाध्यक्षाय प्रयच्छति, विषयाध्यक्षश्च सर्वाध्यक्षाय, स च भूपतये; तथा बाह्येन्द्रियाण्यालोच्य मनसे समर्पयन्ति, मनश्च सङ्कल्प्याहङ्काराय, अहङ्कारश्चाभिमत्य बुद्धौ सर्वाध्यक्षभूतायां,—तदिदमुक्तम्—"पुरुषस्यार्थं प्रकाश्य बुद्धौ प्रयच्छन्ति" इति ॥

(१८०) अन्तःकरणेष्वपि बुद्धेः प्राधान्यम् ॥

बाह्येन्द्रियमनोऽहङ्काराश्च "गुणविशेषाः" गुणानां सत्त्वरजस्तमसां

(१८०) परस्परविरोधशीलानामपि गुणानां पुरुषार्थरूप एककार्ये प्रवृत्तिः प्रदीपवत् ॥

विकाराः, ते तु परस्परविरोधशीला अपि पुरुषार्थेन भोगापवर्गरूपेणैकवाक्यतान्नीताः, यथा वर्तितैलवह्नयः सन्तमसापनयेन रूपप्रकाशाय मिलिताः प्रदीपः, एवमेते गुणविशेषाः इति योजना॥३६॥

कस्मात्पुनर्बुद्धौ प्रयच्छन्ति, न तु बुद्धिरहङ्काराय द्वारिणे मनसे चेत्यत आह—

सर्वं प्रत्युपभोगं यस्मात्पुरुषस्य साधयति बुद्धिः।
सैव च विशिनष्टि पुनः प्रधानपुरुषान्तरं सूक्ष्मम् ॥ ३७ ॥

"सर्वम्" इति । पुरुषार्थस्य प्रयोजकत्वात् तस्य यत्साक्षात्साधनं तत्

(१८२) बुद्धेः प्राधान्यसाधनम्—साक्षात्पुरुषार्थसाधनत्वात् ॥

प्रधानम् । बुद्धिश्चास्य साक्षात्साधनम्, तस्मात्सैव प्रधानम् । यथा सर्वाध्यक्षः साक्षाद्राजार्थसाधनतया प्रधानमितरे तु ग्रामाध्यक्षादयस्तम्प्रति गुणभूताः । बुद्धिर्हि पुरुषसन्निधानात् तच्छायापत्त्या तद्रूपेव सर्वविषयोपभोगं पुरुषस्य साधयति । सुखदुःखानुभवो हि भोगः, स च बुद्धौ, बुद्धिश्च पुरुषरूपेवेति, सा च पुरुषमुपभोजयति । यथा ऽर्थालोचनसङ्कल्पाभिमानाश्च तत्तद्रूपपरिणामेन बुद्धावुपसङ्क्रान्ताः, तथेन्द्रियव्यापारा अपि बुद्धेरेव स्वव्यापारेणाध्यवसायेन सहैकव्यापारीभवन्ति, यथा स्वसैन्येन सह ग्रामाध्यक्षादिसैन्यं सर्वाध्यक्षस्य भवति। "सर्वं" शब्दादिकं "प्रति" य "उपभोगः" "पुरुषस्य" तं साधयति ॥

ननु पुरुषस्य सर्वविषयोपभोगसम्पादिका यदि बुद्धिः तर्ह्यनिर्मोक्ष

(१८३) पुरुषार्थस्यापवर्गस्य कृतकत्वादपि नानित्यत्वम्—करणस्यात्रे बाधनार्थत्वात् ॥

इत्यत आह—पश्चात् "प्रधानपुरुषयोरन्तरं" विशेषं "विशिनष्टि" करोति—यथौदनपाक पचतीति,—करणं च प्रतिपादनम् । ननु प्रधानपुरुषयोरन्तरस्य कृतकत्वादनित्यत्वम्, तत्कृतस्य

मोक्षस्यानित्यत्वं स्यादित्यत आह—"विशिनष्टि"–'प्रधानं सविकार-मन्यदहमन्य' इति विद्यमानमेवान्तरमविवेकेनाविद्यमानमिव बुद्धिर्बोधयति, न तु करोति, येनानित्यत्वमित्यर्थः । अनेनापवर्गः पुरुषार्थो दर्शितः, "सूक्ष्मम्" दुर्लक्ष्यम् तदन्तरामित्यर्थः ॥ ३७ ॥

तदेवं करणानि विभज्य विशेषाविशेषान् विभजते—

तन्मात्राण्यविशेषाः, तेभ्यो भूतानि पञ्च पञ्चभ्यः ।
एते स्मृता विशेषाः, शान्ता घोराश्च मूढाश्च ॥ ३८ ॥

"तन्मात्राणि" इति । शब्दादितन्मात्राणि सूक्ष्माणि । न चैषां शान्तत्वादिरस्ति उपभोगयोग्यो विशेष इति मात्रशब्दार्थः ॥

(१८४) अविशेष-(सूक्ष्म) कथनम् ॥

अविशेषानुक्त्वा विशेषान्वक्तुमुत्पत्तिमेषामाह–"तेभ्यो भूतानि" इति । तेभ्यस्तन्मात्रेभ्यो यथासंख्यमेकद्वित्रिचतुःपञ्चभ्यो भूतान्याकाशानलसलिलावनिरूपाणि "पञ्च" "पञ्चभ्यः" तन्मात्रेभ्यः ॥

(१८५) विशेष (स्थूल) कथनम्–तदुत्पत्तिप्रदर्शनपूर्वकम् ॥

अस्त्वेतेषामुत्पत्तिः, विशेषत्वे किमायातमित्यत आह–"एते स्मृता विशेषाः" इति । कुतः–"शान्ता घोराश्च मूढाश्च"। चकार एको हेतौ द्वितीयः समुच्चये । यस्मादाकाशादिषु स्थूलेषु सत्त्वप्रधानतया केचिच्छान्ताः सुखाः, प्रकाशा लघवः, केचिद्रजःप्रधानतया घोराः दुःखाः अनवस्थिताः, केचित्तमःप्रधानतया मूढा विषण्णा गुरवः । ते ऽमी परस्परव्यावृत्त्या ऽनुभूयमाना 'विशेषाः' इति च 'स्थूलाः' इति चोच्यन्ते । तन्मात्राणि त्वस्मदादिभिः परस्परव्यावृत्तानि नानुभूयन्ते, इत्यविशेषाः सूक्ष्मा इति चोच्यन्ते ॥ ३८ ॥

(१८६) भूतानां स्थूलत्वे हेतुकथनम् ॥

विशेषाणामवान्तरविशेषमाह—

सूक्ष्मा मातापितृजाः सहप्रभूतैस्त्रिधा विशेषाः स्युः।
सूक्ष्मास्तेषां नियता, मातापितृजा निवर्तन्ते ॥ ३९ ॥

"सूक्ष्मा" इति। "त्रिधा विशेषाः स्युः" इति, तान् विशेषप्रकारानाह—

(१८७) अवान्तरविशेषकथनम्-सूक्ष्ममातृपितृजभेदेन ॥

"सूक्ष्माः" सूक्ष्मदेहाः परिकल्पिताः, "मातापितृजाः" षाट्कौशिकाः। तत्र मातृतो लोमलोहितमांसानि, पितृतस्तु स्नाय्वस्थिमज्जान इति षट् कोशाः। प्रकृष्टानि महान्ति भूतानि "प्रभूतानि"—तैस्सह। सूक्ष्मं शरीरमेको विशेषः, मातापितृजो द्वितीयः, महाभूतानि तृतीयः; महाभूतवर्गे च घटादीनां निवेश इति ॥

(१८८) सूक्ष्ममातापितृजयोर्भेदः नित्यत्वानित्यत्वनिबन्धः ॥

सूक्ष्ममातापितृजयोर्देहयोर्विशेषमाह—"सूक्ष्मास्तेषाम्" इति। विशेषाणां मध्ये ये ते "नियताः"[1], "मातापितृजा निवर्तन्ते"[2] इति, रसान्ता वा भस्मान्ता वा विडन्ता वेति ॥३९॥

सूक्ष्मशरीरं विभजते—

पूर्वोत्पन्नमसक्तं नियतम्महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तम्।
संसरति निरुपभोगं भावैरधिवासितं लिङ्गम् ॥ ४० ॥

'पूर्वोत्पन्नम्' इति। "पूर्वोत्पन्नम्" प्रधानेनादिसर्गे प्रतिपुरुषमेकैकमुत्पादितम्। "असक्तम्" अव्याहतम् शिलामप्यनुविशति। "नियतम्" आ चादिसर्गादा च महाप्रलयादवतिष्ठते,—"महदादिसूक्ष्मपर्यन्तम्", महदहङ्कारैकादशेन्द्रियपञ्चतन्मात्रपर्यन्तम्। एषां समुदायः सूक्ष्मं शरीरम्, शान्तघोरमूढैरिन्द्रियैरन्वितत्वाद्विशेषः ॥

(१८९) सूक्ष्मशरीरोपपादनम्—तस्य लक्षणानि—(१) असक्तत्वम्—(२) नित्यत्वम् ॥

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१ नित्याः। २ अनित्याः।

नन्वस्त्वेतदेव शरीरं भोगायतनं पुरुषस्य, कृतं दृश्यमानेन पाट्कौशिकेन शरीरेणेत्यत आह—"संसरति" इति। उपात्तमुपात्तं पाट्कौशिकं शरीरं जहाति हायं हायं चोपादत्ते—कस्मात् इति "निरुपभोगम्" यतः, षाट्कौशिकं शरीरं भोगायतनं विना सूक्ष्मं शरीरं निरुपभोगं यस्मात्तस्मात्सूक्ष्मं शरीरं संसरति ॥

(१९०) (१) संसरणम् निरुपभोगत्वं च ततश्च षाट्कौशिकशरीरस्यावश्यकत्वम् ॥

ननु धर्माधर्मनिमित्तः संसारः, न च सूक्ष्मशरीरस्यास्ति तद्योगः, तत्कथं संसरतीत्यत आह—"भावैरधिवासितम्" इति। धर्माधर्मज्ञानाज्ञानवैराग्यावैराग्यैश्वर्यानैश्वर्याणि भावाः, तदन्विता बुद्धिः, तदन्वितञ्च सूक्ष्मं शरीरमिति तदपि भावैरधिवासितम्, यथा सुरभिचम्पककुसुमसम्पर्काद्वस्त्रं तदामोदवासितम्भवति। तस्माद्भावैरेवाधिवासितत्वात्संसरति ॥

(१९१) धर्माधर्मादिभावैरधिवासितत्वमूलकं तत्संसरणम् ॥

कस्मात् पुनः प्रधानमिव महाप्रलये ऽपि तच्छरीरन्न तिष्ठतीत्यत आह—"लिङ्गम्" इति। लयं गच्छतीति लिङ्गम्—हेतुमत्त्वेन चास्य लिङ्गत्वमिति भावः ॥ ४० ॥

(१९२) महाप्रलये तस्य लयं गमितत्वाल्लिङ्गत्वम् ॥

स्यादेतत्—बुद्धिरेव साहङ्कारेन्द्रिया कस्मान्न संसरति? कृतं सूक्ष्मशरीरेणाप्रामाणिकेनेत्यत आह—

चित्रं यथाश्रयमृते स्थाण्वादिभ्यो विना यथा च्छाया।
तद्वद्विना विशेषैर्न तिष्ठति निराश्रयं लिङ्गम् ॥ ४१ ॥

"चित्रम्" इति। लिङ्गनात् ज्ञापनात् बुद्ध्यादयो 'लिङ्गम्', तत् अनाश्रयन्न तिष्ठति। जन्ममरणान्तराले बुद्ध्यादयः प्रत्युत्पन्नशरीराश्रयाः,—प्रत्युत्पन्नपञ्चतन्मात्र-

(१९३) सूक्ष्मशरीरस्यावश्यकत्वप्रदर्शनम् ॥

वत्त्वे सति बुद्ध्यादित्वात्—दृश्यमानशरीरवृत्तिबुद्ध्यादिवत् । "विना विशेषैः" इति, सूक्ष्मैः शरीरैरित्यर्थः । आगमश्चात्र भवति—

"ततः सत्यवतः कायात् पाशबद्धं वशङ्गतम् ।
अङ्गुष्ठमात्रं पुरुषं निश्चकर्ष बलाद्यमः"। (महाभारत वनपर्व—अध्याय २९६.) इत्यङ्गुष्ठमात्रत्वेन सूक्ष्मशरीरत्वमुपलक्षयति । आत्मनो निष्कर्षासम्भवात् सूक्ष्ममेव शरीरम् 'पुरुषः', तदपि पुरि स्थूलशरीरे शेते इति ॥ ४१ ॥

एवं सूक्ष्मशरीरास्तित्वमुपपाद्य यथा संसरति, येन हेतुना च—तदुभयमाह—

पुरुषार्थहेतुकमिदं निमित्तनैमित्तिकप्रसङ्गेन ।
प्रकृतेर्विभुत्वयोगान्नटवद्व्यवतिष्ठते लिङ्गम् ॥ ४२ ॥

"पुरुषार्थहेतुकम्" इति। पुरुषार्थेन हेतुना प्रयुक्तम् । "निमित्तम्" धर्माधर्मादि, "नैमित्तिकम्" तेषु तेषु निकायेषु यथायथं षाट्कौशिकशरीरग्रहः, स हि धर्मादिनिमित्तप्रभवः । निमित्तञ्च नैमित्तिकञ्च—तत्र यः प्रसङ्गः प्रसक्तिस्तया "नटवद्व्यवतिष्ठते लिङ्गम्" सूक्ष्मशरीरम् । यथा हि नटस्तां तां भूमिकां विधाय परशुरामो वाऽजातशत्रुर्वा वत्सराजो वा भवति, एवन्तत्तत्स्थूलशरीरपरिग्रहणाद्देवो वा मनुष्यो वा पशुर्वा वनस्पतिर्वा भवति सूक्ष्मं शरीरमित्यर्थः ॥

(१९४) सूक्ष्मशरीरसंसरणप्रकारः ॥

कुतस्त्यः पुनरस्येदृशो महिमेत्यत आह—

"प्रकृतेर्विभुत्वयोगात्" इति। तथा च पुराणम्—

"वैश्वरूप्यात् प्रधानस्य परिणामो ऽयमद्भुत" इति ॥ ४२ ॥

(१९५) सूक्ष्मशरीरसंसरणे हेतुः—प्रकृतेर्विभुत्वम् ॥

"निमित्तनैमित्तिकप्रसङ्गेन" इत्युक्तम्—तत्र निमित्तनैमित्तिके विभजते—

सांसिद्धिकाश्च भावाः प्राकृतिका वैकृतिकाश्च धर्माद्याः ।
दृष्टाः करणाश्रयिणः कार्याश्रयिणश्च कललाद्याः ॥ ४३ ॥

"सांसिद्धिकाश्च" इति । "वैकृतिकाः" नैमित्तिकाः, पुरुषस्य जातस्यो-

(१९६) निमित्तनैमित्तिकविभागः—धर्मादिरूपनिमित्तस्य प्राकृतिकवैकृतिकभावकथनम्, तस्य च करणाश्रयित्ववर्णनम् ॥

त्तरकालदेवताराधनादिनोत्पन्नाः। "प्राकृतिकाः" स्वाभाविका भावाः सांसिद्धिकाः। तथा हि—सर्गादावादिविद्वानत्रभगवान् कपिलो महामुनिर्धर्मज्ञानवैराग्यैश्वर्यसम्पन्नः प्रादुर्बभूवेति स्मरन्ति। वैकृताश्च भावा असांसिद्धिकाः, ये उपायानुष्ठानेनोत्पन्नाः, यथा प्राचेतसप्रभृतीनाम्महर्षीणाम् । एवमधर्माज्ञानावैराग्यानैश्वर्याण्यपि ॥ एते बुद्धि दृष्टाः इत्यत आह । - करणाश्रयिण इति करणं बुद्धितत्त्वं ।

(१९७) शरीरग्रहरूपनैमित्तिकस्य कार्याश्रयित्वकथनम् ॥

कार्यं शरीरं तदाश्रयिणः, तस्यावस्थाः, कललबुद्बुदमांसपेशीकरण्डाद्यङ्गप्रत्यङ्गव्यूहाः गर्भस्थस्य, ततो निर्गतस्य बालस्य बाल्यकौमारयौवनवार्धकानीति ॥ ४३ ॥

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(१९८) निमित्तविशेषाणां कार्यविशेषनिरूपणम् ॥

अवगतानि निमित्तनैमित्तिकानि। कतमस्य तु निमित्तस्य कतमन्नैमित्तिकमित्यत आह—

धर्मेण गमनमूर्ध्वं, गमनमधस्ताद्भवत्यधर्मेण ।
ज्ञानेन चापवर्गो, विपर्ययादिष्यते बन्धः ॥ ४४ ॥

"धर्मेण गमनमूर्ध्वम्" द्युप्रभृतिषु लोकेषु । "गमनमधस्ताद्भवत्यधर्मेण" सुतलादिषु[1] लोकेषु। "ज्ञानेन चापवर्गः"। तावदेव प्रकृतिर्भोगमारभते न यावद्विवेकख्यातिं करोति; अथ विवेकख्यातौ सत्यां कृतकृत्यतया विवेकख्यातिमन्तम्पुरुषम्प्रति निवर्तते। यथाहुः—

(१९९) धर्मस्य ऊर्ध्वगमनं प्रति अधर्मस्याधोगमनम्प्रति, ज्ञानस्यापवर्गम्प्रति, अज्ञानस्य च बन्धनम्प्रति—कारणत्वम् ॥

"विवेकख्यातिपर्यन्तं ज्ञेयम् प्रकृतिचेष्टितम्" इति ॥

"विपर्ययात्" अतत्त्वज्ञानात् "इष्यते बन्धः" ॥

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१ भूतलेति पाठान्तरम्।

(२००) बन्धत्रैविध्यनिरूपणम् प्राकृतिक-वैकृतिक-दाक्षिणकरूपम्॥

स च त्रिविधः—प्राकृतिको वैकृतिको दाक्षिणकश्चेति । तत्र प्रकृतावात्मज्ञानाद्ये प्रकृतिमुपासते तेषां प्राकृतिको बन्धः, यः पुराणे प्रकृतिलयान् प्रत्युच्यते ।

"पूर्णं शतसहस्रं हि तिष्ठन्त्यव्यक्तचिन्तकाः" इति ॥

वैकारिको बन्धस्तेषां ये विकारानेव भूतेन्द्रियाहङ्कारबुद्धीः पुरुषधियोपासते, तान् प्रतीदमुच्यते—

"दश मन्वन्तराणीह तिष्ठन्तीन्द्रियचिन्तकाः ।
भौतिकास्[1]तु शतम्पूर्णं, सहस्रन्त्वाभिमानिकाः ॥
बौद्धा दश सहस्राणि तिष्ठन्ति विगतज्वराः ।
ते खल्वमी विदेहा[2] येषां वैकृतिको बन्धः" इति ॥

इष्टा[3]पूर्तेन दाक्षिणकः । पुरुषतत्त्वानभिज्ञो हीष्टापूर्तकारी कामोपहतमना बध्यते इति ॥ ४४ ॥

वैराग्यात् प्रकृतिलयः, संसारो भवति राजसाद्रागात् ।
ऐश्वर्यादविघातो विपर्ययात्तद्विपर्यासः ॥ ४५ ॥

(२०१) वैराग्यात् प्रकृतिलयः ॥

"वैराग्यात् प्रकृतिलयः" इति—पुरुषतत्त्वानभिज्ञस्य वैराग्यमात्रात् प्रकृतिलयः, प्रकृतिग्रहणेन प्रकृतिमहदहङ्कारभूतेन्द्रियाणि गृह्यन्ते, तेष्वात्मबुद्ध्योपास्यमानेषु लयः । कालान्तरेण च पुनराविर्भवति[4] ॥

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१ 'भौतिकाः'—ये भूतान्येव पुरुषधियोपासते । 'आभिमानिकाः'—ये ऽहङ्कारमेव पुरुषधियोपासते । 'बौद्धाः'—ये बुद्धिमेव पुरुषधियोपासते । २ विदेहाः—वैकृतिकबन्धवतां संज्ञान्तरमिदम् पारिभाषिकम् । ३ वापीकूपतडागादि देवतायतनानि च । अन्नप्रदानमारामाः पूतमर्थ्याः प्रचक्षते ॥ एकाग्निकर्महवनं त्रेतायां यच्च हूयते । अन्तर्वेद्यां च यद्दानमिष्टन्तदभिधीयते । ४ यः प्रकृतिलयं गच्छति ।

(२०२) राजसाद्रागात् संसारः ॥

"संसारो भवति राजसाद्रागात्" इति । 'राजसात्' इत्यनेन रजसो दुःखहेतुत्वात् संसारस्य दुःखहेतुता सूचिता ॥ pessimistic.

(२०३) ऐश्वर्यादिच्छानभिघातः, अनैश्वर्याच्चेच्छाभिघातः ॥

"ऐश्वर्यादविघात" इति–इच्छायाः । ईश्वरो हि यदेवेच्छति तदेव करोति । "विपर्ययात्" अनैश्वर्यात् "तद्विपर्यासः" सर्वत्रेच्छाविघात इत्यर्थः ॥ ४५ ॥

बुद्धिधर्मान् धर्मादीनष्टौ भावान् समासव्यासाभ्यां मुमुक्षूणां हेयोपादेयान् दर्शयितुं प्रथमन्तावत् समासमाह—

एष प्रत्ययसर्गो विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टिसिद्ध्याख्यः ।
गुणवैषम्यविमर्दात्, तस्य च भेदास्तु पञ्चाशत् ॥ ४६ ॥

"एषः" इति । प्रतीयते ऽनेनेति प्रत्ययो बुद्धिः, तस्य सर्गः । तत्र

(२०४) विपर्ययादिबुद्धिसर्गस्य समासेन कथनम् ॥

"विपर्ययः" अज्ञानमविद्या, सा ऽपि बुद्धिधर्मः, "अशक्तिः" अपि करणवैकल्यहेतुका बुद्धिधर्म एव । "तुष्टिसिद्धी" अपि वक्ष्यमाणलक्षणे बुद्धिधर्मावेव, तत्र विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टिषु यथायोगं सप्तानाञ्च धर्मादीनां ज्ञानवर्जमन्तर्भावः; सिद्धौ च ज्ञानस्येति ॥

(२०५) तस्यैव व्यासेन कथनम्-पञ्चाशद्भेदाः॥

व्यासमाह–"तस्य च भेदास्तु पञ्चाशत्" इति । कस्मात्? "गुणवैषम्यविमर्दात्" इति । गुणानां वैषम्यमेकैकस्याधिकबलता द्वयोर्द्वयोर्वा, एकैकस्य न्यूनबलता द्वयोर्द्वयोर्वा, ते च न्यूनाधिक्ये मन्दमध्याधिक्यमात्रतया यथाकार्यमुन्नीयेते । तदिदं गुणानां वैषम्यम् तेनोपमर्दः, एकैकस्य न्यूनस्य द्वयोर्वा ऽभिभवः । तस्मात्तस्या भेदाः पञ्चाशदिति ॥ ४६ ॥

तानेव पञ्चाशद्भेदान् गणयति—

पञ्च विपर्ययभेदा भवन्त्यशक्तिश्च करणवैकल्यात् ।
अष्टाविंशतिभेदा तुष्टिर्नवधा ऽष्टधा सिद्धिः ॥ ४७ ॥

(२०६) विपर्ययादीनां पञ्चाशद्भेदपरिगणनम्॥

"पञ्च" इति । अविद्याऽस्मितारागद्वेषाभिनिवेशा यथासंख्यं तमोमोहमहामोहतामिस्रान्धतामिस्रसंज्ञकाः पञ्च विपर्ययविशेषाः, विपर्ययप्रभवानामप्यस्मितादीनां विपर्ययस्वभावत्वात् । यद्वा—यदविद्यया विपर्ययेणावधार्यते वस्तु, अस्मितादयस्तत्स्वभावाः सन्तस्तदभिनिविशन्ते । अत एव पञ्चपर्वाविद्येत्याह भगवान् वार्षगण्यः ॥ ४७ ॥

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(२०७) विपर्ययादीनां प्रत्येकमवान्तरभेदकथनम्—तत्र प्रथमं विपर्ययस्य द्वाषष्टिः ॥

सम्प्रति पञ्चानां विपर्ययभेदानामवान्तरभेदमाह—

भेदस्तमसो ऽष्टविधो मोहस्य च, दशविधो महामोहः ।
तामिस्रो ऽष्टादशधा, तथा भवत्यन्धतामिस्रः ॥ ४८ ॥

(२०८) अविद्यारूपविपर्ययस्याष्टविधत्वम् ॥

"भेदः" इति । भेदस्तमसो ऽविद्याया अष्टविधः । अष्टस्वव्यक्तमहदहङ्कारपञ्चतन्मात्रेष्वनात्मस्वात्मबुद्धिरविद्या तमः, अष्टविधविषयत्वात्तस्याष्टविधत्वम् ॥

(२०९) अस्मितारूपविपर्ययस्याष्टविधत्वम् ॥

"मोहस्य च" इति, अत्राप्यष्टविधो भेदश्चकारेणानुषज्यते । देवा ह्यष्टविधमैश्वर्यमासाद्यामृतत्वाभिमानिनो ऽणिमादिकमात्मीयं शाश्वतिकमभिमन्यन्ते, सेयमस्मिता मोहो ऽष्टविधैश्वर्यविषयत्वादष्टविधः ॥

(२१०) रागरूपविपर्यस्य दशविधत्वम् ॥

"दशविधो महामोहः" इति । शब्दादिषु पञ्चसु दिव्यादिव्यतया दशविधविषयेषु रञ्जनीयेषु राग आसक्तिर्महामोहः, स च दशविधविषयत्वाद्दशविधः ॥

"तामिस्रो" द्वेषो "ऽष्टादशधा" । शब्दादयो दशविषया रञ्जनीयाः स्वरूपतः, ऐश्वर्यन्त्वणिमादिकन्न स्वरूपतो रञ्जनीयम् किं तु रञ्जनीयशब्दाद्युपायाः । ते च शब्दादय उपस्थिताः परस्परेणोपहन्यमानास्तदुपायाश्चाणिमादयः स्वरूपेणैव कोपनीया भवन्तीति शब्दादिभिर्दशभिः सहाणिमाद्यष्टकमष्टादशधेति, तद्विषयो द्वेषस्तामिस्रो ऽष्टादशविषयत्वादष्टादशधेति ॥

(२११) द्वेषरूपविपर्ययस्याष्टादशविधत्वम् ॥

"तथा भवत्यन्धतामिस्रः" । अभिनिवेशो ऽन्धतामिस्रः । तथेत्यनेनाष्टादशधेत्यनुषज्यते । देवाः खल्वणिमादिकमष्टविधमैश्वर्यमासाद्य दश शब्दादीन् विषयान् भुञ्जानाः—'शब्दादयो भोग्यास्तदुपायाश्चाणिमादयो ऽस्माकमसुरादिभिर्मोपघानिपत' इति—बिभ्यति । तदिदं भयमभिनिवेशो ऽन्धतामिस्रो ऽष्टादशविषयत्वादष्टादशधेति ॥

(२१२) अभिनिवेशरूपविपर्ययस्याष्टादशविधत्वम् ॥

सो ऽयं पञ्चविधो विकल्पो विपर्ययो ऽवान्तरभेदाद्द्वाषष्टिरिति ॥ ४८ ॥

(२१३) विपर्ययावान्तरभेदसमष्टिसंख्या द्वाषष्टिः ॥

तदेवं पञ्चविपर्ययभेदानुक्त्वा ऽष्टाविंशतिभेदामशक्तिमाह—

(२१४) अष्टाविंशतिप्रकारकाशक्तिकथनम् ॥

एकादशेन्द्रियवधाः सह बुद्धिवधैरशक्तिरुद्दिष्टा ।
सप्तदश वधा बुद्धेर्विपर्ययात्तुष्टिसिद्धीनाम् ॥ ४९ ॥

"एकादश"–इति । [इन्द्रियवधस्य ग्रहो बुद्धिवधहेतुत्वेन, न • त्वशक्तिभेदपूर्णत्वेन] । "एकादशेन्द्रियवधाः"—

(२१५) एकादशेन्द्रियवधजन्यैकादशविधाऽशक्तिः ॥

बाधिर्यं कुष्ठिता ऽन्धत्वं जडता ऽजिघ्रता तथा ।
मूकता कौण्यपङ्गुत्वं क्लैब्योदावर्तमन्दताः ॥

यथासंख्यं श्रोत्रादीनामिन्द्रियाणां बधाः । एतावत्येव तु तद्धेतुका बुद्धेरशक्तिः स्वव्यापारे भवति । तथा चैकादशहेतुकत्वादेकादशधा बुद्धेरशक्तिरुच्यते । हेतुहेतुमतोरभेदविवक्षया च सामानाधिकरण्यम् ॥

तदेवमिन्द्रियबधद्वारेण बुद्धेरशक्तिमुक्त्वा स्वरूपतो ऽशक्तीराह—"सह बुद्धिबधैः" इति । कति बुद्धेः स्वरूपतो बधा इत्यत आह—"सप्तदश बधा बुद्धेः" । कुतः? "विपर्ययात्तुष्टिसिद्धीनाम् ।" तुष्टयो नवधेति तद्विपर्ययास्तन्निरूपणान्नवधा भवन्ति, एवं सिद्धयो ऽष्टाविति तद्विपर्ययास्तन्निरूपणादष्टौ भवन्तीति ॥ ४९ ॥

(२१६) बुद्धेः साक्षादशक्तिः सप्तदशविधा ॥

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(२१७) नवविधतुष्टिकथनम् ॥

तुष्टिर्नवधेत्युक्तम्, ताः परिगणयति—

आध्यात्मिकाश्चतस्रः प्रकृत्युपादानकालभाग्याख्याः ।
बाह्या विषयोपरमात् पञ्च,-नव तुष्टयो ऽभिमताः ॥ ५० ॥

"आध्यात्मिकाः" इति । आध्यात्मिकाः—'प्रकृतिव्यतिरिक्त आत्मा ऽस्ति' इति प्रतिपद्य, ततो ऽस्य श्रवणमननादिना विवेकसाक्षात्काराय त्वसदुपदेशतुष्टो यो न प्रयतते तस्याध्यात्मिकाश्चतस्रस्तुष्टयो भवन्ति, प्रकृतिव्यतिरिक्तमात्मानमधिकृत्य यस्मात्तास्तुष्टयस्तस्मादाध्यात्मिकाः । कास्ता इत्यत आह—"प्रकृत्युपादानकालभाग्याख्याः", प्रकृत्यादिराख्या यासां तास्तथोक्ताः ॥

(२१८) चतुर्विधाध्यात्मिकतुष्टिकथनम् ॥

तत्र प्रकृत्याख्या तुष्टिर्यथा कस्यचिदुपदेशे,—'विवेकसाक्षात्कारो हि प्रकृतिपरिणाभेदस्तञ्च प्रकृतिरेव करोतीति कृतन्तद्ध्यानाभ्यासेन, तस्मादेवमेवास्तु वत्स',— इति सेयमुपदेष्टव्यस्य तुष्टिः प्रकृतौ, सा तुष्टिः प्रकृत्याख्या अम्म उच्यते ॥

(२१९) आध्यात्मिकतुष्टिषु प्रथमा प्रकृत्याख्या अम्मः ॥

(२२०) द्वितीया उपादानाख्या सलिलम् ॥

या तु,–'प्राक्कृत्यपि[1] विवेकख्यातिर्न, सा प्रकृतिमात्राद्भवति, मो[2]भूत्सर्वस्य सर्वदा, तन्मात्रस्य सर्वान् प्रत्यविशेषात्; प्रव्रज्यायास्तु सा भवति, तस्मात् प्रव्रज्यामुपाददीथाः, कृतन्ते ध्यानाभ्यासेनायुष्मन्'–इति उपदेशे या तुष्टिः सोपादानाख्या 'सलिलम्' उच्यते ॥

(२२१) तृतीया कालाख्या ओघः ॥

या तु,–'प्रव्रज्या ऽपि न सद्योनिर्वाणदेति सैव कालपरिपाकमपेक्ष्य सिद्धिन्ते विधास्यति, अलमुत्तप्ततया तव'–इति उपदेशे या तुष्टिः सा कालाख्या 'ओघं[3]' उच्यते ॥

(२२२) चतुर्थी भाग्याख्या वृष्टिः ॥

या तु,–'न प्रकृतेर्न कालान्नाप्युपादानाद्विवेकख्यातिः, अपि तु भाग्यादेव । अत एव-मदालसापत्यान्यतिबालानि मातुरुपदेशादेव विवेकख्यातिमन्ति मुक्तानि बभूवुः, तस्माद्भाग्यमेव हेतुर्नान्यत्'–इति उपदेशे या तुष्टिः सा भाग्याख्या 'वृष्टिः' उच्यते ॥

(२२३) पञ्चविधबाह्यतुष्टिकथनम् ॥

बाह्या दर्शयति–"बाह्याः" तुष्टयः "विषयोपरमात्, पञ्च" । याः खल्वनात्मनः प्रकृतिमहदहङ्कारादीनात्मेत्यभिमन्यमानस्य वैराग्ये सति तुष्टयस्ता बाह्याः, आत्मज्ञानाभावे सत्यनात्मानमधिकृत्य प्रवृत्तेरिति । ताश्च वैराग्ये सति तुष्टय इति वैराग्यहेतुपञ्चत्वाद्वैराग्याण्यपि पञ्च, तत्पञ्चत्वात् तुष्टयः पञ्चेति । उपरम्यते ऽनेनेत्युपरमो वैराग्यम्, विषयादुपरमो विषयोपरमः । विषयाः भोग्याः शब्दादयः पञ्च, उपरमा अपि पञ्च ॥

तथा हि–अर्जनरक्षणक्षयभोगहिंसादोषदर्शनहेतुजन्मानः पञ्चोपरमा

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१ प्रकृत्या निर्वृत्ता । २ प्रकृतिमात्राद्विवेकख्यातौ सत्यां प्रकृतेः सर्वं प्रति तुल्यसम्बन्धत्वात् सकलजनस्य विवेकख्यातिः स्यादिति हृदयम् । ३ 'मेघ' इति पाठान्तरम् ।

(२२४) बाह्यतुष्टिषु प्रथमा, पारम् ॥ भवन्ति । तथा हि–सेवादयो धनार्जनोपायाः, ते च सेवकादीन् दुःखाकुर्वन्ति,

"दृप्यद्दुरीश्वरद्वाःस्थदण्डिचण्डार्धचन्द्रजाम् ।
वेदनां भावयन् प्राज्ञः कः सेवास्वनुषज्जते" ॥

एवमन्येऽप्यर्जनोपायाः दुःखा इति विषयोपरमे या तुष्टिः सैषा 'पारम्' उच्यते ॥

(२२५) द्वितीया, सुपारम् ॥ तथा ऽर्जितन्धनम् राजैकागारिकाग्निजलौघादिभ्यो विनङ्क्ष्यतीति तद्रक्षणे महद्दुःखमिति भावयतो विषयोपरमे या तुष्टिः सा द्वितीया 'सुपारम्' उच्यते ॥

(२२६) तृतीया, पारापारम् ॥ तथा महता ऽऽयासेनार्जितन्धनं भुज्यमानं क्षीयते इति तत्प्रक्षयम्भावयतो विषयोपरमे या तुष्टिः सा तृतीया 'पारापारम्' उच्यते ॥

(२२७) चतुर्थी, अनुत्तमाम्भः ॥ एवं शब्दादिभोगाभ्यासात् प्रवर्धन्ते कामाः, ते च विषयाप्राप्तौ कामिनं दुःखाकुर्वन्तीति भोगदोषम् भावयतो विषयोपरमे या तुष्टिः सा चतुर्थी 'अनुत्तमाम्भ' उच्यते ॥

(२२८) पञ्चमी, उत्तमाम्भः ॥ एवन्नानुपहत्य भूतानि विषयोपभोगः सम्भवतीति हिंसादोषदर्शनाद्विषयोपरमे या तुष्टिः सा पञ्चमी 'उत्तमाम्भ' उच्यते ॥

एवमाध्यात्मिकीभिश्चतसृभिः बाह्याभिश्च पञ्चभिः 'नव तुष्टयोऽभिमताः' ॥ ५० ॥

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(२२९) सिद्धिभेदकनम् ॥ गौणमुख्यभेदैः सिद्धीराह—

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१. एकागारिकः–चौरः ।

ऊहः शब्दोऽध्ययनं दुःखविघातास्त्रयः सुहृत्प्राप्तिः ।
दानं च सिद्धयोऽष्टौ, सिद्धेः पूर्वोऽङ्कुशस्त्रिविधः ॥ ५१ ॥

"ऊह" इति । विहन्यमानस्य दुःखस्य त्रित्वात्तद्विघातास्त्रय इतीमा मुख्यास्तिस्रः सिद्धयः, तदुपायतया त्वितरा गौण्यः पञ्च सिद्धयः, ता अपि हेतुहेतुमत्तया व्यवस्थिताः । तत्राद्या ऽध्ययनलक्षणा सिद्धिर्हेतुरेव । मुख्यास्तु सिद्धयो हेतुमत्य एव । मध्यमास्तु हेतुहेतुमत्यः ॥

(२३०) सिद्धिभेदकथनम् ॥

विधिवद्गुरुमुखादध्यात्मविद्यानामक्षरस्वरूपग्रहणमध्ययनम् प्रथमा सिद्धिस्तारमुच्यते ॥

(२३१) अध्ययनरूपा प्रथमा सिद्धिः, तारम् ॥

तत्कार्यम् शब्दः; 'शब्दः' इति पदम् शब्दजनितमर्थज्ञानमुपलक्षयति, कार्ये कारणोपचारात् । सा द्वितीया सिद्धिः सुतारमुच्यते पाठार्थाभ्यान्तदिदन्द्विधा श्रवणम् ॥

(२३२) शब्दरूपा द्वितीया, सुतारम् ॥

"ऊहः" तर्कः आगमाविरोधिन्यायेनागमार्थपरीक्षणम् । परीक्षणञ्च संशयपूर्वपक्षनिराकरणेनोत्तरपक्षव्यवस्थापनम् । तदिदम्मननमाचक्षते आगमिनः । सा तृतीया सिद्धिस्तारतारमुच्यते ॥

(२३३) ऊहरूपा तृतीया तारतारम् ॥

"सुहृत्प्राप्तिः" । न्यायेन स्वयम्परीक्षितमप्यर्थं न श्रद्दधते, न यावद्गुरु-शिष्यसब्रह्मचारिभिस्सह संवाद्यते । अतः सुहृदां गुरुशिष्यसब्रह्मचारिणां संवादकानां प्राप्तिः सुहृत्प्राप्तिः सा सिद्धिश्चतुर्थी 'रम्यक' उच्यते ॥[१]

(२३४) सुहृत्प्राप्तिरूपा चतुर्थी—रम्यकः ॥

"दानं" च शुद्धिर्विवेकज्ञानस्य, 'दैप् शोधने' [सिद्धान्तकौमुदी

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१ "मननम् अमननमेवासुहृत्सम्मतम्. इति द्वितीयं मननमाह सुहृत्प्राप्तिरिति" इति पाठान्तरम् ।

(२३५) हानरूपा पञ्चमी, सदामुदितम् ॥

६।४।६८] इत्यस्माद्धातोर्दानपदव्युत्पत्तेः । यथाह भगवान् पतञ्जलिः—"विवेकख्यातिरविप्लवा दुःखत्रयस्य हानोपायः" इति [योगसूत्र २।२६]। 'अविप्लवः' शुद्धिः, सा च सवासनसंशयविपर्यासानां परिहारेण विवेकसाक्षात्कारस्य स्वच्छप्रवाहे ऽवस्थापनम् । सा च न[1] विना ऽऽदरनैरन्तर्यदीर्घकालसेविताभ्यासपरिपाकाद्भवतीति दानेन (विवेकख्यात्याः कार्येण) सो[2] ऽपि संगृहीतः । सेयम्पञ्चमी सिद्धिस्सदामुदितमुच्यते ॥

(२३६) दुःखविघातत्रयरूपास्तिस्रो मुख्याः- प्रमोदमुदितमोदमानाः ॥

तिस्रश्च मुख्याः सिद्धयः प्रमोदमुदितमोदमाना, इत्यष्टौ सिद्धयः ॥

अन्ये व्याचक्षते—विनोपदेशादिना प्राग्भावीयाभ्यासवशात्तत्त्वस्य स्वयमूहनं यत् सा सिद्धिरूहः । यस्य सांख्यशास्त्रपाठमन्यदीयमाकर्ण्य तत्त्वज्ञानमुत्पद्यते सा सिद्धिः शब्दः, शब्दपाठादनन्तरम्भावात् । यस्य शिष्याचार्यसम्बन्धेन सांख्यशास्त्रं ग्रन्थतो ऽर्थतश्चाधीत्य ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते सा ऽध्ययनहेतुका सिद्धिरध्ययनम् । सुहृत्प्राप्तिरिति यस्याधिगततत्त्वं सुहृदं प्राप्य ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते सा ज्ञानलक्षणा सिद्धिस्तस्य सुहृत्प्राप्तिः । दानञ्च सिद्धिहेतुः, धनादिदानेनाराधितो ज्ञानी ज्ञानम्प्रयच्छति । अस्य च युक्तायुक्तत्वे सूरिभिरेवावगन्तव्ये इति कृतम्परदोषोद्भावनेन नः सिद्धान्तमात्रव्याख्यानप्रवृत्तानामिति ॥

(२३७) गौणसिद्धिपञ्चकस्य प्रकारान्तरेण व्याख्यानम् ॥

सिद्धितुष्टिविपर्ययेणाशक्तिर्बुद्धिबधस्सप्तदशधा द्रष्टव्यः । अत्र प्रत्ययसर्गे सिद्धिरुपादेयेति प्रसिद्धमेव । तन्निवारणहेतवस्तु विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टयो हेया इत्याह—"सिद्धेः पूर्वो ऽशङ्कुस्त्रिविधः" इति। 'पूर्व' इति । विप-

(२३८) प्रत्ययसर्गे विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टीनां सिद्धेरङ्कुशत्वम्, ततश्च तासां हेयत्वम् सिद्धेश्चोपादेयत्वम् ॥

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१ "निबिडादेव नैरन्तर्यम्" इति पाठान्तरम् । २ अभ्यासोऽपि ।

र्ययाशक्तितुष्टीः परामृशति। ताः सिद्धिकरिणीनामङ्कुशो, निवारकत्वात्। अतः सिद्धिपरिपन्थित्वात् विपर्ययाशक्तितुष्टयो हेया इत्यर्थः॥ ५१॥

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(२३९) उभयसर्गावश्यकत्वशङ्का॥

स्यादेतत्—पुरुषार्थप्रयुक्ता सृष्टिः। स च पुरुषार्थः प्रत्ययसर्गाद्वा तन्मात्रसर्गाद्वा सिध्यतीति कृतमुभयसर्गेणेत्यत आह—

न विना भावैर्लिङ्गं, न विना लिङ्गेन भावनिर्वृत्तिः।
लिङ्गाख्यो भावाख्यस्तस्माद्द्विविधः प्रवर्तते सर्गः॥ ५२॥

(२४०) उभयविधसर्गावश्यकत्वप्रदर्शनम्॥

"न विना" इति। "लिङ्गम्" इति तन्मात्रसर्गमुपलक्षयति, "भावैः" इति च प्रत्ययसर्गम्। एतदुक्तम्भवति—तन्मात्रसर्गस्य पुरुषार्थसाधनत्वं स्वरूपञ्च न प्रत्ययसर्गाद्विना भवति, एवं प्रत्ययसर्गस्य स्वरूपं पुरुषार्थसाधनत्वञ्च न तन्मात्रसर्गादृते, इत्युभयथा सर्गप्रवृत्तिः। भोगः पुरुषार्थो न भोग्यान् शब्दादीन् भोगायतनं शरीरद्वयञ्चान्तरेण सम्भवतीत्युपपन्नस्तन्मात्रसर्गः। एवं स एव भोगो भोगसाधनानीन्द्रियाण्यन्तःकरणानि चान्तरेण न सम्भवति। न च तानि धर्मादीन् भावान् विना सम्भवन्ति। न चापवर्गहेतुर्विवेकख्यातिरुभयसर्गं विना, इत्युपपन्न उभयविधः सर्गः॥

(२४१) उभयविधसर्गे अन्योन्याश्रयदोषपरिहारः॥

अनादित्वाच्च बीजाङ्कुरवन्नान्योन्याश्रयदोषमावहति, कल्पादावपि प्राचीनकल्पोत्पन्नभावलिङ्गसंस्कारवशाद्भावलिङ्गयोरुत्पत्तिर्नानुपपन्नेति सर्वमवदातम्॥ ५२॥

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(२४२) भूतसर्गविभागः॥

विभक्तः प्रत्ययसर्गः। भूतादिसर्गं विभजते—

अष्टविकल्पो दैवस्तैर्यग्योनश्च पञ्चधा भवति ।
मानुषश्चैकविधः, समासतो भौतिकः सर्गः ॥ ५३ ॥

(२४३) तत्र–(१) दैवो ऽष्टविधः ॥

"अष्टविकल्प" इति । ब्राह्मः, प्राजापत्यः, ऐन्द्रः, पैत्रो, गान्धर्वो, याक्षो, राक्षसः, पैशाचः, इत्यष्टविधो "दैवः" सर्गः ॥

(२४४) (२) तैर्यग्योनःपञ्चधा ॥

"तैर्यग्योनश्च पञ्चधा भवति," पशुमृगपक्षिसरीसृपस्थावराः ॥

(२४५) (३) मानुष एकविधः ॥

"मानुषश्चैकविधः" इति, ब्राह्मणत्वाद्यवान्तरजातिभेदाविवक्षया, संस्थानस्य चतुर्ष्वपि वर्णेष्वविशेषात् । इति "समासतः" संक्षेपतः "भौतिकः सर्गः" । घटादयस्त्वशरीरत्वे ऽपि स्थावरा एवेति ॥ ५३ ॥

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(२४६) भौतिकसर्गे गुणभेदादूर्ध्वाधोमध्यभावकथनम् ॥

भौतिकस्यास्य सर्गस्य चैतन्योत्कर्षनिकर्षतारतम्याभ्यामूर्ध्वाधोमध्यभावेन त्रैविध्यमाह—

ऊर्ध्वं सत्त्वविशालस्तमोविशालश्च मूलतः सर्गः ।
मध्ये रजोविशालो, ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तः ॥ ५४ ॥

(२४७) ऊर्ध्वं सत्त्वप्रधानाः-मध्ये रजःप्रधानाः–अन्ते तमःप्रधानाः ॥

"ऊर्ध्वं सत्त्वविशालः" इति । द्युप्रभृतिसत्यान्तो लोकः सत्त्वबहुलः । "तमोविशालश्च मूलतः सर्गः", पश्वादिस्थावरान्तः, सो ऽयम्मोहमयत्वात्तमोबहुलः । भूलोकस्तु सप्तद्वीपसमुद्रसन्निवेशो "मध्ये रजोविशालो" धर्माधर्मानुष्ठानपरत्वाद्दुःखबहुलत्वाच्च । तामिमां लोकसंस्थितिं संक्षिपति "ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तः", स्तम्बग्रहणेन वृक्षादयः संगृहीताः ॥ ५४ ॥

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(२४८) सर्गस्य दुःखहेतुता ॥

तदेवं सर्गं दर्शयित्वा तस्यापवर्गसाधनवैराग्योपयोगिनीं दुःखहेतुतामाह—

तत्र जरामरणकृतं दुःखम्प्राप्नोति चेतनः पुरुषः ।
लिङ्गस्याविनिवृत्तेस्तस्माद्दुःखं स्वभावेन ॥ ५५ ॥

"तत्र" इति । 'तत्र' शरीरादौ । यद्यपि विविधा विचित्रानन्दभोगभागिनः प्राणभृद्देहा,: तथा ऽपि सर्वेषां जरामरणकृतं दुःखमविशिष्टम् । सर्वस्य खलु कृमेरपि मरणत्रासो–'मा न भूवम्' 'भूयासम्' इत्येवमात्मको ऽस्ति । दुःखं च भयहेतुरिति दुःखम्मरणम् ॥

(२४९) प्राकृतगुणभूतदुःखादीनां पुरुषेण सह सम्बधप्रदर्शनम् ॥

स्यादेतत्–दुःखादयः प्राकृता बुद्धिगुणाः, तत्कथमेते चेतनसम्बन्धिनो भवन्तीत्यत आह–"पुरुष" इति । पुरि लिङ्गे शेते इति पुरुषः, लिङ्गञ्च तत्सम्बन्धीति चेतनो ऽपि तत्सम्बन्धी भवतीत्यर्थः ॥

(२५०) पुरुषप्रकृतिभेदाग्रहानिबन्धनः पुरुषे दुःखाध्यवसायः ॥

कुतः पुनर्लिङ्गसम्बन्धि दुःखम्पुरुषस्य चेतनस्येत्यत आह–"लिङ्गस्याविनिवृत्तेः"–पुरुषाद्भेदाग्रहाल्लिङ्गधर्मानात्मन्यध्यवस्यति पुरुषः । अथवा दुःखप्राप्ताववधिराङौ कथ्यते लिङ्गम् यावन्न निवर्तते तावदिति ॥ ५५ ॥

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(२५१) सृष्टिकारणविप्रतिपत्तिनिराकरणम् ॥

उक्तस्य सर्गस्य कारणविप्रतिपत्तीर्निराकरोति–

इत्येष प्रकृतिकृतो महदादिविशेषभूतपर्यन्तः ।
प्रतिपुरुषविमोक्षार्थं स्वार्थ इव परार्थ आरम्भः ॥ ५६ ॥

(२५२) चार्वाकवेदान्तन्यायमतदूषणम् ॥

"इत्येष" इति । आरभ्यते इति "आरम्भः" सर्गः महदादिभूतः प्रकृत्यैव कृतो नेश्वरेण, न ब्रह्मोपादानो, नाप्यकारणः । अकरणत्वे ह्यत्यन्ताभावो ऽत्यन्तभावो वा स्यात् ।

१ आविनिवृत्तेरित्यत्र 'आङ्'–उपसर्गेणेत्यर्थः ।

न ब्रह्मोपादानः, चितिशक्तेरपरिणामात् । नेश्वराधिष्ठितप्रकृतिकृतो, निर्व्यापारस्याधिष्ठातृत्वासम्भवात् । न हि निर्व्यापारस्तक्षा वास्याद्यधितिष्ठति ॥

(२५३) नित्यप्रवृत्तिशीलप्रकृतिकृतसृष्टिपक्षे संसृतिनित्यत्वस्यानिर्मोक्षस्य च प्रसङ्गशङ्का–तन्निरासश्च ॥

ननु प्रकृतिकृतश्चेत्, तस्या नित्यायाः प्रवृत्तिशीलाया अनुपरमात् सदैव सर्गः स्यादिति न कश्चिन्मुच्येतेत्यत आह–"प्रतिपुरुषविमोक्षार्थं स्वार्थ इव परार्थ आरम्भः" इति । यथौदनकाम ओदनाय पाके प्रवृत्तः ओदनसिद्धौ निवर्तते,–एवं प्रत्येकम्पुरुषान् मोचयितुम्प्रवृत्ता प्रकृतिर्यं पुरुषम्मोचयति तम्प्रति पुनर्न प्रवर्तते–तदिदमाह–' स्वार्थ इव,' स्वार्थे यथा तथा परार्थे आरम्भ इत्यर्थः ॥ ५६ ॥

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(२५४) अचेतनप्रधानप्रवृत्तिशङ्का ।

स्यादेतत्–' स्वार्थे परार्थे वा ह्येतनः प्रवर्तते । न च प्रकृतिरचेतनैवं भवितुमर्हति तस्मादस्ति प्रकृतेरधिष्ठाता चेतनः। न च क्षेत्रज्ञाश्चेतना अपि प्रकृतिमधिष्ठातुमर्हन्ति, तेषां प्रकृतिस्वरूपानभिज्ञत्वात् । तस्मादस्ति सर्वार्थदर्शी प्रकृतेरधिष्ठाता, स चेश्वर'–इत्यत आह––

वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तं क्षीरस्य यथा प्रवृत्तिरज्ञस्य ।
पुरुषविमोक्षनिमित्तं तथा प्रवृत्तिः प्रधानस्य ॥ ५७ ॥

(२५५) तत्परिहारः- क्षीरप्रवृत्तिवत्तस्याः प्रवृत्तिः ॥

"वत्सविवृद्धिनिमितम्" इति । दृष्टमचेतनमपि प्रयोजनम्प्रवर्तमानम्, यथा वत्सविवृद्ध्यर्थं क्षीरमचेतनम् प्रवर्तते । एवम्प्रकृतिरचेतना ऽपि पुरुषविमोक्षणाय प्रवर्तिष्यते ॥

(२५५) ईश्वराधिष्ठितप्रधानसृष्टौ दोषाः ॥

न च–'क्षीरप्रवृत्तेरपीश्वराधिष्ठाननिबन्धनत्वेन साध्यत्वान्न साध्यव्यभिचार'–इति, साम्प्रतम्प्रेक्षावतः प्रवृत्तेः स्वार्थकारुण्याभ्यां व्याप्तत्वात् । ते च जगत्सर्गाद्याव-

र्तमाने प्रेक्षावत्प्रवृत्तिपूर्वकत्वमपि व्यावर्तयतः । न ह्यवाप्तसकलेप्सितस्य भगवतो जगत् सृजतः किमप्यभिलषितम्भवति । नापि कारुण्यादस्य सर्गे प्रवृत्तिः, प्राक् सर्गाज्जीवानामिन्द्रियशरीरविषयानुत्पत्तौ दुःखाभावेन कस्य प्रहाणेच्छा कारुण्यम्? सर्गोत्तरकालं दुःखिनो ऽवलोक्य कारुण्याभ्युपगमे दुरुत्तरमितरेतराश्रयत्वन्दूषणम्,—कारुण्येन सृष्टिः सृष्ट्या च कारुण्यमिति । अपि च करुणया प्रेरित ईश्वरः सुखिन एव जन्तून् सृजेन्न विचित्रान् । 'कर्मवैचित्र्याद्वैचित्र्यम्' इति चेत्—कृतमस्य प्रेक्षावतः कर्माधिष्ठानेन, तदनधिष्ठानमात्रादेवाचेतनस्यापि कर्मणः प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेस्तत्कार्यशरीरेन्द्रियविषयानुत्पत्तौ दुःखानुत्पत्तेरपि सुकरत्वात् ॥

(२५६) प्रकृतिसृष्टौ तद्दोषाभावः ॥

प्रकृतेस्त्वचेतनायाः प्रवृत्तेर्न स्वार्थानुग्रहो न वा कारुण्यम्प्रयोजकमिति नोक्तदोषप्रसङ्गावतारः । पारार्थ्यमात्रन्तु प्रयोजकमुपपद्यते । तस्मात् सुष्ठूक्तम्—"वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तम्" इति ॥ ९७ ॥

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(२५७) पुरुषविमोक्षार्थम् प्रधानस्य प्रवृत्तिः॥

"स्वार्थ इव" इति दृष्टान्तितम् [कारिका. ९६] तद्विभजते—

औत्सुक्यनिवृत्त्यर्थं यथा क्रियासु प्रवर्तते लोकः ।
पुरुषस्य विमोक्षार्थं प्रवर्तते तद्वदव्यक्तम् ॥ ५८ ॥

"औत्सुक्य—" इति । औत्सुक्यमिच्छा, सा खल्विष्यमाणप्राप्तौ निवर्तते । इष्यमाणश्च स्वार्थः, इष्टलक्षणत्वात् फलस्य । दार्ष्टान्तिके योजयति—"पुरुषस्य विमोक्षार्थम्प्रवर्तते तद्वदव्यक्तम्" इति ॥ ९८ ॥

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(२५८) विवेकख्यात्यनन्तरम् प्रधाननिवृत्तिः॥

ननु भवतु पुरुषार्थः प्रकृतेः प्रवर्तकः, निवृत्तिस्तु कुतस्त्या प्रकृतेः? इत्यत आह—

रङ्गस्य दर्शयित्वा निवर्तते नर्तकी यथा नृत्यात् ।
पुरुषस्य तथाऽऽत्मानं प्रकाश्य विनिवर्तते प्रकृतिः ॥ ५९ ॥

"रङ्गस्य" इति, स्थानेन स्थानिनः पारिषदानुपलक्षयति । 'आत्मानम्' शब्दाद्यात्मना पुरुषाद्भेदेन च प्रकाश्येत्यर्थः ॥ ५९ ॥

स्यादेतत्—'प्रवर्तताम्प्रकृतिः पुरुषार्थम् । पुरुषादुपकृतात्प्रकृतिर्लप्स्यते कञ्चिदुपकारम्, आज्ञासम्पादनाराधितादिवाज्ञापयितुर्भुजिष्या । तथा च न परार्थो ऽस्या आरम्भः'—इत्यत आह—

(२५९) गुणवत्याः प्रकृतेः प्रत्युपकारं विनैव पुरुषोपकारः ॥

नानाविधैरुपायैरुपकारिण्यनुपकारिणः पुंसः ।
गुणवत्यगुणस्य सतस्तस्यार्थमपार्थकञ्चरति ॥ ६० ॥

"नाना—" इति । यथा गुणवानुपकार्यपि भृत्यो निर्गुणे ऽतएवानुपकारिणि स्वामिनि निष्फलाराधनः, एवमियम्प्रकृतिस्तपस्विनी गुणवत्युपकारिण्यनुपकारिणि पुरुषे व्यर्थपरिश्रमेति पुरुषार्थमेव यतते न स्वार्थमिति सिद्धम् ॥ ६० ॥

स्यादेतत्—'नर्तकी नृत्यम्परिषद्भ्यो दर्शयित्वा निवृत्ता ऽपि पुनस्तद्दृष्टिकौतूहलात् प्रवर्तते यथा, तथा प्रकृतिरपि पुरुषार्थायात्मानं दर्शयित्वा निवृत्ता ऽपि पुनः प्रवर्त्स्यति'—इत्यत आह—

(२६०) विवेकख्यात्यनन्तरम् प्रधानस्यात्यन्तिकी निवृत्तिः ॥

प्रकृतेः सुकुमारतरन्न किञ्चिदस्तीति मे मतिर्भवति ।
या दृष्टा ऽस्मीति पुनर्न दर्शनमुपैति पुरुषस्य ॥ ६१ ॥

"प्रकृतेः" इति । सुकुमारतरता ऽतिपेशलता, परपुरुषदर्शनासहिष्णुतेति यावत् । असूर्यम्पश्या हि कुलवधूरतिमन्दाक्षमन्थरा प्रमादाद्विगलितसिचयाञ्चला चेदालोक्यते परपुरुषेण, तदा ऽसौ यथा प्रयतते,

अप्रमत्तां यथैनां परपुरुषान्तराणि न पुनः पश्यन्ति,—एवम्प्रकृतिरपि कुलवधूतो ऽप्यधिका दृष्टा विवेकेन न पुनर्द्रक्ष्यत इत्यर्थः ॥ ६१ ॥

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(२६१)निर्गुणपुरुषमोक्षसंसाराद्यसम्भवशङ्का ॥

स्यादेतत्—"पुरुषश्चेदगुणो ऽपरिणामी, कथमस्य मोक्षः? मुचेर्बन्धनविश्लेषार्थत्वात्, सवासनक्लेशकर्माशयानाञ्च बन्धनसमाख्यानां पुरुषे ऽपरिणामिन्यसम्भवात् । अत एवास्य च पुरुषस्य न संसारः प्रेत्यभावापरनामाऽस्ति, निष्क्रियत्वात् । तस्मात् 'पुरुषविमोक्षार्थम्' इति रिक्तं वचः"—इतीमां शङ्कामुपसंहारव्याजेनाभ्युपगच्छन्नपाकरोति ॥

तस्मान्न बध्यते ऽद्धा न मुच्यते नापि संसरति कश्चित् ।
संसरति बध्यते मुच्यते च नानाश्रया प्रकृतिः ॥ ६२ ॥

(२६२) तत्परिहारः- प्रकृतिगतानां संसारादीनां पुरुषे उपचारः ॥

"तस्मात्" इति । अद्धा न कश्चित् पुरुषो बध्यते, न कश्चित् संसरति, न कश्चिन्मुच्यते । प्रकृतिरेव तु नानाश्रया सती बध्यते संसरति मुच्यते चेति । बन्धमोक्षसंसाराः पुरुषेपूपचर्यन्ते । यथा जयपराजयौ भृत्यगतावपि स्वामिन्युपचर्येते, तदाश्रयेण भृत्यानान्तद्भागित्वात्, तत्फलस्य च शोकलाभादेः स्वामिनि सम्भवात् । भोगापवर्गयोः प्रकृतिगतयोरपि विवेकाग्रहात् पुरुषसम्बन्ध उपपादित इति सर्वम्पुष्कलम् ॥ ६२ ॥

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(२६३) प्रकृत्या धर्मादिसप्तरूपैर्बन्धनमेकरूपेण तत्त्वज्ञानरूपेण च मोक्षणम् ॥

नन्ववगतम् 'प्रकृतिगता बन्धसंसारापवर्गाः पुरुषे उपचर्यन्ते' इति । किंसाधनाः पुनरेते प्रकृतेः? इत्यत आह—

रूपैः सप्तभिरेव तु बध्नात्यात्मानमात्मना प्रकृतिः ।
सैव च पुरुषार्थम्प्रति विमोचयत्येकरूपेण ॥ ६३ ॥

"रूपैः" इति । तत्त्वज्ञानवर्जं बध्नाति धर्मादिभिस्सप्तभी रूपैर्भावैरिति । "पुरुषार्थम्प्रति" भोगापवर्गम्प्रति "आत्मना ऽऽत्मानम्" एक-

रूपेण तत्त्वज्ञानेन विवेकख्यात्या विमोचयति, पुनर्भोगापवर्गौ न करोतीत्यर्थः ॥ ६३ ॥

अवगतमीदृशं तत्वम्, ततः किमित्यत आह—

एवन्तत्त्वाभ्यासान्नास्मि न मे नाहमित्यपरिशेषम् ।
अविपर्ययाद्विशुद्धं केवलमुत्पद्यते ज्ञानम् ॥ ६४ ॥

"एवम्" इति । तत्त्वेन विषयेण तत्त्वज्ञानमुपलक्षयति । उक्तरूपप्रकारतत्त्वविषयज्ञानाभ्यासादादरनैरन्तर्यदीर्घकालसेवितात् सत्त्वपुरुषान्यतासाक्षात्कारिज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । यद्विषयश्चाभ्यासस्तद्विषयकमेव साक्षात्कारमुपजनयति,—तत्त्वविषयश्चाभ्यास इति तत्त्वसाक्षात्कारं जनयति । अत उक्तम्—" विशुद्धम्" इति ॥

(२६४) अभ्यासात्तत्त्वज्ञानोत्पत्तिः ॥

कुतो विशुद्धमित्यत आह—"अविपर्ययात् " इति । संशयविपर्ययौ हि ज्ञानस्याविशुद्धी, तद्रहितम् विशुद्धन्तदिदमुक्तम्—"अविपर्ययात्" इति । नियतमनियततया गृह्णन् संशयो ऽपि विपर्ययः, तेन 'अविपर्ययात्' इति संशयविपर्ययाभ्यासो दर्शितः । तत्त्वविषयत्वाच्च संशयविपर्ययाभावः ॥

(२६५) तत्त्वज्ञानस्य विशुद्धिहेतुः अविपर्ययत्वम् ॥

स्यादेतत्—' उत्पद्यतामीदृशाभ्यासात् तत्त्वज्ञानम्, तथा ऽप्यनादिना मिथ्याज्ञानसंस्कारेण मिथ्याज्ञानं जनयितव्यम्, तथा च तन्निबन्धनस्य संसारस्यानुच्छेदप्रसङ्ग इत्यत उक्तम्—"केवलम्" इति=विपर्ययेणासम्भिन्नम् । यद्यप्यनादिर्विपर्ययवासना तथा ऽपि तत्त्वज्ञानवासनया तत्त्वविषयसाक्षात्कारमादधत्या ऽऽदिमत्या ऽपि शक्या समुच्छेत्तुम् । तत्त्वपक्षपातो हि धियां स्वभावः, यदाहुर्बाह्या अपि—

(२६६) अनादेर्मिथ्याज्ञानसंस्कारस्यादिमता तत्त्वज्ञानसंस्कारेण समुच्छेदः ॥

"निरुपद्रवभूतार्थस्वभावस्य विपर्ययैः ।
न बाधो ऽयत्नवत्वे ऽपि बुद्धेस्तत्पक्षपाततः" इति ॥

ज्ञानस्वरूपमुक्तम्—"नास्मि, न मे, नाहम्" इति । 'नास्मि' इत्यात्मनि क्रियामात्रन्निषेधति । यथाहुः 'कृभ्वस्तयः क्रियासामान्यवचनाः' इति [सिद्धान्तकौमुदी.] । तथा चाध्यवसायाभिमानसङ्कल्पालोचनानि चान्तराणि बाह्याश्च सर्वे व्यापारा आत्मनि प्रतिबद्धानि बोद्धव्यानि । यतश्चात्मनि व्यापारावेशो नास्त्यतो 'नाहम्' । अहमिति कर्तृपदम्, 'अहञ्जानाम्यहं जुहोम्यहन्ददे' इति सर्वत्र कर्तुः परामर्शात् । निष्क्रियत्वे च सर्वत्र कर्तृत्वाभावः । ततः सुष्ठूक्तम्—"नाहम्" इति । अत एव "न मे" । कर्ता हि स्वामितां लभते, तस्मात् कुतः स्वाभाविकी स्वामितेत्यर्थः । अथवा "नास्मि" इति "पुरुषो ऽस्मि, न प्रसवधर्मा" । अप्रसवधर्मित्वाच्चाकर्तृत्वमाह—"नाहम्" इति । अकर्तृत्वाच्च न स्वामितेत्यत आह—"न मे" इति ॥

(२६७) तत्त्वज्ञानस्वरूपप्रदर्शनम्—सर्वविधाहङ्कारनिवृत्तिः ॥

ननु 'एतावत्सु ज्ञातेष्वपि कश्चित् कदाचिदज्ञातो विषयो ऽस्ति, तदज्ञानञ्जन्तून् बन्धयिष्यति' इत्यत आह—"अपरिशेषम्" इति । नास्ति किञ्चिदस्मिन् परिशिष्टम् ज्ञातव्यम् यदज्ञानं बन्धयिष्यतीत्यर्थः ॥ ६४ ॥

(२६८) तत्त्वज्ञानस्यापरिशेषत्वम् ॥

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(२६९) तत्त्वसाक्षात्कारफलम् ॥

किं पुनरीदृशेन तत्त्वसाक्षात्कारेण सिध्यतीत्यत आह—

तेन निवृत्तप्रसवामर्थवशात् सप्तरूपविनिवृत्ताम् ।
प्रकृतिम् पश्यति पुरुषः प्रेक्षकवदवस्थितः स्वच्छः[1] ॥ ६५ ॥ pure.

"तेन" इति । भोगविवेकसाक्षात्कारौ हि प्रकृतेः प्रसोतव्यौ । तौ

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quiet १ "सुस्थ" इति पाठान्तरम् ।

च प्रसूताविति नास्याः प्रसोतव्यमवशिष्यत इति निवृत्तप्रसवा प्रकृतिः । विवेकज्ञानरूपो यो ऽर्थस्तस्य वशः सामर्थ्यम् तस्मात् । अतत्त्वज्ञानपूर्वकाणि खलु धर्माधर्माज्ञानवैराग्यावैराग्यैश्वर्यानैश्वर्याणि । वैराग्यमपि केवलतौष्टिकानामतत्त्वज्ञानपूर्वकमेव । तत्र तत्त्वज्ञानं विरोधित्वेनातत्त्वज्ञानमुच्छिनत्ति । कारणनिवृत्त्या च सप्तरूपाणि निवर्तन्त इति "सप्तरूपविनिवृत्ता प्रकृतिः" । "अवस्थित" इति निष्क्रियः, "स्वच्छः" इति रजस्तमोवृत्तिकलुषया बुद्ध्या ऽसम्भिन्नः । सात्त्विक्या तु बुद्ध्या तदा ऽप्यस्य मनाक् सम्भेदो ऽस्त्येव, अन्यथैवम्भूतप्रकृतिदर्शनानुपपत्तेरिति ॥ ६९ ॥

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(२७०) एकविषयमपेक्ष्य निवृत्ताया अपि प्रकृतेर्विषयान्तरं प्रति प्रवृत्तिशङ्का ॥

स्यादेतत्—'निवृत्तप्रसवामिति न मृष्यामहे । संयोगकृतो हि सर्ग इत्युक्तम्, योग्यता च संयोगः, भोक्तृत्वयोग्यता च पुरुषस्य चैतन्यम्, भोग्यत्वयोग्यता च प्रकृतेर्जडत्वम् विषयत्वञ्च । न चैतयोरस्ति निवृत्तिः । न च करणीयाभावान्निवृत्तिः, तज्जातीयस्यान्यस्य करणीयत्वात् पुनः पुनः शब्दाद्युपभोगवत्'—इत्यत आह—

दृष्टा मयेत्युपेक्षक एको, दृष्टा ऽहमित्युपरमत्यन्या ।
सति संयोगे ऽपि तयोः प्रयोजनन्नास्ति सर्गस्य ॥ ६६ ॥

(२७१) तन्निरासः ॥

"दृष्टा" इति । करोतु नाम पौनःपुन्येन शब्दाद्युपभोगम्प्रकृतिर्यया विवेकख्यातिर्न कृता, कृतविवेकख्यातिस्तु शब्दाद्युपभोगान्न जनयति । अविवेकख्यातिनिबन्धनो हि तदुपभोगो, निबन्धनाभावे न तद्भवितुमर्हति, अङ्कुर इव बीजाभावे । प्राकृतान् हि सुखदुःखमोहात्मनः शब्दादींस्तदविवेकात् 'ममैतत्' इत्यभिमन्यमना आत्मा भुञ्जीत । एवं विवेकख्यातिमपि प्राकृतीमविवेकादेवात्मा 'मदर्थेयम्' इति मन्यते ।

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२ "सुस्थः" इति पाठान्तरम् ।

उत्पन्नविवेकख्यातिस्तु तदसंसर्गाच्छब्दादीन्नोपभोक्तुमर्हति नापि विवेकख्यातिम्प्राकृतीमपि कर्तुम् । ततो विविक्त आत्मा न स्वार्थमभिमन्तुमर्हति । पुरुषार्थौ च भोगविवेकौ प्रकृत्यारम्भप्रयोजकाविति पुरुषार्थौ सन्तौ न प्रकृतिं प्रयोजयतः । तदिदमुक्तम्—“प्रयोजनन्नास्ति सर्गस्य” इति । अथ प्रयुज्यते सर्गे प्रकृतिरनेनेति प्रयोजनम्, तदपुरुषार्थे नास्तीत्यर्थः ॥ ६६ ॥

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(२७२) विविक्तस्यात्मनो देहपातात्प्रकृतिदर्शनासम्भवशङ्का ॥

स्यादेतत्—“उत्पन्नतत्त्वसाक्षात्कारश्चेत्तदनन्तरमेव मुक्तस्य तस्य देहपातः स्यादिति कथमदेहः प्रकृतिम्पश्येत् । अथ तत्त्वज्ञाने ऽपि न मुच्यते कर्मणामप्रक्षीणत्वात्? तेषां कुतः प्रक्षयः? ‘भोगात्’ इति चेत्, हन्त भोस्तत्त्वज्ञानन्न मोक्षसाधनम्—इति ‘व्यक्ताव्यक्तविज्ञानजन्मना तत्त्वज्ञानेनापवर्ग’ इति रिक्तम्वचः । ‘भोगेन चापरिसंख्येयः कर्माशयप्रचयो ऽनियतविपाककालः क्षेतव्यः, ततश्चापवर्गप्राप्तिः’ इत्यपि मनोरथमात्रम्” इत्यत आह—

सम्यग्ज्ञानाधिगमात् धर्मादीनामकारणप्राप्तौ ।
तिष्ठति संस्कारवशात्, चक्रभ्रमिवद्धृतशरीरः ॥ ६७ ॥

(२७३) तन्निरासः—विविक्तस्यापि संस्कारवशाच्छररिधाणरम् ॥

“सम्यक्” इति । तत्त्वसाक्षात्कारोदयादेवानादिरप्यनियतविपाककालो ऽपि कर्माशयप्रचयो दग्धबीजभावतया न जात्यायुर्भोगलक्षणाय फलाय कल्पते । क्लेशसलिलावसिक्तायां हि बुद्धिभूमौ कर्मबीजान्यङ्कुरं प्रसुवते । तत्त्वज्ञाननिदाघनिपीतसकलक्लेशसलिलायामूषरायां कुतः कर्मबीजानामङ्कुरप्रसवः? तदिदमुक्तम्—“धर्मादीनामकारणप्राप्तौ” इति, अकारणत्वप्राप्तावित्यर्थः । उत्पन्नतत्त्वज्ञानो ऽपि च संस्कारवशात् तिष्ठति, यथो-

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१ उत्पन्नविवेकख्यातिः ।

परते ऽपि कुलालव्यापारे चक्रं वेगाख्यसंस्कारवशात् भ्रमत् तिष्ठति। कालपरिपाकवशात्तूपरते संस्कारे निष्क्रियम्भवति। शरीरस्थितौ च प्रारब्धपरिपाकौ धर्माधर्मौ संस्कारौ। तथा चानुश्रूयते—"भोगेन त्वितरे क्षपयित्वा ऽथ सम्पद्यते" इति "तस्य तावदेव चिरं यावन्न विमोक्ष्ये ऽथ सम्पत्स्ये" इति च [छान्दोग्य-६।१४।२]। प्रक्षीयमाणाविद्यासंस्कारावशेषश्च संस्कारस्तद्वशात् तत्सामर्थ्यात् धृतशरीरस्तिष्ठति ॥ ६७ ॥

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(२७४) शरीरनाशे ऐकान्तिकात्यन्तिकमुक्तिः॥

स्यादेतत्—"यदि संस्कारशेषादपि धृतशरीरस्तथा ऽपि कदा ऽस्य मोक्षो भविष्यति?" इत्यत आह—

प्राप्ते शरीरभेदे चरितार्थत्वात् प्रधानविनिवृत्तौ।
ऐकान्तिकमात्यन्तिकमुभयं कैवल्यमाप्नोति ॥ ६८ ॥

"प्राप्ते" इति। अनारब्धविपाकानान्तावत् कर्माशयानां तत्त्वज्ञानाग्निना बीजभावो दग्धः। प्रारब्धविपाकानान्तूपभोगेन क्षये सति, "प्राप्ते शरीरभेदे" इति=विनाशे—"चरितार्थत्वात्" इति=कृतप्रयोजनत्वात्। प्रधानस्य तम्पुरुषम्प्रति विनिवृत्तौ—"ऐकान्तिकम्"=अवश्यम्भावि "आत्यन्तिकम्"=अविनाशि—इत्युभयं "कैवल्यम्" दुःखत्रयविगमम्प्राप्नोति पुरुषः ॥ ६८ ॥

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(२७५) सांख्यशास्त्रस्य परमर्षिप्रणीतत्वम्॥

प्रमाणेनोपपादिते ऽप्यत्यन्तश्रद्धोत्पादनाय परमर्षिपूर्वकत्वमाह—

पुरुषार्थज्ञानमिदं गुह्यम्परमर्षिणा समाख्यातम्।
स्थित्युत्पत्तिप्रलयाश्चिन्त्यन्ते यत्र भूतानाम् ॥ ६९ ॥

"पुरुष" इति। "गुह्यम्" गुहानिवासि, स्थूलधियां दुर्बोधमिति यावत्। "परमर्षिणा" कपिलेन, तामेव श्रद्धामागमिकत्वेन द्रढयति—"स्थित्युत्पत्तिप्रलयाश्चिन्त्यन्ते यत्र भूतानाम्" इति। 'यत्र' ज्ञाने=यदर्थम्,—

यथा 'चर्मणि द्वीपिनं हन्ति' इति । "भूतानाम्"=प्राणिनां "स्थित्युत्पत्तिप्रलयाः" आगमैः "चिन्त्यन्ते" ॥ ६९ ॥

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(२७६) सांख्यशास्त्रस्य गुरुशिष्यपरम्परा कपिलादारभ्य पञ्चशिखपर्यंतम् ॥

स्यादेतत्—"यत् परमर्षिणा साक्षात्कथितम् तच्छ्रद्दधीमहि, यत्पुनरीश्वरकृष्णेन कथितम् तत्र कुतः श्रद्धा?"—इत्यत आह—

एतत् पवित्रमग्र्यं मुनिरासुरयेऽनुकम्पया प्रददौ ।
आसुरिरपि पञ्चशिखाय, तेन च बहुधा कृतन्तन्त्रम् ॥ ७० ॥

"एतत्" इति । "एतत् पवित्रम्"=पावनम्—दुःखत्रयहेतोः पाप्मनः पुनातीति—"अग्र्यम्"=सर्वेभ्यः पवित्रेभ्यो मुख्यम्, "मुनिः" कपिलः "आसुरये ऽनुकम्पया प्रददौ, आसुरिरपि पञ्चशिखाय, तेन च बहुधा कृतं तन्त्रम्" ॥ ७० ॥

शिष्यपरम्परया ऽऽगतमीश्वरकृष्णेन चैतदार्याभिः ॥
संक्षिप्तमार्यमतिना सम्यग्विज्ञाय सिद्धान्तम् ॥ ७१ ॥

(२७७) ईश्वरकृष्णस्य गुरुशिष्यपरम्परा ॥

"शिष्य" इति । आरात् याता तत्त्वेभ्य इत्यार्या, आर्यामतिर्यस्य सो ऽयम् "आर्यमतिः" इति ॥ ७१ ॥

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(२७८) सप्ततिकारिकाणां शास्त्रत्वम् ॥

एतच्च शास्त्रम्, सकलशास्त्रार्थसूचकत्वात्, न तु प्रकरणमित्याह—

सप्तत्यां किल ये ऽर्थास्ते ऽर्थाः कृत्स्नस्य षष्टितन्त्रस्य ।
आख्यायिकाविरहिताः परवादविवर्जिताश्चापि ॥ ७२ ॥

"सप्तत्याम्" इति । तथा च राजवार्तिकम् ॥

"प्रधानास्तित्वमेकत्वमर्थवत्त्वमथान्यता ।
पारार्थ्यं च तथा ऽनैक्यं वियोगो योग एव च ॥

शेषवृत्तिरकर्तृत्वं मौलिकार्थाः स्मृता दश ।
विपर्ययः पञ्चविधस्तथोक्ता नव तुष्टयः ॥
करणानामसामर्थ्यमष्टाविंशतिधा मतम् ।
इति षष्टिः पदार्थानामष्टभिः सह सिद्धिभिः" ॥ इति ॥

सेयं षष्टिपदार्थी कथितेति सकलशास्त्रार्थकथनान्नेदम्प्रकरणमपि तु शास्त्रमेवेदमिति सिद्धम् । एकत्वमर्थवत्त्वम् पारार्थ्यञ्च प्रधानमधिकृत्योक्तम् । अन्यत्वमकर्तृत्वम् बहुत्वञ्चेति पुरुषमधिकृत्य । अस्तित्वम् वियोगो योगश्चेत्युभयमधिकृत्य । वृत्तिः स्थितिरिति स्थूलसूक्ष्ममधिकृत्य ॥ ७२ ॥

मनांसि कुमुदानीव बोधयन्ती सतां सदा ।
श्रीवाचस्पतिमिश्राणां कृतिः स्तात् तत्त्वकौमुदी ॥

इत्यखिलतन्त्रापरतन्त्रप्रतिभद्वादशदर्शनटीकाकृच्छ्रीमद्वाचस्पतिमिश्रकृता सांख्यतत्त्वकौमुदी ॥

समाप्तो ऽयं ग्रन्थः

अथ कारिकाणां सूची.

(अकारादिक्रमेण.)

अक्षरक्रमेण विषयसूची.

अशुद्धिपत्रम्.

पृष्ठे.	पंक्तौ.	अशुद्धम्.	शुद्धम्.
४	१९	[बृहदारण्यक] ...	[बृहदारण्यक २।४।५]
४	२०	[छान्दोग्य] ...	[छान्दोग्य ८।१५]
६	२४	°व्यक्तयो	°व्यक्तयोः
६	२५	°क्रेमण	°क्रमेण
११	२२	लिङ्ग	लिङ्ग
११	२३	लिङ्ग	लिङ्ग
१२	२	°रव्यातम्	°ख्यातम्
१४	१८	°नुग्गाख्यव°	°नुमानाख्यव°
१५	२१	क्वचित्पदेऽतर्भा° ...	क्वचित्पदेऽन्तर्भा°
१९	१०	सारुप्य°	सारूप्य°
२२	१२	°स्ततूना	°स्तन्तूनां
२३	२	°सवन्ध°	°सम्बन्ध°
२४	२६	साधायी°	साधीया°
२४	२६	कुचित्	केचित्
२९	(१००) २	°सख्यं	°संख्यं
२९	(१००) ३	°वृतिति°	°वृत्तिनि°
२९	(१०१) ३	°न्योन्वापे° ...	°न्योन्यापे°
३२	२५	क्श्चि°	कश्चि°
३५	४	परिमितत्वत् ...	परिमितत्वात्
३८	२४	°म्बधो	म्बन्धो
४३	(१४३) १	वु°	बु
४५	१४	सतामसः	स तामसः
४६	१८	अलो°	आलो°
४८	(१६०) ३	°मेसाधर	मेवासाधार
४८	२२	°कपदअप° ...	°कपदेऽप
४९	३	परोऽक्षे	परोक्षे
५४	(१८०) १	(१८०)	(१८१)
५४	(१८३) ३	स्यात्रे	स्यात्र

पृष्ठे.	पंक्तौ.	अशुद्धम्.		शुद्धम्.
५९	२२	चेष्ठितम्	...	चेष्टितम्
६२	(२१०) २	°दर्यस्य ...	...	°पर्ययस्य.
६४	१९	°परिणाभेद°	...	°परिणामभेद°
६५	१	माभूत्स्° ...	...	मा भूत्स°
६५	६	सद्योनि° ...	...	सद्यो नि°
६५	७	सिाद्ध° ...	...	सिद्धि°
७०	१६	सर्वः ...	...	सर्गः
७०	१८	भूलोक° ...	...	भूर्लोक°
७१	१४	कथ्यते लिङ्गम्	...	कथ्यते, लिङ्गम्
७१	२१	अकरणत्वे	...	अकारणत्वे
७२	(२५५)	(२५५)...	...	(२५५ अ)
७५	१३	चेति। ...	...	चेति,
७८	३	°श्वर्यनैश्व°	...	°श्वर्यानैश्व°
७८	१९	°भोगान्न...	...	°भोगन्न
७८	२१	°विवका...	...	°विवेका
७८	२१	°न्यमना...	...	°न्यमान°
८२	८	ुभय° ...	...	त्वुभय°